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Abstract 
The primary aIm of this study is to investigate the role that is played by the quality of 
infrastructure on export participation and on foreign direct investment using firm level data from 
the World Bank and employing maximum likelihood techniques such as the Tobit and Probit 
models. Results show that firm size, foreign ownership, internet access, international distance, 
electricity, customs and generator ownership matter in influencing export participation. Thus the 
reason why very few firms in Africa are outward oriented is partly because of poor market access 
and poor electricity and customs infrastructure. Ln the case of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
results show that foreign firms are attracted to a market, bigger in size and that market access is 
also very important. FDI results also show that a big market in an environment characterized by 
acute power problems negatively affects market seeking FDI. Customs problems generally have 
a weak negative effect on the probability to be foreign invested particularly inward FDI, but days 
to export matter to outward looking foreign producers. Water problems do not seem to matter for 
both FDI firms and exporters in this study. In light of these findings, there is need therefore for 
the government in collaboration with multilateral institutions like the World Bank, United 
Nations and other donor agencies to mobilise resources to improve Africa ' s infrastructure 
facilities particularly customs, power and international transport facilities . This could also be 
done by involving the private sector through various Public Private Partnership arrangements. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the study 
A number of studies have emphasized the important role exports and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) play in promoting growth and development (see Darrat, 1987; Balassa, 1978; Frankel and 
Romer, 1999; Lipsey, 2002; Alfaro et ai, 2004; Aitken et al,1999 etc). The World Bank (1993) 
summed up the benefits of outward orientation by arguing that, export expansion generates 
greater capacity utilization, enables firms to take advantage of economies of scale, brings about 
technological progress, improves allocation of scarce resources and increases labor productivity. 
Advocates of export led growth strategy (Balassa, 1980; Bhagwati, 1978; Darrat, 1987; Edwards, 
1998; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) pointed out that, not only are exports highly correlated 
with growth but the former unidirectionally causes the latter. The unprecedented rate of growth 
and rapid industrialization that was achieved by some Asian countries (dubbed the Asian tigers) 
between the 1960s and the 1990s through export promotion provided more support to the export 
led growth strategies (Wood et al 1997). This strong relationship between exports and growth 
resulted in export oriented policies being prescribed to developing countries as the appropriate 
development strategy. 
In the same way that exporting is good for growth, foreign direct investment also has the 
potential to generate employment, raise productivity, transfer skills and technology, enhance 
exports as well as contribute to the long-term economic growth of the world's developing nations 
(Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Romer, 1993; Carkovic and Levine, 2004). Whilst firm level studies 
generally, though not uniformly show no strong evidence between FOI and growth 1, there is 
general consensus in the empirical macroeconomic literature that promoting foreign investment 
is good for growth (Borensztein et al 1998; Carkovic and Levine 2002; Hausman and Fernandez 
2002 etc). Thus as much as it is important for governments to pursue export led growth 
strategies, there is also a similar need for countries to leverage FDI for development. Exports and 
FDI have the advantage of not only accelerating growth and development but also fostering 
1 See Haddard and Hanson, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Blomstrom 1986; Villegas and Sanchez,2009. 
1 
strong economIc links between industrialized nations and developing countries (UNCTAD, 
2007). 
Although exports and FDI are important in promoting growth and economic integration, the 
performance of these economic variables in Africa has been relatively poor in comparison with 
other developing regions. This could partly explain why the growth of the African continent has 
been sluggish over the years. Thus between 1960 and 2008, a meager average growth rate of 3% 
per annum was recorded compared to 7.1 % for East Asia and Pacific and 3.9% for Latin 
America (WDI, 2008f These World Bank statistics also show that for the same period, per 
capita gross domestic product for Sub Saharan Africa also grew at an average rate of 0.7% 
compared to 1.9% and 5.5% for Latin America as well as East Asia and the Pacific respectively. 
This poor economic growth in the continent appears to be closely linked with poor export 
performance as well as poor inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). In fact, according to 
UNCT AD (2007), the African continent's annual share of global FDI of about 3% converges to 
the region's shares in world exports and world output. The poor performance of exports and low 
foreign direct investment inflows are of concern to the continent, since these are the most 
important conduits through which growth, employment creation, poverty reduction as well as 
globalization of the international economy can be encouraged (Dollar et aI, 2004). 
A number of researchers amongst them Hummels (2007), Limao and Venables (2001), Buys 
(2006), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Srinivasan (1998), Morrisset (2000), Asiedu (2005) have 
debated for a long time on the factors that could explain low investment and exporting levels in 
Africa. Asiedu (2005); Hummels (2006); Limao and Venables (2001); Elbadawi et al (2007); 
Buys (2006) argued that this missing trade and investment could be a result of poor institutions, 
inadequate infrastructure and adverse economic geography. 
2 The growth rates between 2001 -2008 were: East Asia and Pacific 8.9%: Europe and Central Asia 5.75%: Latin America 3.6%: 
South Asia .112% and SSA 4.9% (WDJ, 2009). 
2 
Inadequate infrastructure3 is thus a major obstacle to trade promotion in that it adversely affects 
the ability of local producers to compete in international markets as they are displaced by 
relatively efficient low cost suppliers from other regions (Wheeler and Mody, 1992). Thus 
infrastructural services poses costs on trade within and between countries and if the quality is 
poor, then a large portion of goods produced and traded will not be consumed by the national and 
foreign purchasers (Martin et aI, 1995). By affecting the production and consumption conditions 
of any economy, infrastructure has an impact on exports. Khadaroo and Seenatah, (2007) also 
argue that the quality of developing countries' infrastructure and institutions plays a role in 
attracting FDI. They argue that this is mostly because multinationals are profit-oriented entities 
that seek to minimize the costs of doing business and if moving to a developing economy to take 
advantage of lower labour costs means losing patent protection to imitators, making informal 
payments (bribes) to get things done, incur higher transport costs due to inadequate 
transportation and missed supply shipments due to communication problems, then they will not 
choose to do business there. 
In explaining the actual role that infrastructure plays in facilitating trade and FDI, Kessides 
(1993), argued that the quality and availability of infrastructure facilities like transport, water, 
telecommunication and power is important in enhancing the marginal productivity of factors of 
production like capital and labour. She went on to argue that infrastructure services are 
intermediate inputs and any reduction in their cost raises the profitability of production, thus 
resulting in higher levels of output, income and employment. By permitting the transition from 
manual to electrical machinery, reducing workers' commuting time, and improving information 
flows through electronic data exchanges, infrastructure services raise the productivity of factors 
of production like labour and capital and this improves the competitiveness of exports as well as 
promotes foreign investment (Kessides, 1993). Therefore, as a result of this spill over effect, 
infrastructure is often described as an "unpaid factor of production", since its availability and 
quality leads to higher returns obtainable for other factor inputs (Kessides, 1993). 
3 We define Infrastructure as the basic physical and organizational structures needed for the operation of enterprises, or the 
services and facilities necessary for an economy to function, This includes water and power systems, roads, telecommunication 
facilities, and customs systems (soft infrastructure). 
3 
Kessides (1993) also went on to argue that consumption of infrastructure services by households 
also contributes indirectly to productivity because many of these services, notably clean water 
and sanitation, are essential for health and create environmental amenities which improve the 
productivity of labour. Therefore the reductions in the cost and improvements in infrastructure 
services to households can have the beneficial effects of increasing their real income and 
consumption as well as reducing the cost of labour through productivity. 
It is worth emphasizing that all of the above contributions of infrastructure to productivity, trade 
and FDI, derive not from the mere existence or creation of the physical facilities but from their 
operation and the value of the services generated (Asiedu, 2005; Kessides, 1993). This basically 
implies that reliability and accessibility of infrastructure services is more important than their 
physical availability. This partly explains why in this study we analyse the impact of 
infrastructure services by looking at quality indicators such as the number of hours or days firms 
go without power, water and a telephone connection. 
1.2 Motivation of the study 
The impact of infrastructure on export performance and foreign direct investment has been 
analysed largely at macro level using a variety of econometric models such as static and dynamic 
panel data models, spatial econometrics as well as bilateral trade flow or gravity models (see 
Limao and Venables, 2001; Buys, 2006; Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Elbadawi et aI, 2007 
Francois and Manchin, 2007 etc). The problem with these country level studies is that there are 
not that many countries in the world on which there is good enough macro data on social 
infrastructure to derive robust statistical results4 . The other problem is that country level data 
assumes that the quality of infrastructure is the same across locations within a country, when in 
fact they may be interesting variation based on local governance (Dollar et aI, 2004). A further 
problem with developing country level data, especially with respect to infrastructure, is that there 
is very little variation over time to justify panel analysis. The calculated indicators like the 
number of paved roads, telephone density, electricity production and consumption do not say 
4 See Levine and Renelt (I 992); Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000); Dollar and Kray (2003); Blonigen (2005) 
4 
much about the quality of services derived from these infrastructure facilities. Poorly maintained 
and congested paved roads, telecommunication networks breakdowns as well as power outages 
affect service quality and are not clearly discernible from these generally used indicators. As 
argued by Asiedu (2005), it is not physical availability of infrastructure but reliability and 
accessibility that affect exporter and investor behaviour. 
The other issue of concern raised by Elbadawi et al (2007) is that macro econometric modelling 
of the determinants of foreign direct investment and export performance in Africa is also fraught 
with both conceptual and econometric problems. Thus there is lack of a theoretic foundation of 
the relationship between these integration variables and economy wide macro indicators of 
geography and infrastructure5. There is therefore need to explicitly model the mechanisms 
through which they affect foreign direct investment and exporting at firm level. 
Elbadawi et al (2007) went on to argue that econometric modeling of the macro level 
determinants of African manufactured exports also suffers from endogeneity problems with 
respect to infrastructure and some aspects of economic geography. This could be because 
measures of infrastructural quality may be subject to "halo effects", meaning that countries may 
have good infrastructure because they are rich (Dollar and Kray, 2002). Thus high levels of FDI 
and exports increase growth which may also consequently lead to an improvement in the quality 
of infrastructure in a country. By shifting attention to firm level analysis, we may possibly 
reduce this kind of bias as firms can be assumed to take infrastructural settings as given. Micro 
level analysis can also help in identifying the types of infrastructure that matter most to exporting 
and FDI firms. The identification of these effects is important in formulating infrastructure -
specific trade and investment related industrial policy measures. 
In short, this study is a departure from the standard approach in the literature in that, we use a 
number of infrastructure quality indicators measured at firm level (water, electricity, 
telecommunication, customs and transport). The comprehensive firm level analysis of the impact 
of infrastructure on trade and FDI in Africa done in this study sets it apart from other firm level 
5 Infrastructure related trade costs have an effect primarily on the behaviour of finns and it therefore makes sense to analyse these 
costs at finn level rather than at macro level. 
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studies in the literature.6 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
The main objective of this study is to offer a micro-econometric assessment of the influence of 
external factors like infrastructure (transport, electricity, telecommunication, water and customs) 
as well as geography on economic integration variables like exports and foreign direct 
investment using firm level data obtainable from the World Bank's investment climate surveys. 
The specific objectives include: 
• Use of binary choice models like the Probit as well as the linear probability model (LPM) 
to examine the impact of infrastructure quality on export participation. 
• We will also alternatively examine whether these infrastructure variables have an effect 
on the amount exported (export intensity) by using a censored regression model such as 
the Tobit as well as the two stage least squares (2SLS). Despite the shortcomings of the 
2SLS and LPM, we use them here to check for the robustness of our results. 7 The use of 
these models is to help in identifying whether infrastructure quality has an effect on the 
amount exported, affect the likelihood of entering export markets or both. 
• We will also supplement our analysis of infrastructure and exports with a brief 
examination of the impact of these supply side variables on market diversification. Thus 
does poor infrastructure constrain firms from diversifying their export markets and hence 
increase export intensity? 
The use of the Tobit and Probit models in this study is important because exports can be 
increased by either increasing the number of firms in the export sector (export participation rate) 
and or helping existing exporters increase the amount of output exported (export intensity). So 
this study will help us identity which types of infrastructure variables are important in 
encouraging export participation and which ones are important for export intensity. 
6 Other related studies are by Yoshino (2008) only looked at customs and power; Clarke (2004) looked at transport whilst 
Elbadawi et al (2007) only concentrated on institutions. Dollar et al 2004 looked at these indicators using a non African sample 
composed of Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Honduras, India, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Peru. 
7 The problem with LPM is that of non constant variance resulting in biased standard errors and incorrect hypothesis tests. It can 
also create predicted probabilities that are not bounded by zero and one. 2SLS give biased results when using censored data. 
6 
• We also use the Probit and Linear Probability models to determine whether the quality of 
infrastructure in the selected countries affect the likelihood of being foreign invested. We 
interrogate this theme further by differentiating between inward oriented and outward 
oriented foreign investment. 
• We supplement our analysis of FDI by estimating models with different levels of foreign 
equity participation. We looked at models with 10% - 49%; 50%-100% and 100% 
foreign equity acquired in each firm. This will help us ascertain whether the impact of 
control variables on FDI is generic or it varies with the ownership structure in the firm. 
1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter gives an introduction and background to the 
whole study whilst chapter 2 provides a descriptive and comparative analysis of the quality of 
infrastructure in different developing regions as well as in the selected study countries of South 
Africa, Tanzania, Mauritius, Uganda and Zambia. Chapter 3 looks at the impact of infrastructure 
quality on manufactured exports whilst Chapter 4 relates the quality of infrastructure to the 
probability of being foreign invested in the manufacturing sector. Lastly, chapter 5 presents 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.0 INFRASTRUCTURE PROFILES OF SUB SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
2.1 Introduction 
The availability and reliability of infrastructure is crucial in facilitating foreign investment, trade 
and development. Thus efficient transport infrastructure facilities (roads, railways, airports, 
seaports etc) and services provided by telecommunication networks are important in moving 
goods and services timeously from exporting to importing countries whilst electricity and water 
are essential for production. Limao and Venables (2001), also argue that remoteness and poor 
transport and telecommunications infrastructure isolate countries, thereby inhibiting their 
participation in global production. However despite the important role played by infrastructure, 
the current provision of infrastructural services in Africa is still far below the requirements of the 
African people as well as in comparison with other developing regions in Asia and Latin 
America (Oshikoya et aI, 2001). Limao and Venables (2001); Wood and Mayer (2001) also 
found that poor infrastructure facilities in most of Africa account for poor trade performance. 
Estache et al (2005) also argued that if Africa had enjoyed Korea's quantity and quality of 
infrastructure it would have raised its annual growth per capita by about 1 %. This argument was 
also supported by Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) who found that Sub Saharan Africa's poor 
growth is in part related to underinvestments in electricity and telecommunications 
infrastructure. HuIten (1996) also added that differences in the effective use of infrastructure 
resources explain one quarter of the growth differential between Africa and East Asia, and more 
than 40% of the growth differential between low and high income growth countries. 
To elaborate on the above statements, this chapter provides stylised facts on the state of different 
types of infrastructure facilities in Sub Saharan Africa particularly in the selected study countries 
using both country8 and firm level data obtainable mostly from the World Bank through its 
World Development Indicators, Doing Business reports and Investment climate surveys. After 
discussing the stylised facts, we then examine in chapter 3 and 4 whether the state of 
8 The problem with country level infrastructure data is that there are so many missing data points in a number of African 
countries. 
8 
infrastructure has an important role to play in influencing the probability to export or In 
attracting FDI in the manufacturing sector. 
2.2 Transport infrastructure 
Transport infrastructure is important in facilitating the movement of goods within and across 
national borders thus making it easy for suppliers to satisfy their customers' demands. If the 
quality of transport infrastructure is poor, then a large portion of goods produced and traded will 
not be consumed by the national and foreign purchasers (Martin et aI, 1995). 
Road infrastructure in Africa is poorly developed, mostly due to the lack of investment and civil 
wars. Thus WDI, (2009) statistics show that the average amount invested in the transport sector 
including that by the private sector between 2000 and 2008 by Sub Saharan Africa was far much 
lower than in other developing regions. For SSA excluding Nigeria and South Africa it was 
US$357 million (US$I, 138 million for the whole of SSA) compared to US4,445 million by Latin 
America and the Caribbean, US$4,702 million by East Asia and the Pacific, US$622 million by 
Middle East and North Africa and US$2,290 million by South Asia. These statistics suggest that 
a large portion of investment in the transport sector in Africa is in Nigeria and South Africa. 
These low levels of investment in the transport sectors happen despite the fact that road transport 
is the primary mode of moving goods and people in the African continent accounting for 80% of 
the goods traffic and 90% of the passenger traffic (UNECA, 2009). The data available for year 
2005, show that the continent had approximately 353 OOOkm of paved and unpaved roads with 
most of them in poor condition (WDI, 2007). The average road to population ratio for the whole 
continent is 26 km per 10 000 inhabitants and there is a large sub regional variation (UNECA, 
2009). Thus the Commission for Africa 2009 report on transport show that Central Africa and 
Southern Africa have the highest road distribution with 49.5km and 56.3km respectively for 
every 10 000 population. These statistics also show that Poland (a country approximately the size 
of Zimbabwe) which is 97 times smaller in surface area than Africa as a whole has a road 
network that is 1.2 times larger than that of the 53 countries that form the continene. WDI, 
(2007) statistics also show that by 2002, 19% of roads were paved in the whole of Africa, 12.9% 
9 Poland has about 423 997km of roads (2000-2005) compared to 353 OOOkm in Africa (2005) 
9 
in SSA, and 66% in North Africa. However, by the same period 25% of the roads were paved in 
East Asia, 37% in South Asia and 27% in Latin America (see Fig 2.1 below). 
According to the UNECA, 2009 report, most African countries face huge costs associated with 
transportation. The report states that, in accessing foreign markets, on average, Africa ' s transport 
and insurance costs represents 30 percent of the total value of exports which compares 
unfavourably with 8.6 percent for all other developing countries. These costs are excessive when 
it comes to landlocked countries confirming Limao and Venables (2001) finding, that being 
landlocked raises transport costs by 50 percent and improving infrastructure of the landlocked 
economy from the median to the 25 th percentile reduces this disadvantage by 12 percentage 
points. They also argued that this benefit is even higher if transit infrastructure is improved. 
Fig 2.1 : Average percentage of paved roads per region 
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In 2005, the country with the highest number of good and paved roads was Mauritius (96%) and 
the least connected was Chad at 0.8% (see table A2.1 appendix). Another disturbing thing about 
road infrastructure in Africa is that regional and national markets are not effectively linked 
because road density (km of roads/square km of land area) is on average 20 per square km, 
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compared to the world average of at least 80, 110 for South Asia and 22 for East Asia and Pacific 
as well as 18 for Latin America (see table 2.7 appendix). In addition to accessibility problems, 
many national roads in Africa are mainly concentrated in urban areas or around coastal ports and 
therefore do not support balanced economic development (Simuyemba, 2000). This result in 
some regions in a country being isolated thereby excluding or inhibiting them from benefiting 
and participating effectively in national economic activities. There are few regional road 
networks and most of them have some stretches that are not tarred and this could partly explain 
why intra country trade is very low, estimated to be at most 10% of Africa ' s total trade lO 
(Simuyemba, 2000, see Fig 2.2 below). 
Fig 2.2: Map of Trans-African Highways 
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10 The Sub Saharan Africa Transport Policy Programme (SSA TPP) is however proposing to develop a transcontinental network 
with four major road corridors linking major parts of Africa (Simuyemba, 2000). 
11 
Railways in Africa are no exception, they are disjointed , disconnected and are generally in a state 
of disrepair, often not serving their countries well (ADB, 2002, see Fig 2.3 below). The 
aggregate network of African railway is estimated at around 73000 route kilometres of which 
South Africa alone accounts for about 30% of the size (WOI, 2007). About 21 % of African 
countries have no railway systems ll (see fig 2.3 below). 
Fig 2.3: Map of Africa's Railways 
Africa's 
Railroads 
Source: Bullock, 2009 
- -
".....-, 
Most African lines are of light rail and unsuitable for fast or heavy traffic. All networks in Africa 
were built at the end of the 19th or beginning of the 20th century, often with different technical 
characteristics like gauges, couplings, brake systems, buffers etc (Oshikoya, 2001). The 1.067m 
11 These are Burundi. Central Africa Republic, Chad, Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Gambia, Guinea 
Bissau, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe and Libya (WDI , 2007). 
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gauge predominates particularly in East and Southern Africa, the 1.00m in West Africa whilst 
the 1.435m gauge accounts for 76.1 % of total kilometres in North Africa (Oshikoya, 200 I). 
Upgrading and connecting existing railway lines would involve major investments in 
realignment, resignalling, safety systems and rolling stock. However, according to the UNECA 
2009 report, railways in Africa generally have low traffic, carrying only one percent of the global 
railway passenger traffic and two percent of goods. 
The poor network of roads and railways infrastructure constrains the continent's efforts to 
promote productivity, growth and regional integration. Thus without adequate mobility and 
affordable access, Africa's poor will not only be unable to compete in the world markets but will 
also not benefit from the positive developments taking place in the global economy either 
through exports or foreign direct investment. 
Of the five African countries used for this study and by the year 2005, only Mauritius had a high 
proportion of its roads paved (100%) compared to 17% for South Africa, 23% for Zambia and 
Uganda (see table 2.1 below). Tanzania is the sample country with the least percentage of roads 
paved at about 9%. Available statistics also show that despite the fact that Tanzania has the 
lowest percentage of paved roads, however about 71 % of the roads in the country are in good 
condition followed by South Africa (65%), Zambia and Uganda have 52% and 29% respectively 
(WDI, 2009). Mauritius is also one of the many African countries with no railways and where 
transportation is mostly by road, sea and air. The other concern is: African countries are also 
relatively inaccessible. Looking at sampled countries, the problems of accessibility seem to be 
more acute in the coastal country of Tanzania and the landlocked country of Zambia where road 
density is comparably very low at 8.3 and 12.1 respectively (see Table 2.1, below). Rail density 
is low in most of these countries with South Africa and Uganda having an average of 0.3km per 
square km and the least internally connected being Tanzania with 0.08. 
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Table 2.1: Land trans ort infrastructure 
Country Total Total km %paved Total km Rail density Road density Railway 
of roads roads of rail (OOOsq km) perlOOsq km gauge 
S. Africa 364131 17 20872 1.71 29.9 1.067mm 
Mauritius 2030 202 I 100 0 0 99.6 
Tanzania 945 78891 9 3689 3.90 8.3 1.000mm 
Zambia 753 91440 22 2157 2.86 12.1 1.067mm 
Uganda 241 70746 23 1244 5.16 29.3 1.000mm 
Source: WDI , 2007 
Road transport in Uganda is by far the most dominant mode of transport in the country carrying 
well over 90% of passenger and freight traffic despite the fact that only 23% of the roads are 
paved and about 29% are in good condition (Uganda Road Fund report, 2008). The railways 
system is also very important for Uganda which is landlocked and far from the sea as it provides 
the most effective bulk haulage capacity for the country ' s exports of mostly coffee and imports 
of general goods and petroleum products. Thus according to the Uganda Road Fund report 
(2008), railways currently handle between 30- 40% of the total country ' s bulk cargo to and from 
the ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam. However, acute shortage of rolling stock and 
dilapidated infrastructure as well as closure of the northern and western lines is hampering 
Uganda ' s efforts of diverting heavy loads of cargo from the road networks thereby reducing road 
maintenance costs as well increasing the life span of its roads (Uganda Road Fund report, 2008). 
Although the setting up of Tanzania National Road Agency (T ANROADS) in 2000 has 
improved the quality of roads in the country, most of the paved highways are confmed to the 
north-eastern, central-eastern and south western regions of the country . Accord ing to the 
T ANROADS report, (2007), there are no paved roads linking the capital and the south-eastern, 
western, central and northern regions with most of the roads in these areas being dirt tracks with 
a few improved gravel sections. During rainy seasons these dirt roads are impassable and the 
only reliable surface connection from the east of the country towards Lake Tanganyika is by rail. 
Even though the percentage of paved roads is still low in South Africa, the country has a modern 
world class and well developed transport infrastructure. According to South African National 
Road Agency Ltd (SANRAL) the quality of roads have however been deteriorating in recent 
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years due to lack of investment on maintenance and increased road freight traffic and 
overloading. The OSEC (2009) report on infrastructure in South Africa, states that about 70% of 
South Africa's roads are in need of urgent repairs and this will cost about R65 billion. 
2.2.3 Sea and airport infrastructure 
Quality infrastructural investments particularly in air cargo is also a pre requisite for integrating 
world markets and building a sustainable and competitive high value added manufacturing 
sector. A country with relatively good quality airport infrastructural systems and hence low air 
transport costs may have a comparative advantage in time sensitive goods and those subject to 
uncertain demand (Hummels, 2001). According to the World Bank, (2003a), air transport is also 
becoming very important in developing countries, accounting for about 30% of export value. The 
products exported from Africa to mostly the United States by air mainly included precious 
stones, scientific instruments, clocks and watches (Amjadi and Yeats, 1995). 
Africa is also the smallest region of air services in the world, a feature that reflects its low 
income and lack of air transport infrastructure (Button, 2006). All countries have at least one 
international airport as well as several smaller ones but few of them are capable of handling large 
amounts of traffic. Less than 50% of the 5304 potential air links are actually operational or being 
actively exploited (WDI, 2007). According to UNECA (2009) report only about 117 of Africa's 
airports meet international Civil Aviation Organisation (lCAO) standards and recommended 
practices. Most airports in Africa lack modern equipment and are characterised by deteriorating 
runways, obsolete traffic control equipment as well as inadequate ancillary services like baggage 
handling, connecting surface transportation, air cargo, customs and migration (ADB, 2007). The 
quality of air infrastructure varies greatly across countries but generally high income OECD 
countries have seven times as many airports as with paved runways (of over 3,047metres long) 
than low income countries (World Trade Report, 2004). Although the African continent is 
composed of about 28% of the total number of countries in the world, the region accounts for 
only 12% of the total number of airports in the world 12. In our sample the number of quality 
airports (measured in terms of paved runways of over 3,047m) is higher in South Africa with 
12 There are about 53 countries in Africa out of about 195 countries in the world. The total nurn ber of airports in the world is 43 
867 using 2008 World Fact book figures and of these 5304 are in Africa. 
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about. 1 0 compared to Zambia with only one. The other countries have on average two airports 
with big run ways of size 3,042m2 (see Table 2.2). Zambia is also one landlocked country in our 
sample that is located further away from the nearest sea port, implying that transit transport 
infrastructure services (road and air) are very important for the country. 
The other notable thing is that the share of air freight cargo in world total handled by the 84 
African cargo airports between 2001 and 2005 was far much lower compared to other continents. 
This share was 1.3% for Africa, 9.9% for Asia, 3.8% for Latin America and 19% for the 
European Monetary Union (WDI, 2003-2007). This shows that air transport is not widely used in 
Africa probably due to relatively high air freight costs which could be a result of poor airport 
infrastructure and poor civil aviation policies (World Trade Report, 2004). Thus in most African 
countries, the airline industry is monopolised by governments and so there is very little 
competition to encourage efficiency and lower air freight charges (Oshikoya, 2001). 
2.2.3.1 Sea transport 
Shipping or maritime is the predominant mode of transport in Africa, mostly because it is 
relatively cheaper (UNCT AD, 2006). It accounts for about 92% of Africa's external trade with a 
total coastline of 30 725 km and 90 major ports (UNECA, 2009). Between 2001 and 2005 sea 
borne trade (loaded goods as a proportion of world total) was about 6% for Africa, 29% for Asia 
and 13.7% for Latin America (UNCTAD, 2006). However, despite the relatively high volumes 
in cargo shipments (compared with air cargo), there is very little infrastructural development that 
has taken place in most ports. Congestion, long anchorage waiting time, high port clearing times 
characterise most of the continents ports (UNCTAD, 2000). Port productivity is estimated to be 
about a third of the international norm as a result of poor management, excessive bureaucracy 
and inadequate as well as unreliable equipment. The waiting time at African ports is about 10 
days when importing and 4.5 days when exporting compared to 2.5 and 1.5 days respectively for 
high income countries (UNCT AD, 2000). 
The port and terminal handling costs are higher in African countries than in other regions. In fact 
it costs about 6.25 times more to clear cargo at ports by Ethiopian firms compared to firms in 
China (UNCTAD, 2000). Hummels (2001) calculated that the tariff equivalent of one day of 
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waiting for imports is 0.835% implying that it is more expensive to import and export goods 
when in Africa due to long waiting times. Sea freight problems in Africa are also compounded 
by the use of ageing fleet which by 2005 was estimated to be about 20.5 years old compared to 
the world average of 12.2 years (UNCT AD, 2006). The other concern is that, private sector 
involvement in port development is still very low and the majority of terminals in Africa are still 
managed by inefficient parastatal organizations. Customs procedures remain outdated and unable 
to cope with increased container flows. Due to port inefficiency container handling in Africa, 
costs the African manufacturer 300% more than his high income OECD competitor l ) (Hummels, 
2001). Thus most ports are in need of modern, better managed facilities to serve traffic for which 
sea transport has a significant cost advantage over surface transport. Thus significant reductions 
in transport costs are needed to boost production, support diversification efforts and increase the 
competitiveness of African exports. Unless infrastructural bottlenecks are solved particularly in 
transport, improved market access, even on preferential terms would not solve the problem of 
Africa's lack of competitiveness in world trade (UNCTAD, 1999y4. 
Table 2.2: Port infrastructure 
Countries Number of airports Paved run ways Paved run ways Number of Ports and 
over 3.047m terminals 
South Africa 713 146 10 6 
Tanzania 124 II 2 3 
Zam bia III 10 I Landlocked (\ 97 5km)a 
Uganda 31 5 3 Landlocked (927km)" 
Mauritius 5 2 I 
Source: World Development Indicators (2003-2007), UNCTAD, 2006, AIDB statistics (2006) , CIA -World Fact Book,2007 : 
a = shortest distance from nearest seaport 
13 Using Hummels (2001) tariff equivalent calculations, you can estimate the additional tariff equivalent paid by Africans 
compared to OECD region. 
14 High transport costs on imports inflate the consumer prices of imported goods whilst transport costs on exports undermine 
the country's competitiveness in foreign markets. (UNCT AD, 2000): 
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2.2.4 Firm level surveys on transport infrastructure 
In addition to macro wide infrastructure indicators compiled by multilateral organisations, firm 
level surveys were also conducted by the World Bank in various developing and developed 
countries to elicit data on a number of firm specific indicators. The surveys which were initially 
conducted in the manufacturing sector but have now been expanded to include other industries, 
gather data on finance, labour and training, technology, trade, business environment as well as 
infrastructure variables. On infrastructure, data was elicited in two ways: First the survey 
questionnaire contained a question where firms in particular were asked to rank on a scale 0 to 4 
(where 0 is no obstacle and 4 very severe obstacle) the degree by which selected infrastructure 
indicators are an obstacle to doing business in that country. Secondly, another set of questions 
were also asked enterprise managers to state the number of days or hours per day in the previous 
year, the firm had experienced power outages, insufficient water supply and unavailable mainline 
telephone services. The data from these two questions form the basis of our discussion of 
infrastructure variables at firm level. 
The survey data on firms in the five study countries corroborate or confirm the infrastructure 
related transport inadequacies discussed using macro level data above. Transport problems seem 
to be a major obstacle among firms in Zambia (30.4%) and the East African countries of 
Tanzania (23%), Uganda (23%) (Figure 2.4 below). At city or regional level, transport is a major 
obstacle in KwaZulu-Natal province in South Africa (19%), Beau Bassin in Mauritius (28%), 
South Western region in Uganda (36%), Livingstone in Zambia (60%) and Kagera in Tanzania 
(53%) (see Table 2.3, below). These within country variations in infrastructure problems support 
Dollar et al (2004) argument that quality of infrastructure differs across locations within a 
country, mostly due to differences in local governance. The cross country differences in 
infrastructure problems could partly be explained by low levels of quality of domestic transport 
infrastructure like roads and airports in these respective countries. However domestic 
transportation does not seem to be a problem in South Africa and Mauritius, where only 10% of 
firms identified it to be a major obstacle. However in South Africa a high percentage of firms 
that complained about transport problems as an obstacle to doing business in the country were 
those with foreign ownership (see fig 2.4 below). Although the country has good transport 
networks, maybe this still does not compare favourably with the level of efficiency in developed 
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countries where these FDI firms originate. At sectoral level domestic transportation is less severe 
among exporters than non exporters (see table A2.2 appendix) This could be due to the fact that 
exporters are affected more by costs related to moving goods across international boundaries 
rather than locally and hence worry more about international transport costs. Firms in the food 
and agricultural sector report serious domestic transport infrastructure problems contrary to firms 
in the plastic paper sector. This could be due to the fact that these products (plastic paper and 
packaging) are time insensitive and therefore transportation delays have no adverse effects . 
Fig 2.4: Percentage of firms identifying transport as at least major obstacle 
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Table 2.3: Percentage of firms identifying infrastructure as a major obstacle in each region 
Transport Telecoms Customs Electricity 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Gauteng 8 3 14 9 
KwaZulu Natal 19 21 21 13 
Western Cape 9 12 20 5 
Eastern Cape 15 6 30 15 
MAURITIUS 
Port Louis 18 5 25 13 
Beau Bassin 28 0 17 II 
Vacoas Phoenix 0 6 11 0 
Curepipe 14 0 43 14 
Quatre Bornes 17 33 17 25 
Other 16 7 23 13 
UGANDA 
Central region 19 3 26 42 
North East region 24 14 19 37 
South West region 36 6 45 59 
ZAMBIA 
Lusaka 24 31 32 35 
Livingstone 60 20 20 60 
Ndola 45 26 45 45 
Kitwe 24 21 40 37 
Other 36 56 17 44 
TANZANIA 
Dar es Salaam 19 4 39 71 
Arusha 38 34 34 76 
Mwanza 20 8 20 48 
Kilimanjaro 29 13 17 46 
Tanga 22 17 23 48 
Kagera 53 7 27 20 
Morogoro 20 10 30 50 
Iringa 25 75 100 75 
Mbeya 0 29 43 71 
Mara 40 0 25 20 
Zanzibar 0 5 19 47 
Source: Author's computation using Investment climate surveys data 
2.3 Telecommunication infrastructure 
Telecommunication plays a vital role in facilitating the flow of information between suppliers 
and customers who are geographically removed (Limao and Venables, 2001). Efficient internet, 
cellphone and telephone services reduces trading costs by reducing firms' search cost in 
identifying and interacting with potential overseas customers as well as collecting other types of 
information regarding their overseas market and investment opportunities, hence reducing 
market entry costs (Yoshino, 2008). This is important for both FDI and trade promotion. 
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Despite the importance of telecommunication15 and with 28.5million main fixed lines in 2006, 
Africa has a share of only about two percent in worldwide total main fixed lines. It is estimated 
that there are more telephones in Brazil than in the whole of Africa (International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), 2007). Most of Africa's main (fixed) telephone lines are 
concentrated in just six of its 53 economies. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and 
Tunisia account for almost 80% of all fixed lines in Africa (lTU, 2007). According to the ITU 
these main (fixed) telephone lines are almost exclusively located within cities and randomly in 
rural areas. The ITU data also show that Africa's main (fixed) telephone line penetration was 3.1 
per 100 inhabitants compared to 32.4 main (fixed) lines per 100 inhabitants in Americas or 39.7 
in Europe in 2005. The world average in 2006 was 19.4 main (fixed) lines per 100 inhabitants, 
more than six times higher than the penetration rate in Africa. It is also estimated that 92% of 
SSA countries have more mobile phones than mainlines per 1000 people (WDI, 2006). Available 
statistics show that between 1992 and 2002, the average fault rate per 100 mainlines was 72 in 
Africa, compared to 56 in Middle East and North Africa, 37 in Latin America and 51 in East 
Asia and Pacific (WOI,2007). Telephone average costs of call to the United States in US dollar 
are also relatively higher in Africa. Between 1997 and 2004, it costs about US$5.1 to make a 3 
minute call to the US from Africa, whilst in South Asia it was US$3.5. It was also US$3.6 in 
East Asia and Pacific, US$2.5 in Latin America, US$3.5 in Middle East and North Africa (see 
table 2.4 below). Africa's telecommunications infrastructure development has also not kept pace 
with the rest of the world. While the world has been moving towards digital exchanges, the 
networks in the region are generally analogue with outmoded equipment resulting in high fault 
rates (lTU, 2007). The International Telecommunications Union also reports that in 2004 the 
African continent had the highest ratio of mobile to total telephone subscribers than any world 
region, and was therefore dubbed the "the least wired region of the world". 
Internet accessibility is also relatively poor. Thus less than 4 out of 100 people are accessible 
compared to the world average internet penetration of 21.4%, 18% for Latin America, II % for 
East Asia and the Pacific as well as 5% for South Asia (WDI, 2008). The International 
Telecommunications Union, (2007) also estimates that the African continent has fewer internet 
15 Fixed line phones are important for faxes and dial up internet connection. 
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users than France alone 16, a country 13 times smaller in population than SSA. The Digital Access 
Index (DAI) calculated by ITU and which measures the overall ability of individuals in a country 
to access and use information and communication technology, classifies most African countries 
in the low access category. Individuals in South Africa and Mauritius are the only ones with 
better access to communication facilities than those in other countries in the sample (see table 2.4 
below). 
The pattern in our country sample is also similar. Call charges are higher in Tanzania but very 
low in South Africa. Available statistics also show that the number of faults per 100 mainlines 
are however higher in Zambia and Tanzania but relatively low in Mauritius (World Development 
Indicators, 2007). According to WDI (2008) statistics, Mauritius has about 365 000 mainlines 
resulting in a fixed line teledensity of 30 per 100 persons. Mobile cellular services were launched 
in 1989 and teledensity in 2008 reached 80 per 100 persons. In Uganda fixed telephone density 
in 2008 was 16 per 100 inhabitants compared to 10% for South Africa and close to 1 % for 
Zambia and Tanzania (lTU, 2009). 
Table 2.4 Telecommunications infrastructure quality indicators 
Countries Digital # offaults per Call charges to the Delays in Days 
and Regions Access 100 main lines US obtaining a without a 
Index (97-2002) (1997 - 2004) telephone telephone 
in US$ per minute connection connection a 
month 
South Africa 0.45 62 1.8 18.90 0.49 
Tanzania 0.15 91 8.4 23.25 10.8 
Zambia 0.17 133 2.4 17.25 3.34 
Uganda 0.17 5 12.80 13.5 
Mauritius 0.50 23 1.59 38.55 5.04 
Sub Saharan Africa 72 5.1 32.73 
Latin America 37 2.5 34.95 
East Asia Pacific 51 3.6 13.39 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2007; International Telecommunications Union (ITU), World Bank Enterprise surveys. 
Cell phone density is also relatively high in South Africa at about 87 per 100 persons compared 
to 22 for Zambia and 13.58 for Uganda. Internet use also follows the same pattern, high in 
16 The population of France is about 8% of the popUlation of SSA Using 2008 statistics SSA population is 8 I 8million and 
France 62million. 2002 -2005 WDI statistics show that France had 49 internet subscribers per 100 people compared to 4 for SSA 
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Mauritius at 25 per every 100 persons , followed by South Africa with 10 and the remaining 
countries Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania have less than 6 per 100 inhabitants (ITU, 2007). 
Generally, in all the countries the proportion of mobile subscribers per 100 people is higher than 
that of fixed mainlines and internet users. This could probably be due to high tariff rates for 
internet and fixed lines compared to cellular phones (Fig 2.5 below). This tariff pattern is partly 
replicated even at regional level. Internet tariffs are relatively higher in Africa compared to other 
developing regions. The same generally applies even when comparing cellphone and telephone 
rates (see fig 2.6). 
Fig 2.5 Country level communications tariffs 
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Fig 2.6 Regional communications tariffs 
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2.3.1 Firm level surveys on telecommunication infrastructure 
Investment climate survey statistics also show that 33% of finns identified telecommunication to 
be a major obstacle in Zambia, 12% in Tanzania with other three countries having less than 6%. 
Firms that complained about telecommunication problems are mostly in Lusaka in Zambia and 
Iringa and Arusha in Tanzania (see Table 2.3 for more). Exporting companies also seem to be 
the ones largely affected by telecommunication challenges in these respective countries except in 
Mauritius were complainants were mostly from firms with foreign ownership (see fig 2.7). At 
sectoral level telecommunication problems are less severe except in the food and wood furniture 
sectors. In terms of hours without telecommunication services, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda 
are the worse affected , going for about eleven hours a day without telephone services. The 
pattern of internet usage in these countries partly reflects the above communications tariffs. Thus 
about 29% of firms in Zambia are connected to the internet, 46% in Uganda, 59% in Tanzania, 
69% in South Africa and 91 % in Mauritius. Thus high internet tariffs in Uganda and Zambia 
might explain why few firms are connected to the net. This pattern is repeated even when 
looking at exporting and foreign invested firm s in these countries (see fig 2.7 below). 
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Fig 2.7: Percentage of firms identifying telecommunication as at least major obstacle 
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2.4 Electricity Infrastructure 
Power supply in many African countries, is known for its unreliability and high disruption costs, 
and this affect production efficiency and competitiveness. Unreliable power leads to disruptions 
in production, loss of perishable goods, damage to sensitive equipment and loss of orders 
(Oshikoya et aI, 2001). Despite the fact that Africa is endowed with the widest possible range of 
energy sources (coal, natural gas, petroleum, solar, hydro, geothermal, nuclear etc), the 
continent ' s power sector remains severely underdeveloped and energy consumption in general 
and electricity consumption in particular is relatively very low (Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2004). The problem with Africa ' s electricity sector is not that of scarcity but lack of 
infrastructure, proper financing mechanisms and regulations that are important so as to make 
markets work in support of energy for sustainable development (UNDP, 2004). According to 
UNDP (2004), most power utilities in many countries are state owned monopolies and thus low 
tariffs and fiscal constraints have resulted in little investment and poor maintenance of 
infrastructure. Power outages, power surges, brown outs, and load shedding remain common 
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features in most countries 17. Available statistics show that South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, 
Middle East and North Africa are the parts of the world that are mostly affected by power 
outages.(see table 2.5 below). Thus the average power outage days per month between 2000 and 
2006 were 2.87 days in North Africa and the Middle East, 10.30 days in SSA, 42 and 3 days in 
South Asia and Latin America respectively compared to the world average of 9 days. At country 
level, Tanzania and Uganda are the countries with acute power problems in that the average 
power outage days are 61 and 71 days respectively compared to only 5 days in South Africa. 
Using firm level data, statistics also show that an average of 33% of firms identified electricity 
to be a major problem in their countries with the hardest hit being Tanzania with 59% and close 
to II % of output lost due to electrical outages by firms. At city or regional level, a large 
proportion of firms identifying electricity as a major obstacle were from South Africa's Eastern 
Cape province (15%) including 25% of firms in Quatre Bornes in Mauritius, 59% in South West 
Uganda region, 60% in Zambia's Livingstone city and 76% of firms in Arusha, Tanzania (see 
table 2.3 for more). Given all the firms in the study countries, power interruptions seem to be a 
major obstacle specifically amongst foreign owned firms and exporters. In the case of foreign 
owned firms this could probably be a result of the fact that most of them are into exporting and 
therefore timeliness in meeting orders is very important (see fig 2.8 and Table 2.5 below). The 
pattern is also the same when looking at the number of days or hours per day without power 
connection. Thus in Tanzania over a period of five days per month firms go without power for 
about seven hours per day compared to about four hours a day a month in South Africa. The high 
number of firms with alternative sources of power such as generators in Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia also shows that power outages are a major obstacle to business in these countries. Using 
perception indicators at sectoral level, firms in food and agriculture sector as well as those in 
wood- furniture sector. ranked electricity to be an obstacle higher than firms in other sectors. 
Generally, electricity problems in many African countries are a result of the fact that most power 
utilities are state owned monopolies and thus low tariffs and fiscal constraints have resulted in 
little investment and poor maintenance of infrastructure. 
17 Many finns in Africa have tried to avoid this problem by purchasing private generators but this alternative increases fixed 
costs and may contribute to loss of competitiveness. 
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Table 2.5: Electricity infrastructure problems (2000-2008) 
Country/ region Number of Duration of % output lost Electricity Delay in 
power OutaRe5 in due to power from Renerator obtaininR 
outa2es hours outages (if 2enerator is electrical 
Per month used in % connection 
South Africa 2.06 4.49 1.60 10.94 15.77 
Zambia 3.59 2.94 3.65 19.49 96.97 
Tanzania 12.00 7.88 9.62 36.8 1 44.28 
Uganda 11.00 10.07 10.23 30.66 33.03 
Mauritius 3.22 3.22 2.23 3.38 18.65 
SSA 10.30 6.70 5.84 26. 74 3 1.94 
East Asia & Pac ifi c 5. 19 3. 14 2.76 12.3 1 21.65 
Latin America 2.68 7.59 4. 19 18.40 34.45 
South Asia 42.21 4.56 10.8 1 25.94 48.42 
Middle East & North Africa 2.87 3.45 4.2 1 16.16 49.08 
World 8.48 5.56 4.86 19.77 36.68 
Source: World Bank's Enterprise Surveys; 
Fig 2.8: Percentage of firms identifying electricity as at least major obstacle 
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2.5 Customs Infrastructure 
Transport, te lecommunication and electricity are not the only infrastructural problems fac ing 
exporters in Africa. In most of these countries it takes a re lat ively long time for exports and 
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imports to clear customs procedures and in some cases additional informal payments to customs 
officers are needed to expedite the processing of customs documents (Clarke, 2004). In addition 
to long processing times, there are also so many documents that need to be completed before 
customs clearing is done. World Bank's Doing Business report,(2007) show that Sub Saharan 
Africa is second to South Asia in terms of the number of documents required to clear customs 
but tops the list when it comes to exports and imports customs clearing times. It takes about 9.3 
and 8.6 days to clear both exports and imports respectively compared to 1.4 and 1.9 in high 
income OECD countries (see table 2.6 below). Hummels, (2001) also show that the cost of 
waiting or per day tariff equivalent in Sub Saharan Africa is 0.9%, slightly less than that of South 
Asia and Middle East and North Africa. This implies that it is more expensive to export goods 
when in Africa. Customs delays are longer in most African countries due to excessive inspection 
of cargoes, redundant and poorly coordinated procedures, poor communication and information 
management, low skills levels as well as corruption (Hummels, 2001). Doing Business reports 
(2009) statistics also show that costs to both import and export are relatively higher in Africa, 
South Asia and Latin American countries relative to East Asia and the pacific. This pattern is 
repeated even when looking at time to export and import as well as the number of documents 
required to trade. At country level, the costs to both export and import are relatively higher in 
Zambia and Tanzania and relatively lower in Mauritius. 
Investment Climate survey statistics show that at least 20% of firms in these countries identified 
customs soft infrastructure or regulations to be a major obstacle and this seems to be common 
among exporters (see fig 2.9). Customs problems seem to be more severe among exporters and 
foreign owned firms in the East African countries of Uganda and Tanzania as well as among 
firms in the textile and garment sector. Although it takes at least five days in most of these 
countries to clear imports, the situation is even worse in East Africa where about 17 and 8 days 
are needed in Tanzania and Uganda respectively. However when exporting the pattern is a little 
different with South Africa topping the list followed by Tanzania (see table 2.6 below). 
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Fig 2.9: Percentage of firms identifying customs as at least major obstacle 
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Table 2.6 Customs clearing times 
Country Days to Documents Days to Documents Cost to Cost to 
import to import export To export export· import· 
South Africa 35 9 30 8 153 1 1807 
Zambia 73 9 53 6 2664 3335 
Tanzania 31 7 24 5 1262 1475 
Uganda 34 7 37 6 3 100 3390 
Maurit ius 14 6 14 5 737 689 
SSA 39.4 8.8 33.6 7.8 1941.8 2365.4 
East Asia & pacific 24.3 7.1 23.1 6.7 909.3 952.8 
South Asia 32.2 9.0 32.4 8.5 1364.1 1509.1 
Middle East & North Africa 25.9 7.4 22.5 6.4 1034.8 122 1. 7 
Source: Domg Busmess Report, World Bank. * Costs are m US$ per contamer 
2.6 Water infrastructure 
Just like power supply, sustainable water infrastructure is also very important in the production 
of manufactured goods. Most manufac turers use water either fo r fabricating, process ing, 
washing, diluting, coo ling as we ll as for sanitation needs within the manufacturing faci lity. 
Industries that use large amounts of water norma lly produce such commodities like food, paper, 
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chemicals , refined petroleum or primary metals. Many African countries are also manufacturers 
and exporters of these types of commodities. Adequate and sustainable provision of industrial 
water is therefore important for Africa to increase its supply of manufactured exports. However, 
increasing demand, economic development and changes in climate (variable rainfall 
patterns/droughts) are posing serious challenges to sustainable water prov ision in the continent. 
Generally the problem in Africa is mostly not about availability of water (there is abundant fresh 
water resources), but accessibility. This is a result of inadequate assessment, underdevelopment 
of water resources, lack of technical and institutional infrastructure as we ll as use of 
inappropriate water management systems (UNEP, 2004). 
Firm level statistics also show that water problems are very common in Tanzania as firms go for 
about 8 days without water per month for about 13 hours a day compared with an average of 2 
days for about 10 hours a day in both Zambia and Mauritius with only a day in the other two 
remaining countries for 3 hours in South Africa and 20 hours in Uganda (see Table 2.7 and Fig 
2.10 below). 
Table 2.7 Water infrastructure problems 
Country Days without water Hours without water Delay in obtaininga water 
per month per day connection 
South Africa 0.42 3.42 13.90 
Zambia 2.08 9.75 27.17 
Tanzania 8.74 13.23 19.60 
Uganda 0.51 20 .82 20. 13 
Mautitius 2.06 1135 30.04 
Sub Saharan Africa 7.24 13 .99 28.60 
East Asia & Pacific 1.64 7.18 26.60 
Latin America 3.97 16.02 34. 11 
South Asia 210 1 10.80 64 .15 
Middle East North Africa 6.28 10.86 62 .23 
World 6.43 13.06 34.94 
Source World Bank enterprise surveys 
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Fig 2.10: Water related infrastructure problems 
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We have shown that the quality of infrastructure is generally poor in Africa compared to other 
developing regions of East Asia and the Pacific as well as Latin America. The pattern also partly 
reflects or mirrors the performance of the export sector in these regions . The average export 
growth of the continent between 1980 and 2005 was about 4.6% compared to 14.4% for South 
Asia, 10% for Latin America and 17% for East Asia-Pacific (WDI, 2007). Although intra 
regional trade has been expanding in most of the developing world, with East Asia and Latin 
America recording (as a share of total trade) 50% and 30% respectively, in Africa it is 
surprisingly less than 10% (UNCTAD, 2004). Thus the African continent lags behind other 
developing regions when it comes to export performance in the same way as in infrastructure 
development. This pattern could imply that there is some prima facie correlation between 
infrastructure quality and trade performance. Using firm level data we attempted to relate 
infrastructure quality in our study countries to the number of firms that are exporting. To do this 
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we calculated in each country the average number of hours a day firms go without all 
infrastructure services and also calculated the average number of firms who identified 
infrastructure services (electricity, telecommunication, customs and transport) as a major 
problem. This enabled us to come up with one average infrastructure indicator that we related to 
export participation in each of these countries 18. This is because exports movements may not be 
influenced by a particular infrastructure problem like electricity outages alone but a combination 
of infrastructure problems. The scatter plots shown on Fig A2.2 appendix also show that there is 
no clear cut relationship between individual infrastructure problems and export intensity. The 
question that we want to answer is "Do differences in export participation reflect differences in 
infrastructure quality/ problems in these countries". The pattern of relationship is shown in Fig 
2.11 and Fig 2.12 below. For example Fig 2.l1 shows that there is generally a negative 
relationship between the number of hours firms in each country go without infrastructure 
services and the level of export participation. Export participation is high in South Africa and 
Mauritius but low in Uganda and this reflect high number of hours without infrastructure 
services in the latter but low hours in the former countries. This pattern is also replicated even 
when using alternative infrastructure indicators in the form of perceptions as is shown in Fig 2.12 
below. Thus the average number of firms that complain about electricity, telecommunication, 
customs and transport as major obstacles to doing business also varies inversely with export 
participation. However the pattern is inconclusive when it comes to number of firms that have 
foreign equity (see Fig A2.1 appendix). This could be due to the fact that some multinationals are 
market oriented (horizontal FDI) whilst other seek low production cost locations (vertical FOI) 
and these are the ones mostly sensitive to inadequate infrastructure facilities which increase 
production costs. 
IX The reason for doing this was because trade performance is not affected by one infrastructure indicator but by the performance 
of all infrastructure indicators. 
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Fig 2.11: Relationship between infrastructure (hrs without services) and exporting 
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Fig 2.12: Relationship between infrastructure perceptions and exporting 
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This section has given us an overview of the state of infrastructure in Africa using a number of 
indicators. We have shown that the quality of infrastructure is generally poor in Africa compared 
to other developing regions of East Asia and the Pacific as well as Latin America. There are also 
cases particularly in water and electricity where the African continent performs better than in 
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South Asia. Our qualitative analysis has also shown that there is a prima facie negative 
relationship between infrastructure quality and export participation. The next step now, is 
therefore to examine whether the correlation between the quality of infrastructure and exporting 
is statistically significant? 
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CHAPTER TWO APPENDIX 
Railkm Mobile Intemet Rold 
phoaesper per 100 dcusity 
100 I km 
Algeria 108302 70.2 447 
Angola 51429 104 2761 
Benin 19000 9.5 578 
Botswana 15 24455 33 .2 888 53 3.3 
Burkina F aso 92495 4.2 622 7 0.6 34 
Burundi 12322 104 2 0.7 48 
Cameroon 16 50000 10 10 16 13 2 II 
Central Africa Rep 24307 2 0.3 4 
Chad 33400 0.8 4 0.6 3 
DRC 153497 1.8 3641 0.3 7 
Congo Rep 17289 5.0 795 1.9 5 
Cote d1voire 80000 8.1 639 1.6 25 
Egypt 16 15 92370 81 5150 24 8.1 9 
Eritrea I 40 10 21.8 306 I 2.1 4 
Ethiopia 10 I 37018 13.4 0.2 4 
Gabon 18 3 9170 10.2 810 58 6.2 4 
Gambia 3 3742 19.3 24 3.6 37 
Ghana 14 2 57613 17.9 977 23 2.7 25 
Guinea 0 44348 9.8 1115 2 0.5 18 
Guinea Bissau I 3455 27.9 6 2.2 12 
Kenya 18 I 63265 14.1 1917 18 7.6 II 
Lesotho 2 5940 18.3 13 2.6 20 
Liberia 10600 6.2 490 5 II 
Libya 13 8 83200 57.2 2757 65 3.9 5 
Madagascar I 49827 11.6 732 5 0.6 9 
Malawi I 15451 45 710 3 04 16 
Mali I 18709 18 733 13 0.6 2 
Mauritania I 7660 11.3 717 35 3.3 I 
Mauritius 29 2015 100 62 14.5 99 
Morocco 18 4 57626 61.9 1907 52 20 13 
Mozambique 12 0 30400 18.7 3070 II 0.9 4 
Namibia 18 7 42237 12.8 25 4 5 
Niger 0 18423 20.6 2 0.3 I 
Nigeria 24 I 193200 15 3528 22 5.5 21 
Papua New Guinea I 19600 3.5 I 1.8 4 
Rwanda 0 140000 19 3 0.7 57 
Senegal 30 2 13576 29.3 906 25 54 7 
Sierra Leone 11300 8 0.2 16 
Somalia I 22100 11.8 6 1.1 4 
South Africa 6 10 36413 17.3 20247 72 10.9 30 
Sudan 16 2 11900 36.3 5478 12 9.3 I 
Swaziland 4 3594 30 301 22 3.7 21 
Tanzania 27 0 78891 8.6 4582 15 1.0 9 
Togo 46 I 7520 31.6 568 II 5.0 14 
Tunisia 12 13 19232 65 .8 1909 72 12.8 12 
Uganda 0 70746 23 259 7 2.5 36 
Zambia 5 I 91440 22 1273 14 4.3 12 
Zimbabwe 7 3 97267 19 6 9.2 25 
SSA 9 11.9 14 3.8 7 
East Asia & Pacific 7 23 11.4 35 11.1 22 
Latin America 16 18 24.3 55 18.4 18 
South Asia 24 3 56.9 15 4.9 110 
Africa 17 17 70.2 36 13 .8 7 
Source: World Development Indicators (2009) 
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Table A2.2: Perce ntl,~e offirm s identif~in~ infrastructure as at least major obstacle 
Obstacle telecommWlication Obstacle transport.don Obstacle electricity Obstacle customs and trade rep 
Forei Forei n owned ex rters Forei n owned ex rters Forei n owned e rters 
South Africa 20.5 1 30.77 28.33 26.50 20.74 47.0 1 43.33 
Zambia 47.54 44.26 52 .38 59.02 6135 49. 18 47.62 
Tanzani a 21.88 46.88 54.22 79.69 78.62 60.94 66.27 
Uganda 24.64 49.28 64.4 1 76.8 1 68.33 68. 12 67.80 
Mauri ti us 29.4 1 47.06 29.45 4 1.1 8 29.38 61.76 50.68 
Textile_Garment 23.33 46.67 35.59 50.00 40.56 60.00 50.00 
Food_agric 33.00 47.00 52.35 66.00 58.73 60.00 58.82 
Chemicalyharmarcy 26.83 51.22 43.66 48 .78 47. 10 56. 10 56.34 
Plapackaging 12. 12 2 1.2 1 27.78 54.55 42 .49 39.39 52.78 
Wood furniture 30.00 40.00 42.86 70.00 59 .46 60.00 28.57 
Construction metal 3 1.03 48.28 33.33 72.4 1 55.40 65.52 4 1.03 
Source: Author' s own computations based on World Bank's Investment Climate Surveys: 
Note : higher mean values imply greater obstacle. (O=no obstacle; I =mi nor obstacle; 2=moderate obstac le: 3=major obstacle; 4=very severe obstacle) 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. INFRASTRUCTURE AND MANUFACTURED EXPORTS: A Firm level analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
For many poor countries, manufacturing exports expansion IS often seen as the path to 
prosperity. This is because a handful of countries most of them in Asia, achieved unprecedented 
rates of growth through manufacturing exports promotion (World Bank 1993, Wood et al 1997). 
This strategy could help Africa given that the continent's share of manufactured exports has 
remained roughly constant at 0.5% from 1970 to 2003 (Yang and Gupta, 2005, Edwards, 2005). 
It is also estimated that only 21 percent of total African exports worldwide are manufactured 
products and of the 20 most important export items of Africa, 17 are primary commodities and 
low value resource based manufactures (UNCTAD, 2003; Yoshino, 2008). Additionally, 
UNCTAD, (2004) statistics, show that the 48 countries in Sub Saharan Africa maintain a little 
more than 1 % of global trade and intra-regional trade is estimated to be at best less than 10% of 
Africa's total trade. This trade pattern supports the common belief that Africa trades "too little" 
both with itself and with the rest of the world (Alva and Behar, 2008, Limao and Venables, 
2001). 
The increase in the number of free trade arrangements, both bilateral and multilateral, that have 
been negotiated by many African countries to partly reduce applied tariffs on industrial products 
do not seem to have increased the growth of the manufacturing sector 19• As a result a number of 
questions have been raised about the continent's future position in world trade and whether it has 
any chance of developing a competitive industrial structure (Elbadawi et al 2007). The 
Commission for Africa Report, (2005), also states that Africa will not be able to achieve the 
2015 Millennium Development Goals (MOGs), nor set itself on a sustainable growth-path and 
poverty reduction without significantly improving its participation in global trade. This is 
because the continued marginalization of Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) in world trade especially in 
19 Average import tariff worldwide have also dropped from 8.6 to 3.2 percent between 1960 and 1995 (Hwnmels, 2007). 
According to the World Bank (2004), Africa is home to about 30 Regional Trade Arrangements and each country is a member to 
at least 4 of these. Despite this, growth in the manufacturing sector has remained static. 
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the market for manufactured exports is seen as the major reason for the relative lack of economic 
growth, high levels of unemployment and poor standards of living in the region (Commission for 
Africa Report, (2005). 
Development policy experts have for a long time debated on the factors that could possibly 
constrain Africa from diversifying its exports into non traditional areas and thus move away from 
primary commodities. These factors include inter-alia, poor trade policies (exchange rate 
overvaluation and high tariffs), lack of comparative advantage (lack of appropriate technology 
and skilled manpower), civil conflict, etc (Elbadawi et ai, 2007; Collier and Gunning, 1999; 
Rodrik, 1998; Sachs and Warner, 1997). However, other researchers argue that a possible 
explanation of this missing trade could be non tariff barriers like, poor infrastructure, 
inappropriate transport policies and adverse economic geography (Nordas and Piermartini 
(2004); Limao and Venables (2001); Simuyemba, 2000; UNCTAD, 2004). Inadequate 
infrastructure and poor transport networks make it difficult for manufacturers to participate in 
global outsourcing as they cannot guarantee timely delivery or ensure reliability and flexibility in 
the supply of goods (Hummels, 2007). Hummels also argued that inadequate infrastructure in 
many countries explain why a large majority of firms serve only domestic markets and a small 
portion of sales are to foreign customers. Krugman (1991) using the iceberg concept argued that 
poor infrastructure increases transport costs and this forces firms to be "extra" productive in 
order to maintain their profit margins. Differences in trade costs across countries as a result of 
differences in the quality of infrastructure is a source of absolute and comparative advantage 
which affect the volume, direction and composition of trade (World trade Report, 2004). 
Sachs and Warner, (1997) argue that countries that are geographically isolated from world 
markets face higher costs for all international activities, and may end up with a lower division of 
labour and lower output per capita. This is partly supported by Hummels (2006) who also argued 
that distance impedes trade to a surprising extent and typical estimates suggest that doubling 
distance halves trade with costs substantially rising in distance even though this effect seem to 
diminish if transport infrastructure is good. To test the relationship that exists between distance 
and transport costs, Zarzoso et al (2003) estimated a transport costs function using data on 
maritime and overland transport for the ceramic sector in Spain and found that higher distance 
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and poor partner infrastructure leads to notable increases in transport costs. They also found that 
a 1 % increase in distance increases transport costs by approximately 0.25%. As much as it is true 
that geography strongly affects trade and development, it is also true that geography is not 
destiny. The provision of good quality public infrastructure (transport and communication) can 
help overcome some of the adverse effects of economic geography (Henderson, 1999). 
The main objective of this chapter therefore, is to offer a micro-econometric assessment of the 
influence of external factors like geography, infrastructure (transport, electricity, 
telecommunication, water and customs) on export participation in African firms controlling for 
firm specific variables in the analysis. This will not only fill the gap that currently exists in the 
literature but will also minimise the problem of omitted variable bias where infrastructure 
variables are excluded in empirical models on firm level exporting. Thus to set appropriate 
industrial policy goals and make reasonable expectations about the effects of export promotion 
policies you need to understand how firms become exporters. Exporting problems facing 
countries mostly in Africa can only be understood and remedied successfully if policy makers 
have a clear understanding of exporter behaviour. 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Theoretical literature review 
The standard approach that has been followed in the theoretical literature when modelling 
infrastructure costs is to use the concept of iceberg trade costs. This is the same approach that 
was followed amongst other by Krugman and Venables (1995), Melitz (2003) and Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) when looking at the behaviour of monopolistic competitive firms in the context of 
international trade. 
Thus Krugman and Venables (1995) demonstrated in their model how infrastructural 
improvements and hence low transport costs can encourage economic convergence or 
globalization. They argued that the decline in transport costs below a critical level result in the 
formation of what they called a core and periphery with nations that find themselves in the 
periphery suffering a decline in real incomes. In this model, high transport costs result in regions 
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or countries not engaging in trade and being self sufficient resulting in no specialization at the 
aggregate level. However if transport costs fall below a critical level the world economy will 
organize itself into an industrialized core and de industrialised periphery. Thus what happens is 
that if transport costs continue to fall, the importance of being closer to markets or suppliers will 
decline but now the periphery region will offer the advantage of lower wage rate. This 
encourages trade and agglomeration. 
Another theoretical model that relates trade costs with exporting was developed by Melitz 
(2003). Melitz (2003) built a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms producing a 
horizontally differentiated good with a single factor. He argued that the entry of a firm into the 
export market is dependent on firm-level productivity and trade costs associated with exporting. 
The coexistence of firms with different productivity levels in equilibrium is the result of 
uncertainty about productivity before an irreversible entry decision is made. Entry into the export 
market is also costly, but the decision to export occurs after firms observe their productivity. 
Firms only enter the export market if their productivity levels are high enough to absorb trade 
costs associated with exporting. Thus according to Melitz (2003), exposure to trade induces only 
the more productive firms to enter the export market whilst the least productive ones exit and the 
less productive produce only for the local market. Firms produce a unique horizontal variety for 
the domestic market if their productivity is above some threshold, and export to a foreign market 
if their productivity is above a higher threshold. This model basically suggests that trade is 
mostly beneficial to firms that are productive. The impact of trade on the distribution of firms in 
his model is channelled through the domestic factor market where firms compete for a common 
source of labour. Thus when entry into new export markets is costly, exposure to trade offers 
new profit opportunities to more productive firms who can afford to cover the entry costs. Thus 
the increased labour demand by the more productive firms and new entrants bids up real wages 
and forces the least productive firms to exit. In this model, import competition does not playa 
role in the reallocation process due to the CES specification for demand (residual demand price 
elasticities are exogenously fixed and unaffected by import competition). The impact of trade 
costs in the model is explained through its impact on the number of trading partners and 
productivity cut-off. Thus as trade costs fall the productivity level required of firms to enter the 
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export market will fall and this also generates entry of new firms who were not able to export 
because of higher trade costs. Firms lose their domestic market share and those into exporting 
make up for lost market share with increased export sales. The same result holds for a decrease 
in the fixed export market entry costs. In this model, exporter superiority is shown to be the 
equilibrium outcome of more productive firms self-selecting into the export market. This 
selection is driven by the existence of trade costs, which only the most productive firms can 
absorb while still remaining profitable. 
Bernard et al. (2003) construct a static Ricardian model of heterogeneous firms, imperfect 
(Bertrand) competition with incomplete mark-ups, and international trade. Firms use identical 
bundles of inputs to produce differentiated products under monopolistic competition. Within a 
country without trade, only the most efficient producer actually supplies the domestic market for 
a given product. With international trade and variable trade costs, a firm produces for the home 
market if it is the most efficient domestic producer of a particular variety and if no foreign 
producer is a lower cost supplier net of trade costs. A domestic firm will export if it produces for 
the domestic market and if, net of trade costs; it is the low-cost producer for a foreign market. 
With positive trade costs, exporters are firms with higher than average productivity. Bernard et 
al. (2003) demonstrate that as trade costs fall, aggregate productivity rises because high-
productivity plants are more likely to expand at the expense of low-productivity firms which fail. 
Declining trade costs force low-productivity plants to exit the market in both Bernard et al. 
(2003) and Melitz (2003), but the mechanism by which this occurs differs subtly. In Bernard et 
al. (2003), low-productivity plants exit because of increased import competition from foreign 
varieties. In Melitz (2003), countries' varieties do not overlap. As a result, an increase in imports 
raises the probability of death at all levels of productivity while the death of low-productivity 
plants is actually driven by the entry into exporting of other domestic firms. There are also two 
other possible reasons that plant productivity could increase in the face of lower trade costs. One 
is that increased competition may induce plants to improve their productive efficiency, the so-
called 'kick in the pants' effect (Lawrence, 2000). Another is that the plant itself may change its 
product mix, i.e., intra-plant reallocation. Evidence for this type of switching by plants is found 
by Bernard et al. (2006a). In this case it may be that the underlying productivity of 
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manufacturing each good is unchanged but plant-level productivity is affected by the change in 
output mix. 
3.2.2 Empirical literature overview 
The research literature has identified a number of causes of poor manufacturing exports 
performance both at macro and microeconomic levels. Macro level studies have identified inter-
alia poor macroeconomic policies, market constraints and supply-side factors like poor 
infrastructure, institutions and inappropriate transport policies (see Rodrick et ai, 2002; Redding 
and Venables, 2004a; Fugazza, 2004). Micro level studies have tended to dwell much on 
efficiency, firm size, foreign ownership, market size, entry costs (sunk costs) and age (see 
Bernard et ai, 2001; Soderbom et ai, 2003; Rankin et ai, 2006; Robert and Tybout, 1997; 
Wagner, 2005). 
3.2.2.1 Macro level studies 
A study by UNCT AD (2006) highlights the importance of both demand and supply side factors. 
This study used data from about 84 countries (17 of them from SSA) for the period 1980-2003 
and employed a bilateral trade flow gravity model. They built on the theoretical and empirical 
model used by Redding and Venables (2004a) but used quantile regressions to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Accounting for unobservable heterogeneity allows 
for the identification of any differences in the effect of and importance of export performance 
components which are linked to the degree of development of the external sector. Thus this 
UNCT AD, (2006) technique allows for non linearities in the relationship between exports 
performance and supply-demand side variables. In addition to stressing the importance of trade 
barriers, UNCTAD, (2006) results showed that the relative importance of demand and supply 
factors varies from country to country depending a great deal on the level of development of the 
external sector. Strong linkages to international markets, physical infrastructure, soundness of the 
macroeconomic framework and the quality of institutions appear to be other major determinants 
of export performance also identified in the study. 
Other empirical studies have also examined the role played by infrastructure and institutions on 
export performance using bilateral trade flow models like gravity models on macroeconomic 
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data. Francois and Manchin (2007) usmg selection based gravity models and maximum 
likelihood techniques as well as principal components (to condense infrastructure and 
institutional variables) found that infrastructure and institutional quality are significant 
determinants not only of export levels but also of the likelihood exports will take place at all. 
They used the sample selection model to take account of the censoring process that leads to zero 
or missing bilateral trade flows as the amount of trade (a dependent variable in their model) is 
only observed if trade occurs20 . In this case zero bilateral trade flows are systematically excluded 
from the analysis and this can bias results. Their panel study covered a large samp Ie of 123 
countries across the world (including some African countries) over the period 1988 to 2002. 
They found that infrastructure is quantitatively important in determining transport costs and it 
accounts for approximately 60% of predicted transports costs of landlocked countries due to poor 
internal geography. The study found that variation in infrastructure (transport and 
communications) explains a larger proportion of the variation in exports than do the trade 
barriers faced by developing countries. They also found that an increase of one standard 
deviation (from the mean) in the quality of communications infrastructure raises the volume of 
trade by roughly 11 percent, compared to a 7 % effect of transport infrastructure and 2% effect 
for tariffs. 
Another study that also looked at the relationship between infrastructure, transport costs and 
trade was done by Limao and Venables (2001)21. Using cross sectional analysis, they studied the 
determinants of transport cost and found that transport costs depend on a country's geography 
and level of infrastructure quality. They used two different sets of data to arrive at this 
conclusion. Firstly, they obtained quotes for shipping a standard container from Maryland, 
Baltimore (United States) to selected destinations. Using linear regression they found that for 
coastal countries domestic infrastructure22 explained 40 percent of the predicted transport costs, 
20 This creates a non random sample selection process which excludes zero bilateral trade flows. 
21 They used about 103 countries across the world and in their SSA sample they used about 23 countries. 
22 The index measure of infrastructure used, designed to capture the cost of travel in and through a country was constructed as an 
average of the density of the road network, the paved road network, rail network and the number of telephone main lines per 
person. In their regressions they used an inverse of this infrastructure index implying than an increase in the index suggests an 
increase in transport costs. 
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whilst for inland countries own infrastructure explain 36 percent and transit infrastructure (of 
bordering coastal countries) explained 24 percent. Secondly, Limao and Venables (2001) used 
the ratio of c.Lf. to f.o.b. data from the IMF DOTS database to calculate ad valorem transport 
costs. They used the ad valorem transport costs as the dependent variable in a Tobit regression. 
Once again infrastructure was found to be a highly significant determinant of transport costs. 
Improving a country's infrastructure from the median to the top 25th percentile is equivalent to it 
being 2358 km closer to all its trading partners. 
After having identified the nature of relationship between transport costs and infrastructure, 
Limao and Venables (2001) went on to test the impact of infrastructure on trade using a bilateral 
trade flow gravity model; if infrastructure has a significant impact on transport costs, then it 
should also be important in determining trade flows. They found significant results: Moving 
from the median to the top 25th percentile in the distribution of infrastructure raised trade 
volumes by 68 percent. Moving from the median to the 75th percentile decreased trade volumes 
by 28 percent. Increasing the level of infrastructure above the median distribution therefore has 
significantly greater impact than falling below the median. According to Edwards and Odendaal, 
(2008) this could indicate the existence of some sort of threshold for the level of infrastructure, 
or it could simply be due to the shape of the distribution of infrastructure. Unfortunately this is 
an interesting finding that they did not explore further. Limao and Venables (2001) next turned 
their attention to intra-Africa trade. They found that a basic gravity specification could not 
account for Africa's poor intra-trade performance as the African dummy variable was significant 
and negative. However, once the infrastructure variables were included in the regression the 
African dummy variable switched signs indicating that given its low level of infrastructure, 
Africa actually trades more than expected. The severity of Africa's poor infrastructure is 
highlighted by the Africa Competitiveness Report (2007). One of the largest performance gaps 
highlighted by the report is infrastructure. In the report, Africa has the lowest regional 
infrastructure average out of all the other regions. 
Another macro study on infrastructure was done by Nordas et al (2004) using bilateral gravity 
modelling incorporating bilateral tariffs on a number of countries in the developed and 
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developing world23. Nordas and Piermartini (2004) built on the work done by Limao and 
Venables (2001) using trade and infrastructure data from 2000. Firstly, they, argued against 
using direct transport costs such as the c.i.f/f.o.b24 ratio used by Limao and Venables (2001) as 
these ratios are not available for Europe or Japan, nor available at the disaggregate level. They 
also argued that the quality of c.i.f/f.o.b data is generally poor. Secondly, Nordas and Piermartini 
(2004) attempted to correct for an omitted variable bias in the Limao and Venables (2001) 
gravity model by using a theoretical gravity model as specified by Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003). This was done by including multilateral resistance variables into their model. These 
variables are supposed to capture the trade barriers between two trading countries relative to the 
average barriers of these two countries with all other trading partners (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003). Nordas and Piermartini (2004) used the average weighted tariffs faced by the 
exporter and the average tariff of the importer as multilateral resistance variables. However 
Edwards and Odendaal (2008) argue that this is incorrect as using tariff variables will still result 
in an omitted variable bias since the tariff variables will not capture any of the other trade 
barriers faced by the trading countries. Thirdly, Nordas and Piermartini (2004) constructed 
separate indices for each type of infrastructure (rail, roads, telecommunications, ports, airports 
and time for customs clearance) in order to test individual effects of the different forms of 
infrastructure. They found that port efficiency has the largest impact on bilateral trade. A one 
percent improvement in importer (exporter) infrastructure was found to increase imports, on 
average, by 0.67 (0.92) percent. However, they acknowledged that this might be as a result of 
selection bias since only coastal countries were included in the sample. 
Another way that Nordas and Piermartini (2004) expand on Limao and Venables (2001) is that 
they constructed a bilateral dummy variable (for the overall infrastructure index and for the 
separate infrastructure indices) that takes on a value of one if the combined quantity of 
23 This study also included African countries like Lesotho. Ethiopia, ORC, Chad, Niger, Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Gabon. 
24 cif/fob is a widely used indirect measure of international transport costs because of poor data on direct measures. This measure 
takes advantage of the fact that in principle exporting countries report trade flows exclusive offreight and insurance(fob) and 
importing countries report flows inclusive of freight and insurance. Comparing the valuation of the same flow reported by both 
importer and exporter yields a difference equal to international transport costs. However inconsistencies in goods classification 
and missing values creates problems in using this ratio. 
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infrastructure of the trading partners is above average and zero otherwise. This indicates whether 
there is a threshold of combined quantity of infrastructure (as is possibly the case in Limao and 
Venables, 2001). They found that country pairs that had an above average combined 
infrastructure traded 1.36 times more than country pairs which had a below average combined 
infrastructure. However, this variable in effect captures how much the maximum level of 
infrastructure matters in determining trade flows. The construction of the dummy variable uses 
the combined infrastructure of the trading partners, thus if one trading partner has sufficiently 
good infrastructure the country pair will have above average infrastructure. Although Nordas and 
Piermartini (2004) do include some interactions variables in their final set of regressions, for the 
most part they follow the standard procedure in the literature of including exporter and importer 
infrastructure variables (see also Francois et ai, 2007 and Limao and Venables, 2001). According 
to Edwards and Odendaal, (2008), this may be a misspecification leading to an omitted variable 
bias since they do not capture the other factors that may enhance or detract the impact of 
infrastructure quality on trade. 
Buys et al (2006) used a minimum quality road index25 between trading nations In their 
simulation of the trade-expansion potential of an integrated road network in Africa. They argued 
that this provides a more accurate reflection than using an average road quality index. However, 
including the minimum quality road index only is also a misspecification as it ignores the 
infrastructure of the other trading partner (Edwards and Odendaal, 2008). This is because the 
infrastructure of the exporter and the importer matters, as shown in Limao and Venables (2001) 
as well as Nordas and Piermartini (2004). Thus it is also necessary to include a maximum road 
index variable in order to capture the effect of the road quality of both bilateral partners and 
transit countries on trade. According to Limao and Venables (2001), it is not only the quality of 
25 Their transport infrastructure quality index was calculated as follows Q = p a, G a 2 C a, where: 
I I I I 
QI =Road quality index for country j 
PI = Percentage of roads paved in country j 
G
I 
= GDP per capita in country j (index of capacity to maintain roads) 
C 1 = World Bank's country policy and institutional capacity (ePIA) index for transparency, accountability and corruption in 
country j ( a proxy for delays and costs inflicted on truckers) The maximum index should in this case include infrastructure 
quality of both importer and exporter. 
47 
the infrastructure of the trading countries that matters but also that of transit countries. In their 
study, Buys et al (2006) used a gravity model on the data of 35 SSA countries from 2000 to 2003 
to obtain estimates of the effects of road transport quality and road distances on trade. 
These estimates by Buys et al (2006) were then used to calculate the current trade flows in the 
inter-city network and then to simulate the effect of a continental upgrading of the road network 
in Africa. They found that such an upgrade would expand overland trade flows by approximately 
$250 billion over 15 years, whilst financing the program would require about $20 billion initially 
and an additional $1 billion annually for maintenance. 
However, Buys et al (2006) and Nordas and Piermartini (2004) fail to control for the zero trade 
flows between certain countries. Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2006) argued that the OLS 
estimates become biased if the zero observations are simply ignored or eliminated. Ignoring or 
eliminating the zero trade flows would be acceptable if the cases of zero exports occurred 
randomly (Edwards and Odendaal, 2008). However, this is not the case as countries with high 
transport costs are less likely to trade. Thus using only countries that do trade constitutes a self-
selected sample rather than a random sample. This non-random screening of data results in 
biased estimates (Coe and Hoffmaister, 2007). In order to deal with the number of zero bilateral 
trade flows, Francois et al (2007) used a Heckman selection model. 
The results of Buys et al (2006) also suffer from an omitted variable bias as they did not include 
any multilateral resistance variables. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) showed that not 
including the multilateral resistance variables in the gravity model means that these variables are 
captured by the regression residual. These omitted terms are correlated with the trade-cost term 
in the model, thus biasing the estimates of trade costs and all its determinants. The other thing is 
the clustering of variables that was done by Buys et aI, (2006) makes it difficult to relate results 
to specific policy actions. By using both the percentage of paved roads and institutional 
indicators in constructing the road quality index, could mean that their results are driven 
specifically by poor institutions or poor maintenance not necessarily the nature of roads. The 
same problem also affects Limao and Venables (2001) results, in that they lumped together road 
quality indicator variables (percentage of paved roads) with telecommunication indicator 
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(number of fixed telephone line per person) in constructing their infrastructure index that they 
used for estimation. 
Shepherd et al (2006) using gravity models found that exporting firms rely not only on the 
quality of infrastructure provided by home governments but also on that of neighbouring 
countries through which goods must transit. Due to this, the relationship between road quality 
and trade may not be linear as upgrades in important transit countries or resolution of regional 
bottlenecks could have impacts well beyond individual countries concerned. They argued that 
one way of controlling for these transit effects or cross country spillovers is by using the number 
of borders crossed. 
Most of the studies that have been reviewed so far concentrated on the role of infrastructure in 
affecting total trade. The World Bank (2000) however argues that export diversification is one of 
the main elements of the development strategies that countries in Sub Saharan Africa need to 
follow for sustained growth and poverty reduction. Wood and Mayer (2001) departed from 
country level studies that use total exports by looking at factors that affect Africa's manufactured 
exports performance. They used a simple OLS regression to find the determinants of 
manufactures using a sample excluding African countries. These coefficients were then applied 
to the African characteristics in order to calculate an expected level of exports for each African 
country (given its human and natural resources). This was compared against the actual exports 
structure. Looking at the manufacturing sector, Wood and Mayer (2001) found that on average 
manufactures formed a smaller part of exports than expected. For example, eight countries had a 
predicted manufactures export share of 26 percent but only averaged 3 percent. Thus even after 
taking into account the human and natural resource endowments, which they argued give most 
African economies a comparative advantage in primary products rather than manufactures, 
Wood and Mayer (2001) could not explain the low levels of manufactures in most African 
countries. When investigating the causes of variation between the expected and actual levels of 
manufactures they found that lack of infrastructure, macroeconomic mismanagement 
(particularly of the exchange rate) and ineffective administration appeared to cause the shortfall 
between the actual and predicted values (whilst geography and sector bias of trade policies had 
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little to no effect). The discrepancy between actual and predicted export shares led the authors to 
conclude that growth in manufactured exports could make a large contribution to the growth of 
total exports. This in tum would boost aggregate growth (they argued that the causality can run 
both ways, higher aggregate growth can lead to higher export growth and vice versa). Therefore, 
even if Wood and Mayer (2001) are correct in arguing that Africa's comparative advantage lies 
in primary products (which some papers disagree with, see Bloom and Sachs, 1997 and 
Elbadawi, 1999) - improving infrastructure is still likely to have a significant and positive effect 
on the manufacturing sector (Edward and Odendaal, 2008). 
3.2.3 Empirical micro level studies 
At the firm level, a number of studies have been done in and outside Africa to examine the 
impact of various firm specific attributes on exporting using different variants of cross sectional 
models. 
Bernard et al (2001) used a dynamic panel model of USA manufacturing plants to test for the 
role of plant characteristics, spillovers from neighbouring exporters, entry costs and government 
export promotion expenditures. They found that entry costs are significant and spillovers from 
the export activity from other plants negligible. State promotion expenditures have no significant 
effect on the probability of exporting. However, Hanson and Harrison (1997) examining the role 
of geographic and sectoral spillovers on exporting in Mexico find that the presence of 
multinational exporters in the same industry and state increases the probability of exporting. 
Another firm level study by Elbadawi et aI, (2006) which used cross section analysis looked at 
the role of institutions and geography in 18 countries in and outside Africa. They used firm level 
structural export equations derived from the macro model originally developed by Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) but modified by Redding and Venables (2003) to analyse market access and 
supplier access. In this large cross country sample of manufacturing establishments drawn from 
188 cities, they found that average exports per firm are smaller in Africa than in other regions, 
mostly because they face adverse economic geography and operate in poorer institutional 
settings. In their study they argued that geography and institutions affect exports by lowering 
so 
foreign market access and supplier access. 26 Like Limao and Venables (2001), they also showed 
that controlling for institutions and economic geography, what in effect is a negative African 
dummy disappears from the firm level exports equation they estimated. Elbadawi et al (2006) 
also argued that African firms are located further away from wealthier or denser potential export 
markets (poor foreign market access) and also face steeper input prices partly because of their 
physical distance from cheaper foreign suppliers (poor supplier access). They also argued that 
supplier access problems are made worse by the fact that domestic substitutes for importable 
inputs are more expensive. Elbadawi et al (2006) results also show that geography and 
institutions influence average firm level exports more through their effect on the number of 
exporters than through their impact on how much each exporter sells in foreign markets. 
Another micro econometric analysis of the determinates of manufactured exports in Sub Saharan 
Africa based on World Bank survey data is by Clarke (2005). He used eight African countries to 
find that firm level exports are constrained by restrictive trade and customs regulation and poor 
customs administration. Using an endogenous Tobit model, he also found that the quality of 
domestic transport infrastructure has less impact on export performance compared to 
international transport infrastructure. This is against the findings of Naude et al 2007 as well as 
Roper and Love, 2001. Naude et ai, 2007 argued that domestic transport costs have a greater 
effect on the propensity to export and industrial location thereby influencing the spatial location 
of exporters within a particular country or region. Thus therefore the role of domestic transport 
costs on manufactured exports and location of exporting firms in Africa is highly relevant. These 
arguments are supported by Eaton and Kortum (2002) who state that trade diminishes 
dramatically with distance and that prices vary across locations and the differences are greater 
for places that are far apart. They also argued that average exports are larger for firms in larger 
national economies (large domestic markets) and where domestic transport infrastructure, rule of 
law is better. Even Edwards and Alves (2006) found that in South Afric~, manufacturing exports 
are constrained by declining investment in transport infrastructure. However Clarke (2005) did 
26 Foreign market access means that a typical African firm is located further away from a denser wealthier export markets whilst 
supplier access means that African firms face steeper input prices because they are located far away from cheaper foreign 
suppliers and domestic substitutes are expensive. 
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not go into the details of the other types of infrastructure variables like electricity, water, and 
telecommunication as is intended in this research. 
Another study that attempted to analyse the impact of domestic transport costs on exports and the 
spatial location of manufacturing exporters was done by Matthee et al (2007). They used 
manufactured exports from about 354 magisterial districts between 1996 and 2004 and used 
distance as a proxy of transport costs. They used modified Cubic Spline density functions27 on 
spatially disaggregated data on exports and manufacturing firms in South Africa and showed that 
proximity to a port is also an important consideration in most export oriented manufacturing 
firms. Thus 70% of these exporters particularly in the electronics sector locate within a radius of 
100km from a port or export hub. 
Most of the micro level studies on African firms show that there is a strong correlation between 
firm sizes (measured in terms of firm employment, total assets and sales) and exporting. This 
variable is robust across all specifications which allow for certain forms of firm heterogeneity 
and dynamics (Rankin et al 2006). Soderbom et al (2003) argue that the size of the firm's 
domestic base is linked to its export performance implying that firms need to grow domestically 
to be successful internationally. In this context there is concern that government policies that 
restrict the growth of firms domestically may also inhibit export growth. This is because larger 
firms are more involved in exporting than smaller firms. Thus if size is related to the firm's 
participation in the export market, limited domestic demand ensures that the only way to expand 
is to grow into the export market.( to test this hypothesis they examined whether a change in log 
of employment changes the probability of a firm participating in export market in future). Rankin 
et aI., (2006) in a panel study of five African countries discovered that the average size of a firm 
that is into exporting is 273 employees pointing to the importance of size as a factor explaining 
poor export performance. The theoretical literature also suggest that the presence of fixed costs 
associated with exporting may mean that export performance could improve with firm size up to 
27 Cubic spines are piecewise functions whose pieces are polynomials of degree less than or equal to three joined together to fonn 
a smooth function (Mathee et al(2006). They used these functions to overcome the problems experienced with piecewise linear 
regression functions which suffer from discontinuity in their derivatives. They argued that this discontinuation at the kinks of the 
linear regression makes analyses for shifts in elasticities and marginals difficult. 
52 
some point but thereafter remain stable or decline; that is the relationship between export 
performance and firm size could be non linear (Gabittas et al 2003). Teresa et al (2006) found 
this inverted U- shaped relationship in Philippine manufacturing firms. Schlegelmilch and Crook 
(1988), found a hyperbolic non linear relationship between export intensity and firm size in their 
studies of British and Germany manufacturing firms. 
The existence of sunk costs has also been posited as an important determinant of the decision to 
export at the firm level (Robert and Tybout, 1997). Sunk costs in exporting are mainly those of 
information gathering on the new market, setting up new distribution networks, marketing and 
possibly repackaging of products to appeal to new consumers etc. Martina (2006) argues that if 
there are significant sunk costs associated with entry into the new export market, then a high 
level of persistence in the firm's portfolio of destination market will be seen. On the other hand, 
if the main sunk costs involved in exporting are captured by the initial efforts involved in 
becoming outward oriented, then we expect to find that firms experience less persistence in their 
market coverage than they do in their export status (Martina, 2006). The question of whether 
sunk entry costs are relevant to the decision to become an exporter was answered by Bernard and 
Jensen (2004). Looking at exporting activity in the US, Bernard and Jensen (2004) found that 
exporting in the previous period substantially increases the probability of being an exporter in the 
next period. A similar result was also found by Sutherland (2003) when analysing the export 
decisions of Irish firms. He found that significant sunk costs exist in entering the export market 
and these costs were experienced by most Irish firms that are exporting. Dividing exporters into 
those exporting only to the UK market compared to exporters to the rest of the world showed 
that entry costs for Irish firms to the UK market to be significantly lower than the average sunk 
cost to other markets. Martina (2006) using Irish firms also found that the experience of 
exporting to one market significantly reduces the costs associated with entering additional 
markets. Thus the bulk of the sunk costs involved in exporting appear to be associated with the 
initial movement to outward orientation of the firm. 
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The other feature about African firms discussed in the literature is that exporters have a high 
level of labour productivity and are more capital intensive and tend to be older and more likely to 
be foreign owned (Rankin et aI, 2006). Some studies also found that firms with foreign 
ownership are more efficient than firms with none (see Rankin, 2002; Chung and Roberts, 2000; 
Mengistae and Pattilo, 2004). Recent work on export behavior of firms has emphasized the 
heterogeneity of firm characteristics. Thus a wide range of firm specific factors like age of firm, 
capital intensity and the skills of its workforce have a bearing on the threshold question of 
whether or not a firm participates in exporting. Aitken et al (1997), Roberts and Tybout (1997) 
include some plant characteristics in their work and find that plant size, plant age, and the 
structure of ownership are positively related to the propensity to export. However, by comparing 
plants at a point in time, Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1997) document large significant differences 
between exporters and non-exporters among U.S. manufacturing plants. They found that 
exporters have more workers, proportionally more white collar workers, higher wages, higher 
productivity, greater capital intensity, higher technology intensity, and are more likely to be part 
of a multi-plant firm. However, these substantial cross-section differences between exporters and 
non-exporters cannot tell us about the direction of causality, i.e., do good firms become exporters 
or do exporters become good firms (Bernard and Jensen, 2001). Thus do efficient firms select 
themselves into exporting or do they become efficient by exporting through the so called 
learning by exporting effect. 
A set of theoretical models by Dixit (1989), Krugman (1989) suggest that hysteresis in exports 
may be due to the sunk costs in entering the export market at the firm level. This possible 
presence of entry costs could be tested by looking at the effect of exporting yesterday on 
exporting today. Thus Robert and Tybout (1997) using a dynamic model of the export decision 
by profit maximising firms in Columbia find that sunk costs are a significant source of export 
persistence and that unobserved heterogeneity across plants plays a significant role in the 
probability that a firm exports. Thus if sunk costs are significant we would expect to see a high 
level of persistence in the firm's portfolio of destination markets. Distance also plays a role in 
the dependence of firms on an individual market. Firms that export to only one market usually 
export to closer destinations (Martina, 2006). 
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3.2.4 Summary 
The micro empirical literature has shown that a number of firm characteristics play an important role in 
exporting. Thus plat size, efficiency, plant age and the structure of ownership are positively related to the 
propensity to export. The literature has also shown that the role of infrastructure on export 
perfonnance has been done largely at country level using a variety of macro econometric 
models. There is also consensus that distance, good transport infrastructure, telecommunications 
and customs facilities play an important role in facilitating trade. However there is very little that 
has been done at micro level to assess the influence of infrastructure quality. Most of the studies 
have tended to look at the impact of firm level characteristics on exporting. This has been a result 
of unavailability of infrastructure data measured at firm level. We attempt to fill this gap in this 
study by exploiting data on infrastructure variables measured at firm level gathered by the World 
Bank through its investment climate surveys. 
3.3 The modeP8 
We derive the firm level structural equation that we will estimate from a theoretical framework 
based on the standard new trade theory model developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and 
Redding and Venables (2004). This model assumes that the world consists ofN countries in each 
of which varieties of a differentiated manufacturing product are produced under increasing 
returns by a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers. Each variety can be used as a 
consumer good or as an intermediate input entering utility or production through the constant 
elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregator. Each firm also produces horizontally differentiated 
products using a composite factor which consists of labour and capital. This model is basically 
similar to the one developed by Melitz (1993) which is also based on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
model. The only difference is that Melitz (2003) modelled productivity to enter through the 
output function whilst in our model this is done through the cost function. We use the model 
based on the work of Redding and Venables (2004) because it is simpler and easy to manipulate. 
28 Part of the development of our estimated conceptual framework borrows from the works done by Elbadawi et al (2007) and 
Yoshino (2008) 
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3.3.2 Consumer behavior 
The utility function of a consumer in country k is given as follows 
U k (j > 1 
(1) 
where N is the number of countries and h is the number of firms in each country, X
,lk is the 
amount of product produced by the ith firm in country j and sold in country k; (j is the 
elasticity of substitution among the differentiated products and is assumed to be greater than one. 
(We also assume that in equilibrium all products produced in country j are demanded by 
country k in the same quantity). Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the consumer utility 
maximisation result in consumer demand function expressed as follows29 : 
X uk 
(p uk )- (T 
(n k Y - (T Y k (2) 
where P,lk is the consumer price in country k for the product produced by the ;th firm in country 
j; YK is the total expenditure on domestic as well as foreign manufactured products in country 
k. The own price elasticity of demand in equation (2) is given by (j and the term Ok is the price 
index of manufactured goods in country k. It is expressed as follows 
I 
ilk [ ~l t (p "I )'- a ] i=a 
29 The utility function is maximised subject to the following budget constraint. 
N h 
L LPllkX'lk = Yk 
I~I ,~I 
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(3) 
ntlYk in equation (2) is similar to what Redding and Venables (2002) referred to as "market 
capacity" of country k and it depends on total expenditure in k and on the number of competing 
firms and their prices summarised in .ok. It is on this term that Redding and Venables (2002) 
developed the concept of market access. They defined market access as a measure of market 
potential, measuring the export demand each country faces given its geographical position and 
that of its trading partners. 
3.3.3 Production and firm behaviour 
To produce the horizontally differentiated manufactured products, a firm uses one unit of a 
composite factor which consists of labour and capital to produce one unit of the product. Firms 
vary in production efficiency which is exogenously given and influenced by both public and 
private factors. Fixed production costs (F) are assumed to be identical across all firms and their 
presence result in firms facing increasing returns to scale (IRS) from production. These fixed 
costs are meant to capture entry costs (research and development) and since they are sunk, firms 
that cover their marginal costs survive and produce (Melitz et aI, 2005). 
The cost function of the fh firm in the /h country as assumed by Yoshino, (2008) is specified 
as follows: 
OJ N 
C 'I = F I + ~I Q ljk 
" k = I (4) 
where Q"k is total output of the firm sold in country k; 15" indicates firm specific production 
efficiency level whilst 0J, represent the composite factor price in country j. Firm level 
production efficiency is affected by domestic business environment like provision of quality 
infrastructure e.g. electricity, transport and water etc. These may have varying degrees of impact 
depending on location, sector and alternative sources like ownership of generator or borehole etc. 
Production efficiency is also affected by individual firm's characteristics like foreign ownership, 
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firm size30and even internet connection. 
International trade result in firms incurring additional cost in the form of trade costs. These 
increase the marginal costs of production for export markets in relation to domestic markets and 
these extra trade costs are included in trade theories using the concept of iceberg transport 
costs31 • 
Generally, firm level profits are obtained by maximising the difference between total revenue 
and total costs. Total revenue is given as follows: 
Total Revenue (TR" ) of a firm i from sales in country k is given as; 
N 
Ip1jX,jk 
j=1 
This is after substituting equation (2) into the left hand side of equation (5). 
(5) 
However profit from trade is given as the difference between total revenue and total costs. 
Assuming that a profit maximizing firm sets an f.o.b. price p/ such that 
PlJk = p,/T/k (6) 
N (JI-O" [ N J _ Pijk Yk OJ j Profit-I- V'k{-Fj+-IXijk 
;=1 Q k /T;k bij k=1 
(7) 
30 See Van Ark and Monnikhorf(l996): Van Biesebroeck (2005): Baldwin et al (2002): Leung et al (2008): Yoshino, (2008) on 
foreign ownership and finn size. Internet connection affects the efficiency of indirect labour which also spills over to production 
workers. Efficient communication with suppliers and customers is important for production efficiency 
31 See Giralt and Usategui (1997), Krugman (l991a) Samuelson (1952) and McCann (2003) for more information on 
iceberg transport costs. 
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where Tlk is an iceberg transport costs factor (Tlk > 1) if it equals to one then trade is costIess. 
Trade costs or the proportion of output lost through trading is given as Tlk -1. Equation (6) states 
that the selling price of a given variety varies between countries according to transport costs. 
According to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the firm's profit maximization leads to a producer price 
with a markup rate of _(7_ over marginal cost: From the total cost equation (4) marginal costs 
(7 - I 
OJ 
is equal to Me
'l 
= _I . Multiplying marginal cost by the mark up rate and equating to price 
(J'I 
P'I and also using (6) we get the following 
P ijk 
T ;k 
--OJ . ; 
(Jij (J - 1 
Given this, the value of total exports is equal to 
(8) 
(9) 
This is the same total revenue of a firm in country k . Substituting for price (P,lk ) and X"k , we get 
the following 
N -(7 
L P Ilk Y k P Ilk n 1- (7 T Ik k", ) k 
fa [T ,k m , (j/ / 
N gil 
" (j - 1 Y k L n 1- (7 T }k k", I k (10) 
This can be re- expressed as fo 1I0ws 
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N 
L 
k*j 
Let 
Y k T - (J g(J -I. 1- (J n 1- (J' jk • lj OJ j 
k 
(~)I-a = A (cons tan t) 0" -I 
N Y 
" k • T ~k (J = F MA . L..J n I-(J j I 
hj k 
x, = FMA, .!J,.A 0" > 1 
( 
(y ) I-(J 
(y - 1 (II) 
(lla) 
(II b) 
(llc) 
(12) 
The above equation (lOb) is similar to what Redding and Venables (2001) called foreign market 
access. Infrastructure quality can influence exports or export participation through their effect on 
FMA. For example certain aspects of infrastructure quality could influence trade costs and hence 
T,k in equation (lOb). Infrastructure quality could also directly affect the determinants of 
production efficiency 5" or even composite factor prices OJ,. Thus poor quality infrastructure 
affects productivity and hence the prices of factors of production. 
For this model to incorporate firm heterogeneity, we need now depart from the representative 
firm hypothesis and assume that !J, vary between firms and index each firm by m. We now 
replace !J, by !J,m which still share the same determinants as 1], except that it changes from firm 
to firm in each country. We assume that !J,m can be expressed as some log linear combination 
of firm level controls, some aspects of infrastructure quality as well as unobservable country and 
sector specific effects summed up in the random error term, such that: 
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log 7]im = ao + I a1h 'Pih + I a2e <P iek + J.1 ik 
h e 
where tp represents infrastructure quality 
<I> represents firm level controls 
f.1 is a random error term and m indexes firms 
(13) 
Expressing (12) in logs and then substituting for (13), the structural equation to be estimated 
is therefore of the following form, 
log X ik =/30 + I/3lh 'Pih + I/32e<Piek + /33 log FM4 + J.1ik (14) 
h e 
3.3.4 Export participation Model 
The objective of this chapter is to study the impact of infrastructure variable on the probability to 
export. The main question to answer is: Does the quality of infrastructure affect the likelihood of 
firms to participate in export markets? Therefore the above equation (14) will be estimated as a 
Probit model. We will compare our results with those from a related maximum likelihood Tobit 
model. This will help us ascertain whether infrastructure variables have a significant effect on 
the probability to export or the amount exported. For export participation, we will use the general 
Probit model which assumes the following specification: 
K 
y,* = a + I f3 I X'I + U , (15) 
1=1 
Where a is the common intercept across all firms, Xij is the vector of both firm and non firm 
K 
specific(extemal) explanatory variables summarized by If3 X" excluding the error term. i = 
1=1 
* l...N (the number of firms), j = 1 ... K (the number of explanatory variables) and Yi IS an 
unobserved variable that can only be observed in a dichotomous state such that 
o otherwise (16) 
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* In this study the underlying variable Yi could be considered as the likelihood or probability of a 
firm exporting. The explanatory variables in equation (15) include factors that affect export 
paticipation like infrastructural, geography and firm specific variables. 
This methodological objective helps us to depart from the traditional country level analysis and 
gravity models and employ binary choice models like the Probit as well as the linear probability 
model (LPM) to examine export participation. We however also examine the infrastructural 
determinants of export sales by using a censored regression model such as the Tobit as well as 
the two stage least squares (2SLS). Despite their shortcomings, we use the two stage least 
squares (2SLS) and LPM to check for the robustness of our results. 32 To summarize, our 
estimation procedure will be as follows: 
We will start by estimating a linear probability model, but because of its shortcomings we will 
then use the Probit model to cross check the results. The Tobie3 and 2SLS will be used to 
examine export intensity. 
3.4. Data and variables measurement 
The World Bank's Investment Climate Surveys (lCS) on manufacturing sectors from five Sub 
Saharan African countries namely, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Mauritius are 
the primary source of data used in this study. The surveys in these respective countries were 
done between the years 2002 and 2005 and the total number of manufacturing establishments 
covered is 159834 • These firms were also drawn from 6 International Standards Industrial 
Classification (ISlC) industries in 28 towns and cities and the selection of countries was based 
mainly on availability of comparable data on variables of interest. 
32 The problem with LPM is that of non constant variance resulting in biased standard errors and incorrect hypothesis tests. It can 
also create predicted probabilities that are not bounded by zero and one. 
33 The problem with the Tobit model is that its coefficients simultaneously measure two different effects: the impact of the 
corresponding regressor on the probability of entering export markets and the impact of the corresponding regressor on the 
amount exported (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980) 
34 The data are collected through firm surveys that include a common set of questions for all countries surveyed. The sample is 
selected by a simple random or stratified random sampling method controlling for size sub sector, geographic distribution based 
on company registration records or manufacturing census information available from government. The sample size varies ranging 
from about 100 for small African economies like Lesotho to more than 1000 for big countries like India, China etc. 
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Although the number of African countries covered by the study is rather small, however, 
between them, the five reflect the diversity of economies in the Sub-Saharan African region in 
terms of the level of economic development, export orientation and quality of infrastructure. 
Thus we have landlocked groups, low and middle income as well as big and small economies. 
South Africa and Mauritius are countries where the number of manufacturing exporters is 
relatively high at 60% and 67% respectively. Tanzania and Zambia are in the middle where 
between a quarter and two-fifths of manufactures are exporters. Uganda represents the other 
extreme of countries dominated by inward oriented firms where only 19% of them are into 
exporting (see table 3.1). In terms of transport infrastructure, Mauritius has a high percentage of 
paved roads (95%) with South Africa, Uganda and Zambia in the middle with an average of21% 
of their roads paved. Tanzania on the other extreme has only 9% of its roads paved (WOI, 2007). 
The mam aim of this research is to examine primarily the role of geography (a proxy for 
international transport costs) and infrastructural quality in explaining differences in the 
likelihood to export and export levels in Africa, conditional on certain firm specific 
characteristics like age, firm size, foreign ownership, internet access and efficiency. 
Unobservable country level differences will be controlled for by using country dummies. 
The residuals from a Cobb Douglas production function were used to measure efficiency thus 
capturing productivity differentials among firms in these countries. The production function 
estimated is as follows: 
(16) 
Where y is output per unit of labour, k is capital per unit of labour, m is material inputs per unit 
of labour and I is indirect inputs per unit of labour. A is a firm specific parameter to measure 
technical efficiency. In order to convert these input values into common currency for estimation 
purposes, an average real effective exchange rate was used for the years in which the surveys 
were done in each of the study countries. The exchange rate data is from the World Bank's 
World Development Indicators. 
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The geography variable, foreign market access (FMA) is used as a proxy for international 
transport costs and is measured at city level to get international distance. This is because some 
studies have shown that there is a correlation between transport costs and distance and that a one 
per cent increase in distance, increases transport costs by approximately 0.25 per cent (Zarzoso et 
al 2003). The importance of international distance or international transport costs is also 
motivated by the fact that most African countries' traditional export markets are in the EU and 
USA which are in most cases, especially for southern and eastern Africa, in excess of 3000km. 
This distance is calculated from the nearest port of each city (in the study questionnaire) to the 
capital city of the respective African country's major trading partner using the travel distance 
calculator, MapCrow. This calculator estimates total air distance between any world cities and 
displays map coordinates for each location. Data on major trading partner is obtainable from 
International Trade Centre (ITC) statistics. 
The reason why we prefer international distance calculated from the nearest port is to avoid 
problems of endogeneity associated with local city level distance35 and to differentiate it from a 
closely related variable domestic transport costs which is also used for estimation. This 
differentiation will help us ascertain which of these two costs matter most to exporters. Therefore 
FMA captures the fact that African firms' sea ports are located further away from wealthier and 
denser potential export markets and suppliers, a factor that increases trade costs and may also 
negatively affect the probability to export or even the ability to diversify export markets. Another 
alternative indicator for FMA or international transport costs used in this study is the ratio 
calculated at sectoral level using cost, insurance and freight (cit) as well as free on board (fob) 
values for traded commodities falling in a particular sector. This data is available from 
UNComtrade databases. To calculate this value we compare the export and import values of the 
same commodity exchanged by two trading partners in a given year. We took advantage of the 
fact that importing countries normally record their imports using cif values whilst exporting 
countries report the export of the same commodity in their records using fob values. Importation 
and exportation values of commodities from a given sector in this database are selected and 
35 Using city level distance to proxy FMA means that the variable could be endogenous as exporting firms could be assumed to 
locate closer to ports or export hubs. 
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compared using the same identification code. Thus comparison IS done using the same 
commodity classification code (SITC, ISIC, HS, and BEC)36, same quantity, same net weight, 
same currency valuation and traded or recorded in the same year. We use the cif/fob ratio of any 
commodity in a given sector as a proxy for the international transport costs of transporting goods 
in that sector. The UNcomtrade data query allows us to easily calculate the cif/fob ratio using 
these specifications. 
The quality of infrastructural variables like telecommunication, domestic transport, electricity 
and customs used in this study was proxied using firm level perception indicators obtained from 
the Investment Climate Surveys section on business environment constraints. In these surveys 
each firm was asked to judge the severity of selected infrastructure problems on a five-point 
scale37 • To separate domestic transport costs from international transport costs (proxied by FMA 
and sectoral cif/fob), the calculation of domestic transport costs was done based on perception 
indicators and using firms that are not exporting. The quality of customs, telecommunication, 
water and electricity infrastructure was also alternatively estimated using variables like, average 
number of days to clear exports and imports at customs, number of hours per day or days per 
month without power, water and telephone connection38. To minimise problems of missing 
observations in these variable we used regional or city level averages. Thus we calculated the 
average number of hours or days firms go without electricity or water in a particular city. This 
also corrects for the endogeneity of customs transit days, as number of days it takes to clear 
goods may depend on the experience of the enterprise managers in dealing with custom officials. 
The variation of these infrastructure indicators across regions in each country may reflect 
differences in local governance and differences in the experience of enterprise managers in 
dealing with providers of infrastructure services. 
36 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), International Standards Industrial Classification (ISIC), Harmonized 
System (HS) and Broad Economic Categories (BEC). In measuring this variable we used SITC but in cases where the product 
was not available under the SITC code we alternatively used the ISIC coded products. 
37 The scale is: 0 = no obstacle: I = minor obstacle: 2 = moderate obstacle: 3 = major obstacle; 4 = very severe obstacle. 
38 These are firm level averages and so vary at establishment level. 
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Since a high number of firms own generators to supplement power from the public grid, the 
regressions include an interaction term between a dummy for generator ownership and electricity 
indicator variable. This interaction variable is meant to capture the fact that firms with generators 
may be are able to minimise the negative impact of power outages on their operations and hence 
on exporting. Statistics on table 3.1 below also show that firms' export participation rate and 
export intensity is higher among firms with generators than those without. The assumption on 
these variables is that quality infrastructure is important in enhancing productivity, 
competitiveness and hence export-participation. Thus high values of perception indicators, high 
number of clearing days and many hours without infrastructural services as well as high 
percentage of output lost due to power outages indicate poor infrastructure quality. 
Dummies were also created to capture the unobserved country and sector heterogeneity. This is 
because some products might be more difficult to transport or may use less electricity than others 
whilst in some cases enterprises located in countries with good institutions and economic 
policies might find it easier to export than those from poorer institutional and policy settings. 
These dummies could also capture geographic characteristics of the countries and sectoral 
comparative advantage based on the countries' factor end owments differences relative to their 
trading partners (Yoshino. 2008). To avoid running into the dummy variable trap problem, we 
exclude the constant in all our estimations and where necessary, we specify the reference sector 
or country. The manufacturing sectors covered include textile and garment; plastic, paper and 
packaging; construction and metal; chemical and pharmacy; wood and furniture. The complete 
list of variables used in this study is presented in table A3.1 appendix. 
3.5 Descriptive analysis of data 
3.5.1 Firm specific controls. 
Of the 1598 establishments covered in this chapter, a third of them are small with a work force of 
between 10 to 50 employees and another third is composed of large firms with more than a 100 
workers and the rest are spread out between medium and micro sized firms. The statistics on 
Table 3.5 also corroborate the statistics on Table 3.1 in showing that exporters both at country 
and sectoral level are relatively larger in size, with a country level average of 302 permanent 
employees compared to 112 for inward oriented firms. 
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It also appears that the export participation rate (number of firms exporting) as well as export 
intensity (percentage of output exported) is high amongst large firms. Thus these statistics show 
that of the 526 large firms 70% of them export and these firms export roughly 25% of their 
output compared to an export participation rate and export intensity of 29% and 11 % 
respectively among small firms. This corroborates the argument in the literature that size does 
matter in exporting39. The other feature of these manufacturing firms in these five African 
countries is that a large number of them are in the food and agricultural sector, textile and 
garments as well as plastic, paper and packaging. This pattern is replicated even at country level 
where Zambia and Uganda have at least 40% of their firms in the food and agriculture sector 
whilst South Africa and Tanzania have roughly 30% with Mauritius having the least 20%. (see 
Table 3.3 below). The sector with the least population of firms in all these countries (except 
Tanzania) is that of wood and furniture. 
It is also in the food and agriculture sector as well as textile and garment that we have more firms 
exporting and also a relatively high percentage of output exported (see Table 3.4 for more). 
Statistics show that although only 16% of firms in the textile and garments sectors are involved 
in exporting compared to 23% in food and agriculture, the textile firms export an average of 60% 
of output, 1.2 times more than firms in the food and agricultural sector. Relatively high export 
participation rate coupled with high export intensity in the textile and garment as well as food 
and agriculture sectors means that policies and incentives that have a positive impact on the 
entrance and productivity of firms in these sectors will most likely have a large impact on 
exports. Food and agriculture as well textile and garment are the two sectors that are relatively 
larger in size than other sectors with an average employment level of more than 100 workers. 
This implies that these sectors are composed mostly of large sized firms. It is also in these 
sectors that we have high export participation and export intensity. Zambia is the only country 
with firms in the plastic, paper and packaging sector that do not engage in exporting at all. These 
statistics also show that non exporters have a high proportion of small sized firms and the sector 
with highest number of small size non exporting firms is wood and furniture. This sector has non 
exporting firms whose size is about ten times less than average size of firms that are into 
39 See Rankin et al. 2006; Soderbom and Teal. 2004. 
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exporting. 
Table 3.1 Sample averal!.e firm level exports (all firms) 
II of Exporting Exports % Own Own 100% 
firm participatio intensity foreign Generator Borehole Foreign 
n (%of (%) Equity % firms % firms Owned(% 
firms) rums) 
Countries 
South Africa (2003) 603 60. 17 13.67 15. 13 9.53 0 11 .37 
Tanzania (2003) 276 27.72 12.30 15.77 55 .35 34.70 7.00 
Uganda (2003) 300 19.40 9.86 20.74 36.00 13.45 15.72 
Zambia (2002) 207 40.58 16.21 24.37 38.16 59.90 14.98 
Mauritius (2005) 212 66.83 38.90 8.90 39.22 13.37 5.42 
Secto rs 
Texti le and Gannents 180 16.2 61.8 11.43 25 .99 21.26 6.21 
Food and agric 395 23.4 47.5 20.94 51.15 42.68 12.76 
Chemical--'phannacy 138 9.80 16.8 23 .94 31.39 40.96 16.91 
Plapackaging 193 9.90 19.4 14. 12 22.40 20.21 11.40 
Wood and furniture III 3.90 23 .3 6.49 20.91 18.82 3.60 
Construction and metal 139 5.40 14.4 15.82 36.69 28.71 10.14 
Firm characterisiics 
Own generator 475 15 .39 24.69 26.27 45 .76 15.47 
Foreign ownership 347 14.39 26.68 79.81 47.35 43 . 12 53.45 
Internet 900 34.98 22 .79 22.44 3504 29.55 14.86 
Firm sizes 
Micro 171 5.26 lS I 8.65 1404 7.10 7.60 
Small 546 29.85 11.41 10.87 2809 19.94 7.27 
Medium 320 53 .13 17.26 15.66 29.93 37.58 10.88 
Large 561 70.23 25 .33 26.49 37.69 54.88 17.04 
Source: Author' s own calculatIOn based on World Bank' s Investment Climate Surveys 
Micro if firm size< IO; Small if firm size<50 &>=10 ; Medium iffirm size< IOO &>=50; Large if finn size>=IOO 
Exporters also appear to be common destinations of foreign investment than non exporters. Table 
3.4 also shows that a high percentage of firms that have foreign ownership and export are found 
amongst larger firms. In all the countries and sectors, the exporting industry has a higher number 
of firms with foreign equity participation than domestic oriented firms. Statistics on table 3.1 
above show that the average amount foreign invested in these firms is high in Zambia (24%) 
followed by Uganda with about 21 % with Mauritius having the least amount foreign invested of 
9%. At sectoral level firms with the largest share of foreign ownership are found in the food and 
agriculture as well as chemical and pharmacy. Wood and furniture firms have the lowest share of 
foreign ownership. Generally large firms are more attractive to foreign investors than small 
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firms. This is because statistics show that 27% of equity of large firms is owned by foreign 
multinationals and this is about four times larger than the equity invested in small firms. Uganda 
and Zambia are the two countries with larger number of firms (15%) with 100% foreign 
ownership whilst Mauritius has the least (5%). The chemical and pharmacy, food and agriculture 
as well as plastic paper and packaging have between 11 % to 17% of firms with 100% foreign 
ownership with the wood and furniture being the least at 4%. 
Similarly, a large proportion of exporting firms is generally older and uses the internet to interact 
with customers and suppliers. The average age of exporting firms in our sample is 21 compared 
to 19 for non exporters. Thus the age difference between exporters and non exporters is not very 
large and this explains why some studies found that age does not matter in exporting (see Clarke, 
2003). Statistics also show that larger firms are older than small sized firms even though there is 
no significant age difference between large exporters and non exporters. These statistics also 
show that internet access is relatively poor in Zambia with only 36% of firms connected or 
having a website compared to 96% in Mauritius and at least 70% in the other countries. Firms 
that uses internet more than others are found in the food and agriculture as well as textile and 
garment sectors with the wood and furniture sector having the least connected firms. Internet 
connections are higher among exporters and it seems a high proportion of large firms have a 
website or email to interact with clients or suppliers than smaller firms. 
With respect to infrastructure, perception indicators show that firms that have complained about 
infrastructure problems as an obstacle to their operations are mostly in the exporting sector (see 
table A3.3 appendix). Communications infrastructure appears to be a serious problem to 
exporting firms in Zambia while domestic transport facilities create problems for exporters in 
Uganda. However electricity and customs facilities, appear to present more problems to 
exporting firms in Tanzania and Uganda. South Africa and Mauritius appear to have relatively 
better infrastructure facilities because exporting firms in these countries did not complain much 
about infrastructure as an obstacle. The pattern is however similar when using the number of 
hours per day firms go without infrastructure services. Uganda, Tanzania and Mauritius are the 
countries where firms go for long hours a day without power (see table A3.2 appendix). In the 
case of telephone and water, firms in Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda appear to be the ones 
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seriously affected as they also go for long hours without these services. Statistics on table A3.2 
show that a typical firm in Zambia and Uganda go for about 13 hours a day without a telephone 
connection compared to only 4 hours in South Africa. In the case of water firms in Uganda are 
hard hit as they endure an average of 20 hours without water compared to 3 hours in South 
Africa. The percentage of output lost due to power outages also appear to be high in Tanzania 
and Uganda. An average of 10% is lost in Tanzania whilst 6% is lost in Uganda. The situation is 
a little different when looking at export and import transit days. Days to clear imports at the 
border are relatively higher in Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa with an average of 19, 10 and 
7 days respectively. But in the case of days to export, South Africa tops the list. It takes about 13 
days to clear exports in South Africa compared to 12 days in Tanzania. 
The above statistics on these infrastructure indicators are corroborated by statistics on generator 
and borehole ownership in these countries. At country level, Tanzanian firms have most 
generators (55%) followed by Mauritius and Zambia at 39% and the least being South African 
firms (9%). The food and agriculture sector has the highest number of firms with generators 
(51 %) followed by the construction and metals as well as chemical and pharmacy at 37% and 
31 % respectively. Large firms have more generators (39%) than smaller firms (28%). However it 
seems owning a generator helps these firms to export. The statistics show that firms with 
generators to alleviate power outage problems export about 25% of their output compared to 
firms without generators (13%). 
In addition to owning generators, firms in these countries also have boreholes to minimize the 
problems of water shortages or disconnections. About 60% of firms in Zambia have boreholes 
followed by 35% in Tanzania with South Africa being the only country with no single firm 
owning a borehole. This shows that there are no serious water problems in South Africa to 
require firms to look for alternative sources of water. At sectoral level about two fifths of firms 
in food and agriculture as well as chemical and pharmacy own a borehole compared to about a 
fifth in other sectors. As is the case with generator ownership, a high number of firms owning 
boreholes are also large in size. 
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3.5.2 Tests for correlation 
In order to assess the extent to which the variables we are using in this study are correlated we 
constructed a correlation matrix. The idea here is to test the nature of relationship between the 
explanatory variables particularly those that represent the quality of infrastructure. In the case of 
infrastructure we want to see whether there is a correlation between perception indicators and the 
number of days and hours without infrastructure services. A positive correlation between these 
variables will partly justify the use of perception indicators as alternative measures of 
infrastructure quality. Our results are shown in Table 3.2 below. 
Though not high, there seem to be a positive correlation between variables which we use in the 
study as proxies for international transport costs. Thus our distance variable, FMA is positively 
and significantly correlated with transport costs variable measured using cif and fob values. This 
suggests that an increase in distance also increases transport costs though not on a one to one 
basis. This correlation coefficient partly corroborates the finding by Zarzosso, (2003) that a 1 % 
increase in distance increases transport costs by about 0.25% whilst Clark et aI, (2004) argued 
that doubling distance generates an 18% increase in transport costs. 
The correlation matrix also shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
customs perception index and export and import transit days. This suggests that the formation of 
perceptions by enterprise managers is partly related to the time that it takes to process tradable 
goods at the border. The same positive pattern is replicated between electricity perception 
indicators and number of days and hours without power. Days without power appear to be highly 
correlated with the electricity perception indicator, suggesting that they may be the basis of 
firms' perceptions on the quality of electricity infrastructure. However in the case of 
telecommunications indicator and number of days or hours without a telephone connection, the 
relationship is positive but not significant. This is the case even when correlating internet dummy 
with the telecommunication index. This could be due to the fact that the telecommunication 
index is a composite variable whose value is not based on telephone problems alone but on the 
overall quality of internet, telephone and cellular phone services. Additionally, being connected 
to the internet as represented by the internet dummy used in this study does not suggest anything 
about the quality of internet services in these countries and therefore there should be no 
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significant correlation between the dummy and the telecommunications indicator. The positive 
and significant correlation between transport, customs and electricity indicators mean that it is 
possible to interchangeably use them in our estimation models. 
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Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix** 
FMA CIFIF INTERN TELCO ELECT TRANS CUSTIN POW(H) WAT(H) TEL(H) CUSTD EXPD IMPD POW(D) WAT(D) TEL(D) 
FMA 1.00 
CIFIF 0.42- 1.00 
INTERN 0.36- -0.07 1.00 
TELCO -0.25 -0.13 -0.18- 1.00 
ELCT -0.74- 0.21- -0.26- 0.49- 1.00 
TRANS -0.49- 0.22- -0.20 0.46- 0.54 1.00 
CUSTIN I -0.18 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.34- 0.23 1.00 
POW(H) -0.34- 0.29- -0.14 0.02 0.43- 0.17- 0.12 1.00 
WAT(H) -0.42- 0.34- -0.09 0.11 034 0.27 0.32 0.46 1.00 
TEL(H) -0.65- 0.66- -0.23 0.09- 0.36- 0.26- -0.02 0.19 0.29- 1.00 
CUSTD 0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.09- 0.16 0.03- -0.14 0.08 -0.25- -0.25 1.00 
EXPD I 0.62- -0.10 0.17 -0.30 -0.26 -0.27 0.39- -0.05 -0.35- -0.45 0.69 1.00 
IMPD I -0.28 0.09 -0.09 0.04 0.36 0.19 0.47- 0.13 -0.12 -0.03 0.90· 0.31 1.00 
POW(D) -0.78 0.18- -0.24 0.37 0.81· 0.43- 0.24- 0.25- 0.16 0.24- 0.31- -0.16 0.51 1.00 
WAT(D) -0.22- -0.03 -0.01 0.18 0.50- 0.08- 0.30 0.09 0.13- -0.18 0.15- 0.01 0.18 0.63- 1.00 
TEL(D) -0.25- -0.01 -0.19- 0.33- 0.30 0.19- 0.07- -0.01 0.22 0.15 -0.13 -0.29- 0.02 0.26- 0.34- 1.00 
NB. * means significant at 5% **FMA = Foreign market access; CIF/F =Cost insurance and freight and free on board values; INTERN= Internet; TELCO =Telecoms 
index; ELCT=Electricity index; TRANS=Transport index; CUSTIN=Customs index; POW(H)=Hrs without power; W AT(H)=Hrs without water: TEL(H)=Hrs 
without a telephone; EXPD= days to export: IMPD=days to import; CUSTD= (EXPD + IMPD)l2; POW(D), WAT(D), TEL(D)= days without power. water and a 
telephone per month respectively. 
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Table 3.3 Distribution of firms among sectors in each country (Export participation rates) 
All countries (e/e) South Africa (e;e) Zambia (e/e) Tanzania (e;e) Upnda(e/e) Mauritius (e/e) 
(1598) ( 603) (207) (276) (300) (212) 
All firms ex rters All firms e rters All firms ex rters All firms ex rter All firms e rters All fmns e 
Texti Ie_Garment 11.4 16.2 18.2 61.2 5.80 83 .3 11.2 38.7 5.00 6.70 36.0 
Food_agric 24.9 23.4 28.4 43.6 44.0 47.3 29.3 49.4 40.7 64.4 19.2 
Chemicalyhannarcy 8.70 9.80 8.90 60.4 10.1 38.1 9.80 33.3 6.00 38.9 9.40 
Plapackaging 12.2 9.90 23.0 46.2 6.30 000 9.10 16.0 7.70 13.0 11.3 
Woodhlnliture 7.00 3.90 4.00 41.7 2.90 50.0 23 .6 15.4 2.30 14.3 14.4 
Constmction metal 8.80 5.40 14.6 62.1 16.4 14.7 14.5 10.0 20.3 9.80 5.90 3.60 
Source: Author' s own computations based on World Bank' s Investment Climate Surveys 
Note: numbers in brackets represent the total number of firms in each country. All finilS represent the percentage of firms in each country that belong to any of the sectors. 
Table 3.4 Distribution of firms among sectors in each country (Export intensity) 
All countries (e/e) South Afric:a (%) Zambia (e;e) Tanzania (e~) Upnda(e~) Mauritius (e/e) 
(1598) ( 603) (207) (276) (300) (212) 
All firms ex rters All firms e rters All firms ex rters All firms ex rter All firms e rters All firms e rter 
Textile Garment 40.1 61.8 17.4 28.4 45.7 54.8 21.2 54.7 6.33 95 .0 71.0 80.3 
Food_agric 19.8 47.5 8.62 19.8 18.9 40.0 28.9 61.1 20.9 68.4 18.3 36.6 
Chemicalyhannarcy 8.47 16.8 10.1 17.2 2.79 7.31 4.32 12.9 10.7 27.4 14.5 18.6 
Plapackaging 7.12 19.4 9.01 18.0 0.00 4.81 24.8 0.97 4.83 14.6 30.5 
Woodfumiture 5.40 23 .3 4.75 11.4 32.4 64.8 2.05 18.1 1.71 12.0 15.1 34.0 
Constmction metal 4.04 14.4 9.16 15.1 3.44 15.5 0.87 8.75 1.73 13.8 6.50 15.6 
Source: Author' s own computations based on World Bank' s Investment Climate Surveys 
Export intensity is the average amount exported by firms in these sectors. 
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Table 3.5 Firm level varia bles ave rages by country and sectors 
Owner: She Foreign ownenhip Age TFPI Produetivity Internet access 
MaIe('Ye of (% offlnns) .ven ae (ele of flnns) 
ftnns) 
Non Non Non Non NOlI 
Exportcn Exporter Exporten Exporter Exporter Exporter Exporters Exporter export« Exporter 
South Africa 90 .86 159 465 11.0 26.0 20 29 -0.082 0.049 58.0 79.0 
Zambia 85 .40 108 397 23 .0 39.0 19 20 -0.804 -0.756 2 1.0 36.0 
Tanzania 92.27 185 2 19 15.0 42 .0 19 17 0.712 0.639 38.0 80.0 
Uganda 94.6 1 41 2 11 13.0 64 .0 12 17 0.929 1.1 84 20.0 71.0 
Mauriti us 88.27 66 2 16 6.0 21.0 27 24 0.489 0.648 86.0 96.0 
TeJ\.1ile _ Gannent 72.77 10 1 446 6.0 10.3 19 23 0.338 0.153 7.42 17.3 
Food and agric 78 .95 142 433 23.3 32.7 15 24 0.246 0.169 20.8 20 .9 
Chemicaly harmarcy 74.13 84 164 15.5 10.3 18 22 0.3 14 0. 154 10.7 10.3 
Plapackaging 79.87 63 185 15.5 6.73 20 21 0.152 0.498 20.8 10.8 
Woodfumi ture 99.60 39 3 14 2.59 3 .1 4 18 19 0.289 0.327 7.72 2.90 
Constmction metal 82.21 50 237 15.5 4 .93 19 34 0.489 0.355 10.7 5.4 1 
Firm sizes I 
Small 90.05 22 27 11 .5 2 1.5 16 15 0.248 0.273 41.0 65 .0 
Medi um 90.63 69 69 18.0 21.0 2 1 2 1 -0.1 00 0.147 49.0 75 .0 
Large 91.06 373 651 2 1.0 39.0 27 3 1 -0. 148 0.06 1 6 1.0 83 .0 
Source: Author' s own computations based on World Bank' s Investment Climate Surveys 
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3.5.3 Summary 
These descriptive statistics show that exporters are larger in size, older, uses internet 
more, are attractive to foreign investors and are more likely to own boreholes and 
generators as well as complain more about infrastructure problems than non exporters. 
These statistics also show that most of the large firms are owned by males. 
3.6 Geographical and market diversification of exports 
Diversification of export markets is also one avenue through which African countries can 
achieve high export growth and export participation. Diversification of exports can take 
the form of: (i) diversifYing the range of markets into which existing products are sold 
(geographical diversification); (ii) increasing the range of products sold in a particular 
market (horizontal diversification) and moving out of primary into manufactured exports 
so as to benefit from strong spillover effects referred to as vertical diversification 
(Lehmann and Herzer, 2004). Brenton et aI, (2007) also argue that export diversification 
is a positive trade objective and important for sustaining economic growth. 
Diversification makes countries less vulnerable to adverse terms of trade shocks by 
stabilising export revenues and also encourages broader economic integration (Ghosh and 
Ostry, 1994). 
Export diversification studies which decomposed export growth over time found that 
growth of the intensive as well as extensive margins have been the driving forces behind 
high export expansion (Brenton et aI, 2007)40. Evenett and Venables (2002) decomposed 
export growth of 23 developing countries (to 92 importers) over 1970 to 1997 for around 
200 product categories and found that selling existing products to new markets accounted 
for one third of exports growth for their smaller set of developing countries. Alberto and 
Martha (2008) also investigated geographic and product diversification patterns of a cross 
country of developing nations between 1990 and 2005. Using gravity equations they 
found that geographical diversification is more important than product diversification 
40 Intensive margins refers to horizontal diversification whilst extensive is geographical diversification. 
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especially for developing nations. They argued that reducing trade costs and trading with 
countries in the North have positive impacts on export diversification for developing 
countries. Thus good transport infrastructure (roads, rails, seaports and airports), effective 
telecommunication systems as well as efficient customs procedures which are important 
in reducing trade costs, promote market diversification and thus foster economic or 
regional integration. 
Diversification of markets is also important to exporters in that it increases export sales 
and reduces a country's dependence on a small number of export markets and hence the 
vulnerability to shocks within destination countries. We try to capture the degree of 
market diversification in this section using the concept of number of equivalent markets, 
an approach that was developed by the International Trades Centre. This approach or 
formula was basically derived from the Herfindahl index41 by Adelman (1969) when he 
suggested interpreting an inverted Herfindahl index as a "numbers equivalent". In order 
to capture the degree of market diversification, the equivalent number (NE) formula is 
used and it distinguishes for each country, the number of partner countries weighed 
according to their importance as follows: 
41 Adelman (1969) suggested interpreting an inverted Herfindahl index as a "numbers equivalent. "The index 
approaches zero in the competitive case with a large number of small firms and equals one in the monopoly case, so its 
inverse approaches infinity in the competitive case and one in the monopoly. In our context, the inverse may be thought 
of as giving the number of equivalent sized markets that would provide a degree of competition equivalent to that 
actually observed in the market share data. The index captures inequality in market share by summing the square of 
each country's market share. For example if a country has two markets and having 50% market share in each, the 
Herfindahl index is 0.502 +0.502 =112. Inverting this gives 2 (effective markets). Similarly the index for three equal 
sized markets in three countries is 3 xO.33 3 = 1/3, so inversion gives 3 effective markets. But if there were 3 markets 
with the largest serving 2/3 of the country's exports and the other two each serving 116 of the country's exports, the 
Herfindahl index would be 1/2, which also translates into 2 effective markets. Thus the number of effective markets has 
a more intuitive interpretation than the Herfindahl index. 
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NE I 1 
( J
2 
P Xl / I ijcl 
;=1 /x :cI (17) 
X:/ ci = country i exp orts of all products belonging to cluster cl to country j in year t 
X:cI = country i total exp orts of all products belonging to the cluster cl 
X:/ ci / = the share of market j in country itotal exports of products belonging to the cluster cl 
/ X:cI 
The International Trades Centre (lTC) calculates the number of equivalent markets for a 
number of products exported by countries using the above formula. Since in this study 
our products are classified into six sectors, we then grouped all the products and the 
associated number of equivalent markets into these categories and then calculated an 
average NE value for each sector. The ITC calculates the NE value for a number of 
products exported by each country and what we did was to pick those products and 
associated NE values from the ITC database for each country and related them to the six 
sectors that we are working with. To calculate a specific NE value for each sector we 
calculated the average NE value for all the products in that particular sector. The use of 
these ITC values is necessitated by the fact that it is not possible to obtain this kind of 
information from the World Bank survey data on some of the study countries. Since this 
was not one of the main variables that determined the selection of study countries, we 
decided to fill the gap by using ITC data. 
Using Table 3.6 below, the average number of equivalent markets is high in South Africa 
(14.9), partly reflecting its level of development, economic size as well as relatively large 
number of developed ports. South Africa is home to about six major commercial ports 
compared to three in Tanzania and only one in Mauritius with the remaining countries 
Zambia and Uganda being landlocked. Thus if availability of close ports is important in 
exporting this could explain why the number of equivalent markets is relatively high in 
South Arica compared to other countries. There are about 14.9 equivalent markets for 
each commodity sector in South Africa compared to about three (3) in landlocked 
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countries in our study sample (see Table 3.6 below). The geographical orientation of 
exports also varies among sectors as well, generally reflecting the comparative advantage 
of these African countries vis a vis the rest of the world. These African countries export 
food and agriculture related products to a relatively large number of markets. This is 
followed by the plastic, paper and packaging sector with about 7.2 equivalent markets 
compared to 4.2 for firms in the least diversified leather and footwear sector. However, 
although food and agriculture firms serve a large number of markets, the average amount 
exported in the sector is far much lower than in the textile and garments sector (see Fig 
3.1). This means that to achieve high export revenues, we need to complement 
diversification gains with high export intensity. 
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Table 3.6 Market diversification (No of equivalent markets) by country and sector 
Cotmtry Average No of Markets 
Per commodity sector 
Sectors Average No ofMatkets 
Tanzania 
South Africa 
Mauritius 
Uganda 
Zambia 
5.0 
14.9 
4.6 
3.2 
3.0 
Wood and Furniture 
Textile and Gannents 
Leather and footwear 
Source: International Trades Centre (fTC): Trade Competitiveness Map (Trade perfornlance Index) 
Fig 3.1 Relationship between market diversification and export intensity 
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3.7 Econometric issues 
The dependent variable in our models is either the percentage exported or a dummy variable 
taking a value of one when the firm is exporting and zero otherwise. Given this measurement it is 
clear that we are dealing with a censored dependent variable. This is not only in the sense that 
percentage exported cannot be negative but a firm that is not exporting is assumed to be a corner 
solution to choice based on the profitability of exports42 (Elbadawi et aI, 2006). The other source 
of censoring in our data comes from the fact that percentage exported lies between zero and 
hundred whilst export participation is represented by a dummy resulting in the dependent 
variable being censored from both below and above. This makes Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates biased and to correct this we estimate by maximum likelihood a Probit function of 
equation (14) as presented under the theoretical framework. Although our objective is to analyze 
the impact of infrastructure quality on both export participation and intensity by using the Probit 
and Tobit models, we will nonetheless supplement these with other models that make different 
estimation assumptions to check for robustness43 . 
3.7.1 Country results and the pooling assumption 
Since we are using country cross section analysis to estimate our coefficients, it is therefore 
important to test whether pooling these countries together will not affect the reliability of our 
estimates. Pooling basically assumes that we can impose the same coefficient on each country or 
industry for the same regressor, i.e that on average the effects of each explanatory variable on the 
dependent variable is the same across countries (Becker and Hall, 2004). However, if the size of 
the true effects varies considerably between countries, the estimates may be misleading in two 
42 Melitz (2003) in his new trade theoretic threshold model of exporting of this kind argued that firms that have passed the 
profitability threshold export on scales that increase monotonically with profitability. While the profitability can thus be inferred 
from the scale of exports for exporters, the dispersion of the potential profitability cannot be observed from their exporting status. 
So what is being censored in our data is thus not the scale of exports but rather the profitability of exporting for non exporters. 
43 In most cases when it comes to exporting, the binary models like Logit and Probit are more informative than Tobit in that they 
clearly distinguish the impact of independent variables on export participation. The Tobit model however does not clearly 
differentiates between export participation and export intensity. 
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ways. First, the pooled coefficients will not be the average but rather be biased towards zero or 
smaller value (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). Even for relatively small parameter heterogeneity the 
bias may be significant (Robertson and Symons, 1992). Second, the pooled coefficients will not 
provide a reliable estimate of the effect of a change in the explanatory variables on exports in 
different cross section members (Becker and Hall, 2004). Thus if the micro units underlying the 
aggregated data are heterogeneous, their individual characteristics can differ significantly from 
those of the aggregate data (Granger, 1980, Lewbel, 1992 and 1994), and policy inference based 
on the aggregate evidence could be misleading. Becker and Pain (2003) test the pooling 
assumption using principal components analysis whilst Franzese (2003) as well as Beck and 
Katz (2001) propose using what they refer to as "cross validated standard errors". Stanig, (2005) 
suggest adding interaction terms between country dummies and explanatory variables and then 
testing their significance44 . However since carrying out pooling tests is not the main focus of our 
study, we will use a simple test. We check whether the pooled and country by country regression 
coefficients are significantly different (Stanig, 2005). 
44 The main shortcoming of this procedure is that the estimates of the country-specific slopes are less efficient than the pooled 
estimates, even if they are not biased in the case in which the coefficient is not constant across countries (Stanig, 2005). 
82 
Table 3 . 7: Summary of Country level results: Tobit Model (using hours and percentage 
exported)aaa 
Variables 
Sector dummies 
Foreign ownership 
Internet 
Efficiency 
Log age 
Log size 
Sectoral (cif/fob) 
South 
Africa 
Yes 
6.222 
(3.423) * 
7.527 
(4 . 1 74 ) * 
4.6733 
(1. 3074 ) *** 
0 . 095 
(1. 559 ) 
3.875 
(1.55 0) ** 
-1.559 
(0 .501 ) * 
Power outages (hrs) - 4 .270 
(1. 843 ) ** 
Water probs (hrs) 2.913 
(1. 257) ** 
Telephone prob (hrs) 1 .73 4 
(1.585 ) 
Efficiency x electricity -0 .4 638 
(1. 936 1 ) 
Efficiency x -0 . 2406 
telephone (0.5129) 
Efficiency x water -0 .72 55 
(0 . 014 9) 
Outages x generator 2 . 118 
(1.111 )* 
Ave customs (days) -2 . 577 
(0.7 12) ** 
Constant -7.454 
(17.089) 
Observations 259 
Zambia 
Yes 
1 . 436 
(0.649) ** 
18 .308 
( 11. 646) 
9.7013 
(4.6133) ** 
-2.9 11 
(4.797) 
15 .222 
(4.7 13 ) *** 
-64.864 
(34.538)* 
-13.6 16 
( 6.813 ) * 
- 4.252 
(1. 413 ) *** 
- 0.528 
( 1. 665 ) 
-0 . 0352 
(0 .1403) 
-0 .1 517 
(0 .1 070) 
-0.0473 
(0.28 19 ) 
6.951 
(1.976) *** 
- 5.584 
(3 . 989 ) * 
135.653 
(100.677) 
129 
Absolute values of standard errors in parenthesis 
Uganda Mauritius 
Ye s Yes 
-26.529 5.654 
(3 6.845 ) (1. 9479) *** 
51.511 48.787 
(18.4 75) *** (24.307 ) ** 
4. 5066 5.5763 
(2. 4394 ) * (1. 0303) *** 
- 1. 825 -17.455 
(8.60 1 ) (7 .496) ** 
12.531 21. 290 
(6.1 59 ) ** (5 .614 ) *** 
93.980 -41.535 
(38.04 1 ) ** (33 . 777) 
- 1. 535 -1. 614 
(5.228) (0.66 6 ) ** 
-3.360 0. 52 1 
(1. 608 ) ** (0. 191 ) *** 
- 3 .8 55 -0 . 963 
(2. 13 2) * (0.850) 
0 . 0582 0 . 4178 
(0. 1648 ) (0. 14 70) 
-0.3768 -0 . 9872 
(0 .4 086) (0.3835) * 
-0.906 5 -0. 1665 
(0.8484) (0. 3933 ) 
4.343 -0.746 
(1. 695 ) ** (0.997) 
-19.981 6.783 
(13.954) (2.886) ** 
48.293 - 175. 16 9 
(191.164) (50. 4 09) 
181 125 
**Significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; * significant at 10% level 
aaa excluded Tanzania because the sample size was very small with 83 observations. 
Country level results presented on Table 3.7 above show that foreign ownership variable is 
significant in all the countries except Uganda. Thus the transference of skills and technologies, 
accessibility to overseas business networks and marketing channels as well as affordable lines of 
credit are very important for firms in these countries to boost exports. The insignificance of this 
variable in Uganda could partly explain why export participations and export intensity levels are 
comparatively low. Only less than 20% of firms export and the proportion of output sold in 
foreign markets is 9% compared to an average of 50% and 20% respectively for the other four 
83 
countries. Other firm specific variables like internet dummy, firm size and efficiency are 
generally significant determinants of exports in these countries. However the internet dummy is 
insignificant in Zambia and this is probably explained by the low internet connection rate of 21 % 
among non exporters and 36% in outward oriented enterprises. Thus being large in size and 
productive is important for firms that want to grow their exports. 
Results on infrastructure indicators suggest that electricity problems have a significant negative 
relationship on exports in South Africa, Mauritius and Zambia whilst water problems matter only 
in Zambia and Uganda. Having a generator enables firms to minimize the negative effects of 
power outages on exports in all the countries. However telephone problems have a negative and 
significant impact only in Uganda. The international transport costs variable estimated by using 
cif and fob values has a negative effect on exporting but only significant in Zambia and South 
Africa. Thus poor foreign market access and supplier access makes it expensive for firms to 
acquire inputs that they need to produce competitive exports. Efficiency-infrastructure 
interaction variables are all insignificant in all countries even though they carry the expected 
sign. This means that being efficient in a place where infrastructure quality is poor has a weak 
negative effect on the amount firms are able to export. Lastly, the customs variable calculated by 
taking the average of imports and exports transit days appear to be significant with a negative 
sign in South Africa and Zambia only. 
These results basically show that the pattern of significance of these explanatory variables is 
generally the same across all the four countries and using Stanig (2005) basic rule of thumb 
should make it possible for us to pool the countries together. 
3.7.2 Endogeneity tests 
After having pooled the data, the cross sectional results using OLS, Probit and the Tobit models 
are shown in table 3.8. These results from these first regressions indicate that electricity, 
transport and international distance (FMA) variables are statistically insignificant whilst 
telecommunication and customs variables are statistically significant but with wrong expected 
signs. They also show foreign ownership, firm size and internet connection to be significant 
whilst age and efficiency are insignificant. It would be erroneous to draw any definitive 
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conclusions from these results since the estimates could be biased due to possible endogeneity of 
all perception based infrastructure indicators. 
Table 3.8 Regressions using OLS and Probit Models (Export participation Models) 
Sectoral dummies 
Foreign ownership 
Log age 
Log size 
Efficiency 
internet 
Telecommunication 
Transportation 
Electricity 
Customs 
Regulation 
Log FHA 
Electricity x 
generator 
Zambia 
Tanzania 
South Africa 
uganda 
Mauritius 
Efficiency x 
electricity 
Efficiency x 
telecomms 
Efficiency x 
transportation 
OLS OLS Probit by maximum Probit by maximum 
likelihood likelihood 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Yes 
0.0189 
(2.6535) 
-0.6l49 
(2.2905) 
-5.0484 
(2.4858)** 
20.2006 
(2 . 8367}*** 
-12.2412 
(3.1806) *** 
3.1921 
(2.0739) 
16.3372 
(2.6085) *** 
Yes 
5.0752 
(2.1821)** 
2.2791 
(0.9535}*** 
5.3032 
(0.7651)*** 
0.2381 
(1.1979) 
5.5495 
(2.0459)** 
1.5543 
(0.9556) ** 
-0.4383 
(0.7988) 
-0.4343 
(0.8647) 
-0.4537 
(0.6832) 
-44.7367 
(45.4536) 
1.5463 
(0.9981}*** 
5.5232 
(5.4428) 
20.8429 
(23.6634) 
6.9316 
(15 . 1299) 
31. 4322 
(10 . 9233)*** 
-101823 
(4 . 1567) ** 
0 . 4474 
(2 . 5856) 
12.3551 
(3.2310 ) ** 
Yes 
-0.2023 
(0 . 0890)*** 
-0.4231 
(0.0218)*** 
0.2481 
(0 . 1863) 
-0.1640 
(0.0210)*** 
0.8678 
(0.2635)*** 
0.1898 
(0.1639) 
0.4937 
(0.2083)** 
Yes 
10.0473 
(5.1761) * 
- 2 . 7622 
(2.3087) 
10 . 8382 
(1.9207)*** 
1.8761 
(2 . 7030) 
13.7752 
(5 . 0974) *** 
4.5315 
(2.2535)** 
0.0936 
(1. 9391) 
-1.8890 
(1.9119) 
0.87l4 
(1.6621) 
-101.2302 
(112.8104) 
8.8789 
(2.9040) *** 
0.1496 
(13.2344) 
0.2843 
(0.1753) 
0.5449 
(0.1469) 
0.1470 
(0 . 4299) 
0 . 7045 
(0 . 2867)** 
-0 . 9425 
(2 . 5765) 
0.7433 
(0 . 9505) 
0.4296 
(0.4684) 
Yes 
0.2367 
(0 . 0967)** 
-0 . 0262 
(0 . 0830) 
- 0. 0511 
(0.0839) 
0.1460 
(0 . 0725)** 
-2 . 9276 
(4 . 8518) 
0 . 1677 
(0 . 1231) 
0.1522 
(0 . 0471)* 
0.3773 
(1 . 5404) 
0.0735 
(1.4727) 
-0.0481 
(2.6611) 
-0.3621 
(0.5249) 
0.3921 
(0.3924) 
0.8915 
(0 . 4532) ** 
Absolute values o f st a ndar d errors in p a r e nthesis 
*** Si gni f icance at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level ; *S i gnificant at 1 0% level . 
Perception indicators could be endogenous in that enterprise managers with greater experience 
dealing with infrastructural problems might have different perceptions about these variables than 
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managers without the same level of experience (Clarke, 2004)45 . Consequently, export behaviour 
might affect perceptions rather than the reverse. As in Table A3 .3 in the appendix, exporters 
complain more about infrastructure problems than non exporters. This is because sometimes, 
firms exporting more might also be producing more and the problems of infrastructure service 
quality are more likely felt when firms produce more and thus need these services more 
compared with non exporters. The alternative variable like days to clear customs could be 
endogenous since it is based on the experiences of the individual firms. In this case, the more 
firms export, the more likely they are to experience problems in their trade related transactions 
such as customs clearance (Y osh ino, 2008). To test the endogeneity of the four perceptions based 
infrastructural indicators we use the Durbin Wu Hausman test in the context of OLS and the 
Smith Blundell test (Smith Blundell, 1986)46 in the context of the Tobit model. The results of 
these tests are shown on Table 3.9 below. 
Table 3.9 Summary of endogeneity 
Tests and endogenous variables 
Durbin Wu Hausman endogeneity test 
Smith Blundell exogeneity test 
Anderson- Rubin weak instrument test 
Anderson Rubin Wald test 
Cragg- Donald weak instrument test 
Telecommunications 
Electricity 
Transport 
Customs 
* * Thl s lS a Ch i Squa re va l ue 
tests and first stage regression 
All industries 
Shea ' s 
Part i al Partial 
R- squared R- squared 
0. 1 2 0. 11 
0 .11 0 . 11 
0 .11 0. 11 
0 . 09 o .l1 
results from 2SLS 
F-Value Probability 
Value {P>F) 
3 . 9 2 0.003 8 
5.44 0 . 0003 
3. 84 0 . 00 43 
15.8 7 ** 0.0032 
14.85 
2 1 .52 0 . 0000 
19. 8 7 0 . 0000 
2 1.1 9 0 . 0000 
2 1. 2 4 0 . 0000 
All these endogeneity tests reject the null hypothesis that instrumented regressors are exogenous. 
This rejection means that we should use a 2SLS, endogenous tobit and probit models for 
estimation instead of the standard models. We attempt to control for endogeneity in these 
infrastructure variables by substituting with the average perception index of firms involved in 
45 This experience could also affect the number of days production is interrupted by infrastructural fa ilures. For example more 
experienced managers can minimise the number of days the ir goods take to clear at customs or to have a telephone connection 
because they understand the way the systems fu nction better than inexperienced managers. 
46 The steps to foll ow in impl ementing these tests of endogeneity are explained in Wooldridge, 2002, page 53 1 
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exporting in the same region and same sector. For domestic transport infrastructure, the sector 
regional average was done across firms that service the domestic market only. According to 
Clarke, (2004), this approach does not only correct for endogeneity but also cleans out white 
noise associated with the perceptions of the individual managers. Alternative infrastructural 
ind icators were also calculated using the concept of region-sector averages. 
Since weak instruments can produce biased instrumental variable (IV) estimators47 and 
hypothesis tests with large size distortions (Stock and Y ogo, 2004), we test the validity of our 
region-sector infrastructure perceptions averages using the Cragg-Donald statistic, Anderson and 
Rubin test as well as Shea's partial R-squared. Stock and Yogo (2004) provide two general 
definitions of a weak instrument set. One is based on the bias of the estimator and the other on 
the size distortion of the associated Wald statistic. They argue that an instrument set is weak if 
the ratio of bias of the IV estimates to the bias of the OLS estimates is likely to exceed some 
tolerable level, B. Using size distortion they argue that an instrument is strong from the 
perspective of the Wald test if the size of the test is close to its level for all possible 
configurations of the IV regression model. Stock and Y ogo (2004) therefore propose tests for 
weak instruments based on these definitions and on the Cragg Donald statistic (Cragg and 
Donald, 1993). However the maximal bias approach can only be used if there is over-
identification and the number of instruments is more than the number of endogenous regressors 
by at least two degrees of over identification. 
Since our model is just identified the only Stock and Yogo (2004) defmition that is applicable is 
the one based on maximal 5% Wald test size distortion. The null of the test that instrument set is 
weak is rejected if the Cragg Donald test statistic exceeds the Stock and Y ogo critical values that 
vary with the desired maximal size distortion (r), the number of instruments (K) and the number 
of endogenous regressors (R). Our Cragg-Donald test statistic has a value of 14.85 (see table 
3.9). Stock and Yogo (2004) provide critical values at the 5% level of significance and for 
various configurations of r = 0.1, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25; R=I,2 and K= 1,2,3, ........... ,30. Since we 
47 This argument is supported by Wooldridge, 2002 page 101, that IV methods can be ill behaved if the instruments are weak 
leading to inconsistent estimators and hence severe finite sample bias. 
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have R= 4 we do not have the exact critical value that our test statistic can be compared with. To 
go around this problem we will use the approach taken by Elbadawi et al (2007), where we take 
advantage of the fact that for given r and given K, the critical value strictly decreases with R. 
This enables us to use the critical values Stock and Yogo (2004) provide for the case of R=2 as 
the upper bound to the true critical value we would ideally use. For a choice of r =0.15, so that 
the maximal size distortion of the IV estimator is 15% of the maximal 5% Wald test distortion, 
the critical value at K=4 and R=2 is 9.93. The true critical value corresponds to R=4 and should 
be even lower than that. We can therefore be confident that this test would reject the null of weak 
instruments given our Cragg Donald statistic of 14.85. It would do so even more clearer and 
easily if we choose r to be higher say r = 0.2 or 0.25, in which case the critical values at K =4 
and R=2 is 7.54 and 6.28 respectively. 
Another useful IV diagnostic is that provided by Shea's partial R- squared (Shea, 1997) which 
basically shows the contribution of an instrument without the inclusion of the contribution of 
other instruments or regressors. It is a test of the individual explanatory power of the IVs. As a 
rule of thumb and for models with multiple endogenous regressors, if an estimated equation 
yields a larger value of the standard R squares and a small value of the Shea partial R squares, 
one may conclude that the instruments lack sufficient relevance to explain all the endogenous 
regressors and therefore the model maybe essentially under identified (Bo Malmberg et al 
(2004). The closeness of the Shea's R squared values in table 3.9 show enough separate variation 
in the instruments which are positive and statistically significant for each of the endogenous 
regressors. 
Another test for robust inference in the weak instrument case is the Anderson- Rubin Wald test 
(Anderson and Rubin, 1949) .This test has correct size in cases where instruments are weak and 
when they are not and its null hypothesis is that excluded variables (instrumental variables) 
coefficients are equal to zero. In our model the null is rejected at 1 % level suggesting that our 
instruments are relevant. Thus the bottom line from all these tests is that there is no evidence that 
our estimation results which uses these instruments suffer from potential weak instrument 
problem. However, the important caveat is that, these conclusions are based on diagnostic tests 
that can only be implemented in linear models. 
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The inclusion of the efficiency parameter in our models may also pose some econometric 
problems since it enters the estimated equations as a generated regressor in the sense of Pagan 
(1984). In accordance with Elbadawi et al (2007), standard estimates of the variance-covariance 
matrices of the OLS estimators and maximum likelihood Tobit estimators would therefore lead 
to standard errors that are invalid as they ignore the sampling error involved at the stage of 
estimating the regressors. To deal with this problem we used bootstrapping techniques to obtain 
consistent standard errors in the estimation of models below using 50 full sample replications 
where possible. 
3.8 Presentation and analysis of Cross sectional results 
The estimations under cross sectional analysis were done using a number of models such as the 
Tobit, Probit, Linear Probability Model so as to check whether our results are robust to changes 
in model specification. Thus if our results are able to withstand the stress (do not change 
markedly) after being subjected to different models built on different assumptions, then they are 
statistically robust. We also used different indicators of infrastructure quality and international 
transport costs so as to check whether our estimations are robust to changes in variable 
specifications as well. Our results are presented on Tables 3.10 to 3.13 below. 
Country dummies: A number of studies in the literature have found that being in Africa on its 
own has a negative effect on trade and growth (see Elbadawi et aI, 2006; Fielding 2000; Burger 
and du Plessis, 2006; Redding and Venables, 2004). We examine the presence of a negative 
African dummy by comparing the signs and the significance of our country dummies before and 
after controlling for infrastructure and firm specific variables. By using country dummies alone 
as regressors we want to examine the impact of being in any of these African countries on the 
probability to export. Thus does being in Zambia on its own have a positive or negative effect on 
export participation? After controlling for infrastructure and other firm specific variables, the 
idea now is to find out whether the quality of infrastructure, changes the impact of country 
effects on export participation. This difference will give us an idea whether changes in quality of 
infrastructure can account for differences in likelihood to export or amount exported by firms in 
these countries. Our regression results on Table 3.8, columns 1 and 3 above, where we exclude 
infrastructure and firm specific regressors, corroborates the fact that being in Zambia, Tanzania 
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and Uganda has a negative influence on exporting compared to being in South Africa. This is 
because these country dummies are negative and also significant. This suggests that a typical 
firm in these countries (Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania) is far less likely to enter export markets 
than a typical firm in South Africa. This is because the probability to export in South Africa is 
higher than in these other countries. To find out the reason that can account for this, we then 
control for infrastructure quality and firm specific characteristics. We find that the country 
dummies of Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda are no longer significant but are now positive. This 
could suggest that the difference between export participation rates in South Africa and these 
countries could be a result of poor quality infrastructure. In South Africa and Mauritius, the 
country dummies are positive and this is the case even after controlling for the quality of 
infrastructure and business characteristics. The general infrastructure facilities in South Africa 
and Mauritius probably provide a good environment for firms to participate or increase their 
exports. This argument is partly supported by infrastructure indicators on Tables A3.2 and A3.3 
in the appendix. Thus infrastructure perception indicators as well as number of days and hours 
without infrastructure services are lower for South Africa and Mauritius compared to other study 
countries. Our inference however must be qualified by the fact that we also controlled for firm 
characteristics in columns 2 and 4 in table 3.8. It could then be that the negative dummies in 
Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda reflect the fact that firms in these countries are older, smaller and 
lack foreign participation. To check this we decided to exclude these firm specific characteristics 
in column 5, table 3.8. Results show that controlling for infrastructure does change the negative 
dummies in these countries. 
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Table 3.10: Pooled re ression results usin 
2SLS Model Bndogenous Bndogenous Endogenous 2SLS Model 
perceptions Tobit Tobit Probit Perceptions 
Variables Perceptions Perceptions Perceptions Linear Prob 
(internet) (no internet) Dlodel 
Dependent variables Pexport Pexport Pexport Probexport Probexport 
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign ownership 5.2124 10.9467 13. 0 386 0.3593 0.1 061 
( 2 . 9174 ) * (6.132 0) * (6.1941 ) ** ( 0.1607 ) ** ( 0.04 7 5 ) ** 
Log age -2.2856 -4.8397 - 4.5556 -0 . 0 442 -0. 012 0 
(1 . 2548 ) * (2.7159 ) * ( 2.7280 ) * ( 0 . 0686 ) ( 0.0206 ) 
Log size 5.5331 12.8190 14.5146 0.4275 0.1265 
(1. 0 522 ) *** (2 . 3209 ) *** (2.3386 ) *** ( 0. 0 618 ) *** (0.01 7 2 ) *** 
Efficiency - 1.8201 6.5063 5 . 4405 0 .0869 0.0291 
(3 . 8636 ) (8.2908) (8.3357 ) ( 0 . 2243 ) ( 0.0631 ) 
Efficiency x 6.9438 - 1.4423 - 2 . 5542 0. 11 27 0.0326 
electricity (1. 7264 ) (5.1183 ) (5.0988 ) (0.1276 ) (0348 ) 
Efficiency x - 0 . 2750 2.1262 2.8939 0 . 1417 0 .0320 
telecoms (2.7498 ) (6.3810 ) ( 6 . 3699 ) ( 0 .1 615 ) (0 . 0348 ) 
Efficiency x -1. 9488 - 2.2724 -0.9733 0.0327 0.0004 
transport (2.5622) (5.7144) (5.7622) (0.1446 ) (0.0418) 
Efficiency x customs 0.5566 -2. 0 936 - 1.4085 -0 . 0393 0.0237 
(2.1704 ) (4 . 7729 ) (4 . 7860 ) ( 0.1188 ) (0.0354) 
Telecommunication 
-1.5023 3.0742 2.3 1 95 -0.2550 0.0808 
(3.4501) ( 7.8852 ) (7.9148) ( 0 .1 899 ) (0.0563 ) 
Transportation 
4.6468 7.9172 8 . 2332 - 0.1032 -0.0180 
(2.9866) (6.7215) (6 . 7065 ) ( 0.1695 ) ( 0.0490 ) 
Electricity 
- 7.1327 - 17.5987 -18.6874 - 0 . 4857 -0.1347 
(3.0187 ) ** ( 6.8223 ) ** ( 6 . 8653 ) *** ( 0.1704 ) ** (0.0494 ) *** 
Customs Regulation 
-6.1952 -16.5023 - 15 . 5797 -0.1989 -0.0435 
(2 . 8155 ) ** (6.3761 ) ** (6.3396 ) ** (0 .1 620 ) (0.0459 ) 
Log FHA 
- 4 . 4946 -7 .8278 -9.7239 - 0 . 8526 - 0 . 6439 
(5.7461 ) (13.0228 (13.0808 ) (1. 0999 ) ( 0 . 9359 ) 
Electricity x 
generator 6.9438 14.6942 15.5 785 0. 1 9 79 0 .0509 
(1.7264 ) *** (3.8957 ) *** (3 . 9418 ) *** ( 0.0968 ) ** ( 0.0281 ) * 
Internet 19 . 3147 0.4499 
(6.1208 ) *** (0 . 1511 ) *** 
Constant 438.1084 663.8684 885 . 88 0 8 0. 8525 o . 727 3 
(526.6211) (115 7 . 4 77) ( 1199.81 ) (1.1 713 ) ( 1. 03 9 0) 
Observations 693 692 693 697 697 
Absolute v alues of standard errors in parenthesis: RSA and food and agric a r e base dumm i es 
*Signif i cant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level ; *** signif i cance at 1% level 
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Table: 3.11. Pooled re the Tobit Model with infrastructure variables measured in hours! da 
Variabl •• Hour. Hour. Hour. Day. Hour. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variables Pexport Pexport Pexport Pexport Pexport Pexport 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Ye s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign ownership 10.9586 10.3542 9.8387 17.0286 9.8473 4.5074 
(5.3386)** (5.3178)* (5.1291)* (5 . 3211)*** (7.2248) (2.2195)** 
Log age -2.7786 -2.4 338 -2.1450 -2 .7 678 0.6793 -0 . 9282 
(2.3083) (2.2982) (2 . 2497) (2 . 3359) (3.4796) (0.9735) 
Log size 12.8 44 0 12.9607 13 . 3195 13.2853 15.6 023 5.7637 
(1. 9722) *** (1. 9798) *** (1.8794)*** (1.9286) *** (2 . 9217) (0.813 3)*** 
Efficiency 10 . 8959 10.9492 13.0204 3.7249 8 .3497 5.6343 
(5.2645)** (5.2524)* (5.0150)*** (3 . 7784 ) (7.9834) (2.1701)*** 
Efficiency x electricity -0 . 7745 -1.1105 -1.2859 -1. 342 - 1.4799 - 0.5564 
(1.1282) (1.1025) (0.7254) (1.483 0) (1. 0169) (0.3869) 
Efficiency x -0.0679 -0. 0619 -0. 0997 -2.2 017 - 0.0376 - 0.0432 
telephone (0 . 2032) (0.2019) (0.2007) (1.22 01) * (0.2580) (0.0869) 
Efficiency x water -0 . 11 96 -0 . 0485 -0.0279 4.4353 0.25 43 -0.012 1 
(0 . 2883) (0 . 2872) (0.02776) (2.234)** (0.3347) (0. 1 20 1 ) 
Telephone 1.5393 1 .5 009 1 .7978 -1.4873 0. 4539 0 . 7779 
(0.3947) *** (0.3956) *** ( 0. 4744)*** (1 . 2865) (0.7059) (0.2053)*** 
Water 1.1597 1. 0178 1 . 0696 -2.0954 0.7723 0 .462 9 
(0.3 599)*** (0.3792) *** (0.3497)*** (1.8341) (0.4571) (0. 1 51 3)*** 
Electricity -1.7953 -1.1030 -5.6915 - 0.6699 -0.4773 
(1. 0813) * (0.9599) (2.3242) ** (1.0759) (0.4154) 
Average Customs Clearance -3.3099 - 1 .8581 -4.4433 - 1 . 1074 -5.222 0 -1.9227 
(1.8129)* (1 .0732) (1.6323)*** (0.8211) (2.7139 ) (0.7063)*** 
Export Clearance -0.3637 
(1 .6873) 
Import Clearance - 3.368 4 
(2.1018) 
Log FMA -6 . 4 1 75 -9.2552 -3 .5804 0. 707 3 
(17.0646) (17.3996) (1.4254) ** (6.5451) 
Sec cif fob -4.2182 -2.8253 
(2.1230) * (1.2169)* 
Electricity x generator 3.1354 3.1243 2.4950 6.1307 1. 754 9 1. 0797 
(0.8041)*** (0 . 8023) *** (0.7254) *** (1. 8287) *** (0.8951)* (0.3139) *** 
Internet_telephone interaction 0.9607 
(0.3154)* 
Borehole water interaction 0.105 7 
(0.3500) 
Observations 582 582 572 647 586 572 
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Table: 3.12. Pooled re!!ression usin!! the Pro bit Model with infrastructure variables measured in hours/ da 
Variable. Hour. 
(1) 
Dependent variables Probexport 
Country dummies Yes 
Sector dummies Yes 
Foreign ownership 0.2736 
(0 .1563) * 
Log age -0.01 4 0 
Log size 
Efficiency 
Efficiency x 
electricity 
Efficiency x 
telephone 
Efficiency x water 
Telephone 
Water 
Electricity 
Average Customs 
Clearance 
Export Clearance 
Import Clearance 
Log FMA 
Sec cif fob 
Electricity x 
generator 
Borehole water 
interaction 
Internet_telephone 
interaction 
Observations 
(0 . 0661) 
0.3870 
(0.0598) *** 
0.3073 
(0.1588) * 
-0.0107 
(0.0320) 
- 0 . 00 4 0 
( 0 . 0055) 
- 0 .007 
(0.0081)* 
0 . 02 41 
(0.0107)** 
0.019 7 
(0.0105)* 
0.0 454 
(0.0232)** 
- 0.1 21 0 
(0.0533)** 
0 .4 1 44 
(4. 659 4 ) 
0.0 454 
(0.0232) ** 
586 
Hour. 
(2) 
Pro b e xpor t 
Yes 
Yes 
0.2 641 
(0.1568)* 
-0.0082 
(0.0663) 
0 . 39 53 
(0.0603)*** 
0 .3215 
(0.1603)** 
- 0.0136 
(0.03 18) 
- 0.0036 
(0.0055) 
- 0.0009 
(0. 008 2) 
0 . 0 23 0 
(0. 010 7)** 
0.0155 
(0.0107) 
-0.0591 
(0. 0306) * 
- 0.0065 
(0. 0478) 
-0.1339 
(0. 0 598)** 
- 0.853 4 
(4 . 774 1) 
0 . 0 44 8 
(0.0232) * 
586 
Absolute values of standard e rrors in parenthesi s 
Day. 
(3) 
Probexp ort 
Yes 
Yes 
0 .4 316 
(0. 119 5 )** * 
-0.019 4 
(0.0514) 
0 . 3932 
(0.043 1) *** 
0.1797 
(0. 099 2)* 
- 0.0085 
(0. 0464) 
- 0 . 0501 
(0.0348) 
- 0 . 06 4 1 
(0.0 535) 
- 0 .0683 
( 0 .0366)* 
- 0 . 054 8 
(0.0620) 
-0.0226 
( 0 . 1 221) 
- 0 . 03 25 
( 0 . 0187) * 
0.5620 
(2 . 8029) 
o .l3 94 
(0 .047 3)** * 
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Hour. 
(4) 
Probexp ort 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3070 
(0. 1 532)** 
-0.0102 
(0. 06 51) 
0 . 3986 
( 0.0 573)*** 
0 .4 299 
( 0 . 1 570)*** 
- 0 . 0 4 03 
(0 . 0255) 
-0.0041 
(0.0056) 
0 .00 33 
(0.0079) 
0 .0368 
(0 . 013 4 )* ** 
0.01 42 
(0.0101) 
- 0 . 00 4 3 
(0.0265) 
-0.l362 
(0 . 0477 ) 
- 0 .2445 
(0.1468) * 
0 . 0351 
(0. 0212) * 
576 
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significant at 5% l eve l; * significant at 10% l eve l 
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Hour. 
(5) 
Probexport 
Yes 
Yes 
0 .365 1 
(0.2207)* 
0 . 0283 
(0.0667) 
0.3 524 
(0.6612)* ** 
0.386 4 
(0.16 1 5)** 
0.0015 
(0.0324) 
0 .001 8 
(0.006 1) 
0.0027 
(0. 0083) 
0.0032 
(0.01 58 ) 
0.0168 
(0. 0l3 7) 
-0. 00 54 
(0.032 1) * 
-0.123 3 
(0 .0 533)** 
0.7311 
(4.682 1) 
0.0 4 02 
(0 .023 5)* 
- 0 .0007 
(0.1116) 
0.0 259 
(0.0080) *** 
586 
s/ month. 
Marginal· 
Bffect. eq(l) 
Probexport 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1084 
(0. 0619) * 
-0.0055 
(0 . 0260) 
0 . 1 521 
( 0 . 023 5)*** 
0.120 8 
( 0 .0624)* 
- 0 . 00 42 
( 0 . 0126) 
-0.00 1 6 
( 0 . 0028) 
- 0 . 0003 
(0.0032) 
0.0094 
(0.00 42 )* * 
0.00 77 
(0.00 41 )* 
- 0 . 02 16 
(0.0123) 
-0.0 47 6 
( 0 .0209)** 
0 .1629 
(1. 831 4 ) 
0 . 0178 
(0 . 0091) ** 
572 
Table: 3.13: Pooled re the OLS and Linear Probabilitv Model with infrastructure variables measured in hours! day and davs! month. 
Variabl • • 
Dependent variables 
country dummies 
Sector dummies 
For eign ownership 
Log age 
Log size 
Efficiency 
Effici ency x electricity 
Efficiency x 
telephone 
Efficiency x wat er 
Telephone 
Water 
Electr iCity 
Aver age Customs Clearance 
Expor t Clearance 
Import Clearance 
Log FMA 
Sec cif fob 
Electricity x generator 
Observations 
Hour. 
Pro b exp ort 
Yes 
Yes 
0 . 0829 
(0 . 0 47 3) * 
-0.0049 
(0.0199) 
0 . 1070 
(0.0163)*** 
0 . 0897 
( 0.0 428 )* 
-0.0014 
(0.0081) 
- 0.001 5 
(0.0016) 
- 0.0016 
(0. 00 22 ) * 
0.0042 
(0.0029) 
0 . 00 44 
(0.0027) 
-0.0147 
(0.0081)* 
- 0.0203 
(0. 0109) * 
- 0.1 498 
(1. 3601) 
0.0 1 02 
(0.0063) 
586 
Abs o lut e va lues of stan dard e rro rs in parenthes is 
Mod.l Ordinary L.a.t Squar •• 
Day. Day. 
Probexp o rt Pexpor t 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
0 . 1252 7.4947 
( 0.0 421 ) *** (2.6768 ) *** 
- 0.0008 - 1.8308 
(0.0187) (1.1461) 
0.1154 5.5359 
(0.0141) *** (0.9111 ) *** 
0.08 45 2.3712 
( 0.0311) *** (1. 933 4 ) 
- 0.00 27 -0.4495 
(0.0148) (0.6844) 
- 0.013 4 - 1. 5552 
( 0.0115) ( 0 .5964 ) *** 
- 0.00 42 1. 2346 
(0. 00 89) (1. 0112) 
-0.0140 - 0.3790 
(0 . 011 4 ) (0.5944) 
- 0.02 2 3 -0.6091 
(0.0125)* (0.8384) 
- 0.0003 -3.2712 
(0.03 55 ) (1.0519) 
0.000 4 
(0.0073) 
-0 .0060 O .. 6868 
(0.0035)* (0. 766 3) 
0 . 1718 
(0 .5362 ) 
0.0 26 1 -20 . 878 
(0.0283) (6 .40 00) *** 
0.0281 2 . 5557 
(0.0125)** (0.8 31 4)*** 
586 582 
***S i g nificant at 1% l evel; ** signif icant a t 5% l evel; * s i g nificance at 10\ level 
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Hour. 
Pexp o r t 
Yes 
Yes 
4. 0609 
(2.7729) 
- 1. 2 618 
(1.1875) 
5.2292 
(0.939 7 ) *** 
4. 8 4 32 
(2.5404)* 
-0.2986 
(0. 4457 ) 
-0.0456 
(0.0969) 
- 0.09 27 
(0. 1310) 
0 . 6180 
(0.2262)*** 
0.5767 
(0. 1 833)*** 
-0.6434 
(0.4611) 
-0 . 0 48 9 
(0 . 8922) 
-0 . 1611 
(0.8444) 
0.8099 
(2 . 5528) 
1. 172 4 
(0.3539) *** 
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Foreign ownership: It is generally argued that firms with some foreign ownership find it easier to 
export than domestic firms (see Rankin et ai, 2005; Yoshino, 2008, Elbadawi et ai, 2006; Clarke, 
2005). This is because foreign ownership enables firms to have easier access to international 
marketing and distribution networks, particularly when the foreign owner is affiliated to a 
multinational corporation. This affiliation makes it easier for the firms to enter international 
markets (Bloomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Similarly, foreign owned firms might have easier 
access to finance either because they are perceived to be more efficient than other enterprises or 
they have access to finance in their home countries. This enables them to shoulder the fixed costs 
associated with entering export markets (Buch et al 2008). According to Clarke (2003), the effect 
of foreign ownership on export behavior might be important in developing or transitional 
economies, since domestic enterprises in these countries may lack the skills and resources to set 
up marketing, distribution and services networks. Reid (1981) argued however, that foreign 
owned firms may sometimes be less export oriented because they were established primarily to 
gain a tariff free access to host country market which may represent the only predominant market 
of interest outside the investor's home country. This is supported by Wolf (2007), who found 
that firms in the agricultural processing and plastic sector in Ghana with more foreign ownership 
tend to be less export oriented but rather serve the domestic market. 
Table 3.10 results however show that when using perception indicators, the foreign ownership 
dummy carries the right expected sign and is generally significant as well as robust to changes in 
model specification. The same pattern is replicated even when using alternative indicators like 
hours and days without infrastructure services under the Tobit and Probit models in Tables 3.11 
and 3.12 respectively. This variable is significant and positive even after using different 
measures of infrastructure quality (days or hours) as well as different proxies for international 
transport costs and customs efficiency. However, this variable though positive is insignificant 
when using OLS and probably this is because the OLS model ignores the censoring of the 
dependent variable which biases estimates. Marginal effects under column 7 on Table 3.11 show 
that having foreign ownership increases exports by about 4.5% whilst column 5, Table 3.12 
shows that, there is an increase in the probability to export by about 11 %. The general 
significance of this variable suggests that foreign ownership does not only have a modest effect 
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on amount exported but even on the likelihood to export. According to Yoshino (2008), there are 
several reasons why foreign ownership may matter for firms in low income countries such as the 
ones in the current sample. First, foreign direct investment brings skills and technologies from 
source countries that are otherwise not available domestically. Such skills and technologies help 
improve the productivity of firms (productivity effect). Secondly, another reason is that firms 
with foreign ownership are more likely to access established overseas business networks and 
marketing channels including those with parent companies which facilitates their exporting 
activities (network effect). The network effect includes not only networks for marketing and 
sourcing, but also for access to finance, which is very important for overseas transactions. 
Firm age: The impact of firm age on exporting in the empirical literature has been studied 
extensively but with mixed results. Studies by Aitken at al (1997, Roberts and Tybout(l997), 
Fryges (2006) found a positive relationship between firm age and exporting whilst Yoshino 
(2008), Majochi et al (2005) on Germany and British firms; Rankin et al (2006) on Nigerian 
firms; Soderbom and Teal (2003) on five African countries found a negative relationship. This 
suggests that older firms through accumulated experience and economies of scale would be at a 
better advantage to participate or establish themselves in export markets. Our cross section level 
results show that using perception indicators as measures of infrastructure, the age variable is 
negative and significant under the 2SLS and the Tobit models. But however when we use other 
alternative measures of infrastructure, under the Tobit, Probit, OLS and Linear Probability 
models, this variable is consistently negative and insignificant. This suggests that there is a weak 
negative impact of firm age on export participation and intensity. This could be true if old firms 
are very inflexible to changes in technological demands than younger firms and also if these 
older firms were set up to promote import substitution industrialisation (lSI). In this case their 
goal would be to ensure local availability of imported products rather than seek external markets. 
However the survival of these lSI firms is only possible in countries that are still relatively 
closed and use protectionist policies. These results partly support the fact that, when it comes to 
exporting, younger firms are more likely to be less risk averse and more adventurous than 
conservative older firms. In this case being older will reduce the likelihood to export. Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt (1985) also argued that the strategy of an exporting firm varies by its age. Thus the 
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firms they identified as "world marketers" were significantly younger than firms guided by other 
strategies. 
Firm size: A common finding across many African firm studies is that there is a strong 
correlation between firm size and exporting (van Biesebroeck, 2005; Bigstern et ai, 2004; 
Soderbom and Teal, 2003; Rankin et ai, 2006). Clarke (2004 also argued that large fixed costs 
associated with setting up an international distribution or service network generally makes 
exporting easier for large enterprises. However this interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the 
robust significance of the size variable when there are controls for sunk costs (Rankin et ai, 
2006). Additionally large firms have better access to finance than small enterprises particularly 
in developing countries. Our results confirm and are consistent with most of the above findings 
in the literature that size does matter for exporting. Using perception indicators the size variable 
is statistically significant at 1 %. This pattern is the same even when using other alternative 
infrastructure indicators and different models showing that firm size is a robust determinant of 
export participation and intensity. The marginal effects column show that an increase in the size 
of the firm increases the probability to export by 15% and the amount exported by about 6%. The 
significance of the size variable indicates that large enterprises export more than smaller 
enterprises and that size is not capturing sectoral differences in technology since it remains 
highly significant with sectoral controls in the models. A number of studies in the literature have 
arrived at the same conclusions. For example Clerides et ai, (1998) found consistent evidence for 
Columbia, Mexico and Morocco. Grenier et ai, (1999) also found that Tanzania firms export 
more than smaller firms. Using data from several countries in Sub Saharan Africa, Bigstern et ai, 
(2004), Elbadawi et ai, (2007) and Soderbom and Teal (2003) found similar results. In fact 
Soderbom and Teal (2003) argue that the size of the firm's domestic base is linked to its export 
performance implying that firms need to grow domestically to be successful internationally. In 
this context there is concern that government policies (poor macroeconomic stability, high tax 
rates, high cost of finance etc) that restrict the growth of firms domestically may also inhibit 
export growth. This is because larger firms are more involved in exporting than smaller firms. 
Thus if size is related to the firm's participation in the export market, limited domestic demand 
ensures that the only way to expand is to grow into the export market. However, Gabbitas and 
97 
Gretton (2003) however argue that studies that do not explicitly control for unobserved firm 
specific factors (by using panel data techniques) result in them attributing to firm size a degree of 
influence that should rightly be attributed to other unspecified factors. The other thing about size 
argued by Rankin et aI, (2006) that we cannot rule out in this study because of the cross sectional 
nature of our estimations is that the size variable may be a simple proxy for some time invariant 
aspects of the firm correlated with the other regressors. Rankin et aI, (2006) argued that if larger 
firms have more skilled labour and that is the key to exporting, then size on its own is not a 
determinant of exporting. In this case the association between exporting and size basically 
reflects the importance of skilled labour that large firms are endowed with. However our cross 
sectional data is not able to unravel this dimension of firm size on exporting. A longer time series 
data is vital. 
Internet access: Past studies on low and middle income countries In Europe and Asia have 
shown that manufacturing establishments that are connected to the internet export more than 
those that are not48. A similar relationship appears to hold for the African countries in this study. 
The internet dummy49 is statistically significant and positive at 1 % showing that it is associated 
with export participation and sales (see results on Table 3.11). A concern that has been raised in 
the literature about this variable is that the high cost of international communications in Africa 
might encourage exporters to get internet connections rather than internet connections making it 
easier for enterprises to export (Clarke, 2004). This means that the internet dummy may be 
endogenous. However, results in these models (Table 3.10) are robust to the exclusion of this 
variable. Due to this endogeneity and the difficulty of instrumenting for it, we decided to drop 
the variable from our analysis. 
48 Lal (2004) shows that Indian firms that use e-business technologies more intensively were more likely to export than other 
firms. Using data from manufacturing establishments in 27 low and middle income countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
Clarke, (200 I) shows that firms that were connected to the internet exported more than other enterprises even after controlling for 
self selectivity bias. 
49 This dummy is equal to one if a firm has a website or an email facility and zero otherwise and is not a proxy for internet 
infrastructure quality. 
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Efficiency: A number of studies have found that exporters seem to be more efficient than non 
exporters (Bigstern et al,2000; Tybout and Westbrook,1995; Bernard and Jansen, 1995; Kraay, 
1997). There are two alternative but not mutually exclusive hypotheses why exporters can be 
more productive than non exporters (Wagner, 2007). According to Wagner, the fIrst hypothesis 
points to self selection of more productive firms into export markets because of additional costs 
of selling in foreign markets. Thus extra transport costs, distribution and marketing costs etc 
provide an entry barrier that less successful firms cannot overcome. Furthermore the behavior of 
firms might be forward looking such that the desire to export tomorrow leads a firm to improve 
performance today so as to be competitive in the foreign market. Thus cross sectional differences 
between exporters and non exporters may in part be explained by ex ante firm differences. Thus 
more productive firms become exporters. The second hypothesis points to the role of learning by 
exporting. Knowledge flows from international buyers and competitors help improve the post 
entry performance of export starters. Therefore fIrms participating in international markets are 
exposed to more intense competition and must improve faster than firms that sell products to 
domestic markets. Thus exporting makes fIrms more productive. 
Our results obtained using perception indicators show that the efficiency variable is not 
important for exporting as it is consistently insignificant though positive. However when we use 
substitute indicators (days and hours without infrastructure services), the variable becomes 
positive and significant. Of the six model variations that we used under the Tobit approach in 
Table 3.11, the variable is significant with the right sign in four of them. This efficiency variable 
is also significant under the Probit, LPM and OLS models showing that it is robust to model 
specification. By controlling for efficiency - infrastructure interactions we want to check 
whether the impact of efficiency on exporting is dependent on the quality of infrastructure. The 
results show that these interactions terms are insignificant and negative. The negative 
coefficients suggest that being efficient in an environment with poor infrastructure services has a 
weak negative effect on export participation and export sales. Since we do not have panel data to 
compare to, it is difficult to know whether these firms become efficient through exporting or they 
need to be more efficient to penetrate export markets. These cross section results only support 
the argument that effIciency and exporting are positively related. 
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Customs Infrastructure: Hummels (2001) argued that it is more expensive to export and import 
goods when in Africa. Customs delays are longer in most African countries due to excessive 
inspection of cargos, redundant and poorly coordinated procedures, poor communication and 
information management systems (Hummels, 2001). The results from Table 3.10 show that 
customs delays have a negative and significant effect on export sales rather than export 
participation. This is because the customs perception index is insignificant under the Probit and 
LPM models. We then alternatively used the average number of days firms take to import and 
export goods and found that the variable is negative and significant under both the Probit and 
Tobit models (Tables 3.11 and 3.12). However under OLS and LPM, this variable is insignificant 
though consistently negative using both days and hours without infrastructure services. We also 
decided to check which of the customs related variable, the number of days to import as well as 
export clearing days is more important to exporters. Results show that days to export variable is 
negative and significant under the Tobit model whilst import transit days is an important 
determinant of the probability to export. This means that firms that are contemplating entering 
the export markets worry more about the number of days it takes to import whilst those that want 
to boost export sales are concerned more about export transit days. This could mean that firms 
that are deciding on whether to export or not have had an encounter with customs procedures 
only when importing supplies and therefore use that to gauge customs efficiency. However, 
traditional exporters are interested in ensuring timely delivery of export orders and so gauge 
customs efficiency using export clearing days. 
Electricity Infrastructure: This variable is negative and significant as well as robust to changes in 
model and variable specification. Thus electricity perception indicator is negative and significant 
under both the Tobit and Probit models suggesting that it is an important determinant of both 
export participation and amount exported (see table 3.10). Using the 2SLS and LPM, the 
estimated parameters suggest that a unitary average increase in the perception index decreases 
average exports by about 7 percentage points whilst the probability of exporting falls by about 14 
percent. However changing the measurement of electricity infrastructure quality by using 
number of days and hours without power, results are no longer robust. Under the Probit model 
the variable is insignificant but becomes significant when using the alternative Tobit model. This 
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suggests that power outages have a negative impact on amount exported than probability to 
export. The only consistent fact about this variable is that it has a negative impact on exporting 
across all models. Controlling for generator ownership consistently result in a positive and 
significant impact on exports. Thus marginal effects results show that the probability to export 
increases by 2% whilst export sales increase by 1.1 % if a firm has a generator. This shows that 
owning a generator reverses the negative impact that poor electricity infrastructure has on 
exporting. Under perception indicators and using the 2SLS and LPM, owning a generator 
changes the probability to export by 19% and the amount exported by 14%50. 
Domestic transport Infrastructure: We included this variable in the model to differentiate the 
impact of domestic transport infrastructure from international transport infrastructure. The results 
for this variable appear to be partly consistent with Clarke, (2003) fmdings that domestic 
transport infrastructure is negative but not significant in affecting the probability to exports. 
However the difference with his results is that this variable shows a positive and insignificant 
relationship with amount exported. The insignificance could mean that firms that are into 
exporting are more worried about international transport costs than costs related to domestic 
transport infrastructure. This could explain why the geography variable foreign market access 
(FMA) which measures international distance or international transport costs, has a negative but 
weak impact on exporting and by replacing it with its alternative indicator - sectoral (cif/fob) 
values, it becomes negative and statistically significant. Thus in short these results suggest that 
international transport costs have a strong negative impact on both likelihood to export and 
amount exported than costs related to the quality of domestic transport infrastructure. The 
insignificance of the distance variable could mean that this variable is not a good proxy of 
international transport costs. The finding by Zarzosso (2003) that a 1 % increase in distance 
increases transport costs by 0.25% shows that distance does not explain a large proportion of 
variation in international transport costs. 
50 Without a generator the probability to export is -14% and with generator it is +5%. In the case of export sales the amount 
exported is -7% without a generator and 7% with a generator. 
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Telecommunication infrastructure: Using perception indicators this variable is consistently 
insignificant but if we use an alternative indicator like hours without a telephone service, the 
variable is now significant but positive under both the Tobit and Probit models. The 
insignificance of the telecommunication indicator could partly be a result of its composite nature. 
Thus this telecommunication indicator captures the quality of telephone, internet and cellular 
phone infrastructure and the quality and costs of these services differ markedly in many African 
countries. The significance and positive effect of hours and days without a telephone service 
variable is counter intuitive. To explore this further, we decided to interact telephone connection 
problems with internet dummy to find out whether being connected to the internet minimise the 
effect of telephone connection problems on exports (see tables 3.11 and 3.12). Results show that 
this interaction variable is significant and the telephone variable is now insignificant. This could 
suggest that being connected to the internet not only enables firms to sell their products to a 
wider market but also minimises the negative effects of telephone failures. This could be true if 
internet services are of good quality and affordable, something possible in countries where the 
private sector plays a leading role in the telecommunications sector. 
Water infrastructure: Just like power supply, sustainable water infrastructure is also very 
important in the production of manufactured goods. Industries that use large amounts of water 
normally produce such commodities like food, paper, chemicals, refined petroleum or primary 
metals. Many African countries are also manufacturers and exporters of these types of 
commodities. Results from this study show that the variable, number of hours or days without 
water is positive and significantly affects the amount exported not the likelihood to export. This 
is another counter intuitive result. We also explored this variable further taking into account the 
fact that some firms in these countries own boreholes (see tables 3.1 above) to serve as 
alternative sources of water. In light of this we again interacted water problems with ownership 
of a borehole and found that the interaction as well as water infrastructure quality variable are all 
insignificant (see tables 3.11 and 3.12 above). This suggests that water problems do not matter 
much to exporters and this is the case even if the firm owns a borehole. 
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3.8.1 Sectoral level results 
Sectoral analysis helps us identify whether infrastructure impacts differently in each sector. This 
would help policy makers in coming up with sectoral specific infrastructure strategies that would 
promote the exports of desired manufactured goods. Similarly, this will also help encourage both 
horizontal and geographical diversification of exports by improving the quality and accessibility 
of infrastructure important in promoting non traditional exports sectors or markets. 
Table 3.14 Sectoral results using alternative infrastructural indicators (hrs without infrastructure services) 
Variables 
Dependent variable 
Country dummies 
Foreign ownership 
Internet 
Efficiency 
Log age 
Log size 
Sectoral (cif/fob) 
Power outages (hrs) 
Water probs (hrs) 
Telephone prob (hrs) 
Outages x generator 
Average customs(days) 
Efficiency x 
electricity 
Efficiency x 
telephone 
Efficiency x water 
Wood 
Furniture 
Prob export 
Yes 
-0.337 
(0. 58 ) 
-0.273 
(0.57) 
0.0 1 
(0.05) 
0.005 
(0 . 02) 
0.02 5 
(0.13) 
-1. 849 
(3.60) ** 
0. 1 58 
(1.82) * 
-0 . 0 5 2 
( 1. 07) 
0.09 8 
(5. 1 8) ** 
-0 . 0 1 2 
(0. 1 7) 
0.079 
(4.28) ** 
-0.4178 
(0.1470) 
- 0.9872 
(0.3835)* 
0.1665 
(0.3933) 
Food 
Agric 
Prob export 
Yes 
0 . 02 4 
(0 . 08) 
-0 . 2 4 7 
(0 .96 ) 
0. 165 
(1. 03) 
-0 . 366 
(2.96) ** 
0. 1 8 1 
(1. 94) * 
- 0. 4 35 
(2.08) * 
0. 1 22 
(2.74 ) 
- 0.02 1 
(2 .10) * 
0 . 0 44 
(3 . 97) ** 
0 .1 02 
(2 . 78) ** 
-0. 1 2 1 
(7 . 09) ** 
0 .1 98 5 
(0. 11 4 5 ) * 
-0. 11 09 
(0 . 773 ) 
-0 . 2 4 78 
(0. 1 863) 
Textile 
Garment 
Prob export 
Yes 
1 . 1 78 
(2.6 4 ) ** 
0.772 
(1.93) * 
0.073 
(0.3) 
0. 1 5 
(0.8) 
0.232 
(1.73) * 
3.37 8 
(7.4 5 ) ** 
-0.2 5 7 
(3.90) * * 
0.0 5 4 
(4. 1 2) ** 
-0 . 258 
( 5. 76) ** 
-0.0 15 
(0.38) 
-0.02 
(0.98) 
0.9826 
(1.168 1 ) 
-0.8036 
(0.8137) 
-0.1392 
(0.3141) 
Observations 5 4 9 549 5 4 9 
Absolute values of standard errors in parenthesis 
*Significant at 5% level; •• significant at 1% level 
Note: Estimates done using Probit Model 
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Chemical 
Pharmacy 
Probexport 
Ye s 
0 .6 13 
( 1. 81) * 
0.7 9 6 
(2.33) * 
0 . 273 
( 1. 44 ) 
- 0.006 
(0.0 4 ) 
0 .41 
(3 . 36) ** 
2. 5 65 
(7. 4 2) ** 
0 . 029 
(0. 59 ) 
-0.045 
( 3.13 ) ** 
-0. 161 
( 6 . 98 ) ** 
- 0 . 025 
(0 . 55) 
-0 . 083 
( 4. 0 4 ) ** 
0.28 4 2 
(0 .1 680) * 
0 . 3566 
(0 .4 006) 
-0 . 6789 
(0 . 3773) 
549 
Construction 
Metal 
Probexpor t 
Yes 
1. 021 
(2.8 5 ) ** 
-0 .161 
(0.5) 
0 .1 7 4 
(0 . 83 ) 
0 .4 2 4 
(2. 5 4)* * 
0.4 5 4 
(3.3 1 ) ** 
- 1. 307 
(4 . 04)* * 
-0.082 
(1.100) 
-0.003 
(0.17) 
0 . 018 
( 1 . 1 ) 
-0. 1 06 
( 1. 56) 
-0 . 029 
(1.79) * 
-0.2744 
(0.4397) 
0.280 1 
(0.40 1 8) 
- 0 . 5093 
(0.924 4 ) 
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Results on Table 3.l4 above, show that foreign ownership is positive and significant in the 
Textile and garment, chemical and pharmacy as well as construction and metal sectors. This 
could be due to the fact that these industries require an intensive use of modem technology or 
they need good marketing and sourcing expertise to survive in the competitive world of exports. 
Huge financial resources (to acquire modem technology) and aggressive marketing make foreign 
ownership inevitable. The significance of the size variable confirms the widely held view in the 
literature that big firms have the potential to export more than small firms regardless of the sector 
or country. The insignificance however of the efficiency variable suggest that self selectivity bias 
does not hold or that there is not enough evidence in our sectoral data to suggest that firms need 
to be efficient to export. The efficiency infrastructure variables are insignificant though negative 
indicating that quality infrastructure is important for productive firms to export more. 
The results on infrastructure variables are mixed. International transport costs have a significant 
negative effect on exports in all the examined sectors excluding the textile garment and chemical 
and pharmacy sectors. This variable suggest that in these sectors (textile and chemicals), high 
transport costs encourage exports, something counter intuitive51 . The surprising thing about this 
variable is that textile and garment as well chemical and pharmacy sectors are some of the few 
sectors with high export participation rate. Power outages are a problem in the textile and 
garments sectors whilst water is a negative and significant determinant of food and chemical 
exports. This makes sense because these two sectors, food and chemicals use a lot of water in 
production compared to wood and furniture and hence should be negatively affected by water 
shortages as expected. Having a generator is important for firms in the food and agriculture 
sector and this enhances the amount exported. This finding could suggest that power is so 
important in the food and agricultural sector that firms have to use generators to minimize outage 
problems. Long hours without a telephone connection have a negative impact on the amount of 
textile and chemical goods exported. The significance of internet access also in these two sectors 
51 This counter intuitive result may suggest that may be the transport variable measured using cif and fob values is not exactly 
capturing transport costs but something else. This may also imply that this kind of data is not good enough to proxy transport 
costs (see Hummels, 2002) for more on this. 
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(textile and chemical) suggests that telecommunication facilities are important to governments 
who want to boost textile and chemical exports . The relatively high export participation and 
export intensity in these sectors imply that probably communication with external clients is more 
important for these firms . Customs clearing days have a negative effect on the amount of textile 
chemical and construction goods exported and this is not surprising because firms in these 
sectors are more outward oriented. 
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3.9 Market Diversification results 
In section 3.6, we calculated the degree of market diversification using the number of equivalent 
markets, an approach developed by the International Trade Centre. Market diversification 
reduces vulnerability to shocks and also promotes wide economic integration; we estimate an 
OLS model to find out how firm characteristics as well as infrastructure quality explain the level 
of market diversification. Our empirical strategy is to use the same approach that we followed at 
cross country level by estimating a model that checks for robustness in variable specification 
using different indicators of infrastructure and transport costs. 
Table: 3.15. Geo ra hical Market diversification Model usin OLS 
Variables Hours Hours Hours Days 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Market Ma rke t Ma rket Mark e t 
variables d ivers i f ica tion d i v er s i f ica tion d i v ers i f i ca tion diversi f ica tion 
country dummies Ye s Ye s Yes Ye s 
Sector dummies Ye s Ye s Yes Yes 
Foreign 0.0075 0 . 011 0 0.0 144 0.0 1 2 1 
ownership (0.03 3 7) (0 . 0306) (0 . 0306) (0 . 0298) 
Log age -0.0037 0.002 1 -0.0009 -0.0077 
(0.0 141 ) (0.0 13 0) (0.0 13 0) (0.0 129) 
Log size 0.009 5 0.02 31 0.0220 0 . 029 9 
(0.0 11 7) (0.0 1 06) ** (0 . 01 07) ** (0 . 01 04 ) ** 
Efficiency 0.0 8 76 0.0 61 2 0 . 0 64 2 0 . 00 4 9 
(0.030 1 ) *** (0.0279) ** (0 . 027 8 ) ** (0 . 02 00) 
Efficiency x -0 . 00 83 -0.0 14 6 - 0 . 01 59 - 0 . 01 98 
electricity (0 . 00 6 0) (0.0049) *** (0 . 00 4 9) (0 . 0074) *** 
Efficiency x -0.0037 -0 . 0022 -0.0022 0.0 1 00 
telephone (0 . 00 11 ) *** (0 . 00 11 ) ** (0.00 11 ) ** (0 . 00 6 7) 
Efficiency x -0 . 000 1 -0.002 3 -0 . 0027 -0 . 00 15 
water (0.00 1 6) (0 . 00 14 ) (0.00 14 ) * (0.0057) 
Telephone -0.00 6 8 -0 . 0075 -0 . 006 5 0.02 41 
(0.002 1 ) *** (0 . 0002 4 ) *** (0 . 002 5 ) *** (0.0066) *** 
Water -0.0 11 7 0 . 00 5 6 -0 . 00 4 2 -0 . 0084 
(0.00 1 8) *** (0 . 00 1 9) *** (0 . 0020) ** (0.0062) 
Electricity 0 . 0224 0 . 0002 - 0.00 11 0.0 4 23 
(0 . 00 5 7)* ** (0.0050) (0.00 51 ) (0 . 011 6) *** 
Average Customs - 0.0 103 -0.00 4 3 
Clearance (0 . 0075) (0 . 0069) 
Export -0.0 1 9 8 -0.0237 
Clearance (0.0098) ** (0.0089) *** 
Import o .0 144 0 . 0206 
Clearance (0 . 0093) (0.0063) *** 
Log FMA 0. 5 677 
(0.9 91 8) 
Sec cif fob 0 .1 099 0 .1 098 0 . 052 1 
- (0.0280) *** (0.0279) (0.022 1 ) ** 
Electricity x 0.00 1 5 0 . 00 11 0 . 00 13 0.0209 
generator (0 . 00 44 ) (0 . 0039) * (0 . 0039) *** (0 . 008 1 ) *** 
Observations 586 586 73 6 638 
Absolute v a lue s of st a ndar d e rrors in pa renth e s i s 
*Significa nt at 10% level; ** si g ni f ica nt a t 5 % level; *** si g ni f i c anc e at 1% level 
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Results from estimations are presented in Table 3.15 above. These results are consistent in 
showing that firm level characteristics like size and efficiency have significant influence on 
market diversification. The large fixed costs associated with setting up new international 
distribution or service network is generally easier for large enterprises. Additionally large firms 
have better access to finance than small enterprises and therefore able to shoulder these fixed 
costs associated with entering new markets. Being productive is imperative in that it enables 
firms to survive competition in these new markets. The results also suggest that being efficient 
when there are infrastructure related problems negatively affects geographical diversification of 
exports. This is because it makes it difficult to ensure timely delivery of exports, production of 
high quality goods and constant interaction with new or prospective customers. As for foreign 
ownership, results suggest that market seeking multinationals diversifY by acquiring stakes in 
local firms or by establishing foreign subsidiaries in host countries. So a foreign owned affiliate 
represents some form of market diversification on the part of a parent company and that could be 
the reason why being foreign owned is negatively or not significantly related to diversification. 
The age variable is also insignificant mostly because of the fact that older firms are more 
conservative and risk averse and inflexible to adapting to changes important in diversifYing or 
penetrating new markets. 
Infrastructural variables like telecommunication, number of hours without telephone services and 
water, export clearing days have a significant negative impact on market diversification. 
Generator ownership is also positive and significant implying that reliable power is important for 
market diversification because it enables firms to circumvent power outages and ensure quality 
competitive goods are produced. However international transport costs variable is significant but 
with a wrong expected sign. 
3.10 Marginal effects 
In the tables 3.16 and 3.17 below we report the marginal effects of exogenous infrastructural 
indicators (measured in hours) calculated at their overall sample means. The idea behind the 
marginal effects in these tables is to investigate the extent by which differences in infrastructure 
quality in South Africa and Uganda explain the differences in export intensity. Uganda is a good 
107 
illustrative case since its manufacturing industries are significantly less export oriented than 
those of countries like South Africa and has a relatively large number of firms complaining about 
infrastructure related problems than other countries in the sample. (see table 2.3). South Africa is 
one of the countries with relatively good export intensity and quality of infrastructure in this 
study sample. 
As potential exporters, Ugandan manufacturers have a clear disadvantage over their counterparts 
in South Africa in terms of infrastructural quality. Thus they appear to operate in an inferior 
infrastructure environment compared to South African firms (see table A3.2 and table 2.3). To 
get a sense of the power of infrastructural quality we estimate what Uganda's average firm level 
exports would be if it had the quality of infrastructure of South Africa while retaining all the 
other characteristics of Ugandan firms. We also estimate the impact on exports of changing the 
quality of infrastructure in South Africa to Ugandan levels. The results are as reported in the 
tables 3.16 and 3.17 below (using unconditional expected values). These results show that if 
Ugandan firms had the infrastructure similar to her South African counterpart, the fall in average 
exports would be lower than the current Ugandan levels. The reverse also happens when we 
change infrastructural levels in South Africa to Ugandan levels. The fall in exports due to poor 
infrastructure quality is higher than the current levels in South Africa. Thus it appears that it is 
possible for the gap between export levels of South Africa and Uganda to be minimized through 
increases in the number of exporters and the amount exported by improving the quality of 
infrastructure. These results also show that the cost disadvantages in Uganda come from not only 
poor infrastructure but even its longer distance from major international markets which increases 
international transport costs given by sectoral (cif/fob) values. Thus results on table 3.16 below 
show that if international transport costs in Uganda were the same as those incurred by South 
African firms the reduction in exports will be lower. The reverse is true for South African firms. 
Thus a Ugandan firm is some several miles away from the nearest port than the typical 
manufacturing firm in South Africa and this is made worse by the landlockedness of the country. 
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Table 3 . 16 Marginal effects on selected infrastructural indicators 
Ugandan mar ginal effects at South African Infrastructure mean levels 
Unconditional ConcH tional on Probability uncensored I 
Bxpected value being censored All Countries 
Infrastructure Uganda at Uganda at Uganda a t Uncondi tional Condi tional Probability 
Indicators (Brs per Ugan da S . Afri ca Ugan da S.Afri ca Uganda S.Afri ca Expec ted on being unce nsored 
day) Levels l evels Level s l e ve ls Levels levels value censore d 
Power Outage hours - 1.0195 -0.0735 -0.9166 -0.0317 0.0215 0.0027 -1. 6070 -0.8071 0.0233 
Water problem hours -0.2755 -0.0199 - 0.2477 -0.1707 0.00 58 0 . 0007 0.1609 0.0808 -0.0023 
Telephone p r ob hours -0 . 3879 -0 . 0279 -0.3488 -0.2402 0.0082 0.0010 - 0.4354 - 0.218 7 0.0063 
Custom delays days -2.1149 -0 . 1524 -1. 9014 -1.3104 0.04 46 0.0055 - 0.7596 -0.3815 0 . 0110 
Sectoral (CIF/FOB -10.7064 -0.7717 9 . 6252 0.6336 -0.225 7 - 0.0280 7.3350 3.6838 -0.1067 
Table 3 . 17 South African Marginal effects at Ugandan Infrastructure mean levels 
Unconditional Conditional on being Probability uncensored I 
Infrastructure Bxpected value censoreeS 
Indicators (Brs par S . Af rica at S . Afr i ca S.Africa 
day) South Afri ca Uganda South Africa a t Ug a nda South Africa at Ugan da 
Le vels leve l s Levels levels l e vels levels 
Power Outage hours -1.8903 -2.7 066 -1.3699 - 1.8958 0.0597 -0.0504 
Water problem hours 1 .4063 2 . 0136 1.0191 1.4104 -0.04 44 0.0375 
Telephone prob hours 0.4524 0.6477 0.3279 0.4537 -0.0143 0.0121 
Custom delays days -0.3453 - 0.4944 - 0. 25 03 - 0.3463 0.0109 -0.0092 
Sectoral (CIF/FOB) -0.3901 -0.5586 - 0.28 27 - 0.3913 -0.0123 -0.0104 
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3.11 Conclusions 
The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the role played by the quality of 
infrastructure and geography on amount exported and export participation. We also wanted to 
test whether some theoretical predictions made in models developed inter alia by Krugman and 
Venables (1995), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Melitz (2003) are confirmed by our results. A 
sectoral analysis was also carried out to ascertain whether the impact of these variables is 
homogenous across sectors or varies from sector to sector depending on the manufactured 
product. 
Although descriptive statistics show that exporting firms are older, larger in size, are more 
attractive to foreign investors, uses internet and rate infrastructural problems more than non 
exporters, results from regressions are somehow mixed and the impact of these supply side 
constraints appear to vary from sector to sector as well as from country to country. The statistical 
significance of firm specific variables like size, foreign ownership and internet access confirms a 
number of literature findings (Clarke 2004 who looked at 8 SSA countries, Clerides et al (1998) 
who looked at Columbia, Mexico and Morocco, Grenier et al (1999) for Tanzania, Bigstern et al 
(2004), Soderborm and Teal (2003) for Sub-Saharan African; countries Bigstern et al,2000; 
Tybout and Westbrook,1995; Bernard and Jansen, 1995). This therefore means that governments 
must remove measures that restrict firm growth, create an environment attractive to foreign 
investors and that promotes productivity as well as design policies that improve internet 
accessib ility. 
The significance of the international distance, electricity, customs and electricity- generator 
ownership interaction variables means that infrastructure and distance matter in influencing 
export participation. Thus the reason why very few firms in Africa are outward oriented is partly 
because of poor market access and poor infrastructure. It is important therefore for governments 
to channel more resources or find alternative ways of boosting infrastructural investment in their 
respective countries. The significance, also of customs infrastructure suggests the need for 
government to improve customs facilities by setting up systems (i.e. employing skilled labor, 
stamping out corruption and streamlining customs procedures and use of efficient information 
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and communication management systems) that will improve customs efficiency and hence 
minimize import and export transit days. 
In the case of power outages, governments need to come up with proper financing mechanisms 
and regulations to make markets work in support of energy generation. This can be achieved 
either through the commonly used private public partnership arrangements or privatization or 
commercialization of state run power utility monopolies. Proper regulatory mechanisms can be 
used to minimize abuse of monopoly power by these privatized utility companies. By so doing, 
resources will be generated to build and maintain electricity infrastructure. The significance of 
the electricity - generator interaction variable also means that firms in countries with serious 
electricity problems should be encouraged or assisted in acquiring alternative energy sources like 
generators as this appears to improve the likelihood to export as well as geographical 
diversification of exports. 
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CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX 
APPENDIX SECTION: Table A3.1: List of variables 
Variables 
Business Characteristics 
probexport 
Logsize 
Logage 
anyfor 
Internet 
Pexport 
Efficiency 
Geography / Market access variable 
Foreign market access : (LogFMA) 
Sector cif fob 
Market diversification 
Infrastructure cost variables 
Obs_telecomms 
Obs _ electri 
Obs_transport 
Obs customs 
Owngenrator 
Alternative infrastructure variables 
Water problem hours 
Power outage hours 
Generator_outage _ hours _interraction 
Telephone problem hours 
Custom delay days 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Illfrastructure variables 
te1ecomlV 
Domestic transportlV 
customslV 
electrilV 
e1ectri_generator _ interaction 
Country dummies 
dwntanzania 
dumuganda 
dumzambia 
dums _africa 
dums mauritius 
Sectoral dummies 
Textile Garment 
Food_agriculture 
Chemicalyharmacy 
Plapackaging 
Wood furniture 
Construction metal 
DefiDitioD 
Exporting dumm y = I if% exported is greater than zero 
Log of number of employees 
Log of age of firm 
Foreign ownership dummy=1 if there is foreign ownership 
Internet dummy= 1 iffirrn ha internet or website 
% of output exported (export intensity) 
Cobb Douglas production function residuals 
Measured using distance from nearest port 
Alternative international distance indicator measured using cost, insurance 
and freight as well as free on board values 
Equivalent number of markets (for measurement see equation 17) 
Telecommunication perception index 
Electricity perception indicator 
Transport perception index 
Customs perception index 
Generator dummy= I if firm has one 
Used sector-regiollal averages 
Number of hours without water per day 
Number of hours without electricity per day 
Interaction variable using hours 
Number of hours per day without telephone connection 
Average number of days to clear goods at customs when importing and 
exporting 
Used sector -regiollal averages 
Average perception or number of days/ hours without telecommunications 
Average perception indicator calculated over non exporting firms 
Average perception index or number of days to export and import 
Average perception index or number of days/ hours without electricity 
Interaction variable 
Dummy= I if country is Tanzania 
Dummy= I if country is Uganda 
Dummy= I if country is Zambia 
Dummy= I if country is South Africa 
Dummy= I if country is Mauritius 
Plastic, paper and packaging sectors 
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Table A3.2 Alternative measures of infrastructure quality by country 
All COWltries (%) South Africa (e;.) Zambia (e;.) 
(1598) ( 603) (207) 
All firms ex rters All firms e rters All firms ex rters 
Power outages days 2.35 1.82 0.49 0.51 3.10 3.01 
Power outages hours 6.37 6 .22 4.12 4.29 5.47 4.72 
Days without telephone 1.55 l.37 0.49 0.50 3.34 4.40 
Hours without telephone 14.2 11.4 3.94 3.94 13.5 1l.8 
Days without water 2.02 1.80 0.42 0.43 2.08 l.34 
Hours without water 12.9 13.9 3.42 3.57 9.75 9.83 
% output lost due to power outages. 5.30 5.26 0.90 0.72 4.53 3.65 
Import clearing days 8 .02 7.37 6.75 6.76 4.81 5.24 
Export clearing days 10.0 9.64 12.8 13.4 2.20 2.16 
Sectoral- CIF / FOB ratio l.85 l.82 1.57 l.60 l.37 1.42 
Generator ownership (% tinns) 30.0 34.0 10.0 11.0 38.0 50.0 
Source: Author' s own computations based on World Bank' s Investment Climate Surveys 
Table A3.3: Infrastructure DerceDtion indicators means bv country and sectors 
Obstade telecommunication Obstacle transportatian 
Non exoorters exoorters Non exoorters 
South Africa 0.37 0.54 0.71 
Zambia 1.41 1.99 1.54 
Tanzania 0.99 1.08 1.34 
Uganda 0.65 0.77 1.35 
Mauritius 0.50 0.64 1.07 
Textile Garment 0.91 0.73 1.28 
Food _ agric 0.97 1.04 1.33 
Chemical_pharmarcy 1.05 0.79 1.26 
Plapackaging 0.84 0.65 1.20 
Woodfurniture 1.06 1.02 1.28 
Constmction metal 1.0 I 0.70 1.35 
Source: Author' s own computations based on World Bank' s Investment Climate Surveys 
Tanzania (0/.) 
(276) 
All firms e rter 
5.60 
7 .84 
4.13 
10.8 
8.74 
13.2 
10.8 
18.5 
11 .7 
l.86 
55.0 
1.74 
1.83 
1.73 
1.52 
2.08 
2.06 
5.26 
7.20 
4.51 
12.1 
8 .90 
13 .6 
9.78 
17.1 
10.5 
2.09 
80.0 
Uganda (e;.) Mauritius (e;.) 
(300) (212) 
All firms ex rters All firms Ex rter 
3.22 4.68 0.65 0.64 
9.06 14.8 7.23 6.98 
1.49 0.65 0.21 0 .28 
l3.5 16.0 5.04 6.72 
0.51 1.45 206 l.99 
20.8 15.6 11.4 12.2 
6 .25 7.64 4 .00 4.49 
9.73 7.93 5.45 5.32 
3.16 2.56 4.44 4.49 
2.74 3.03 1.60 1.62 
36.0 78.0 39.0 38.0 
O_tIIde autom. and trllde rep 
Non exoorters exoorters 
0.78 1.34 
1.61 1.52 
1.44 2.17 
1.32 1.91 
1.26 1.61 
1.53 1.46 
1.42 1.48 
1.55 1.36 
1.42 1.26 
1.40 1.33 
1.56 1.22 
Note: higher mean values imply greater obstacle. (O=no obstacle; I=minor obstacle; 2=moderate obstacle; 3=major obstacle; 4=very severe obstacle) 
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Fig A3.1: Kernel densities of firms that export 
o 
o 
Kernel density estimate 
o 20 40 60 
percentage_exported 
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth::: 3 .71 
o 20 
Kernel density estimate 
40 60 
large_exporters 
kernel -=- epanechnikov, bandwidth = 5 . 17 
Kernel density estimate 
o 20 
kemel = epanechnikov, bandvvictth = 7 . 19 
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CHAPTER 4 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AFRICA 
(Evidence from firm level data) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDIi2 has the potential to generate employment, raise 
productivity, transfer skills and technology, enhance exports as well as contribute to the long-
term economic growth of the world's developing nations (UNCTAD, 2006). More than ever, 
countries at all levels of growth seek to leverage FDI for development (UNCT AD, 2007). 
FDI is also one of the most significant factors leading to the globalization of the international 
economy, since it contributes towards building strong economic links between industrialized 
nations and developing countries. 
Africa has attracted increasing amounts of inward FDI in the past two decades, with FDI 
inflows rising from US$2.4 billion in 1985 to $52 billion in 2007 (see table 4.1 below) and 
inward FDI stock in the region rose from US$39 billion in 1980 to about US$393 billion in 
2007. The ratio of FDI inflows to the region's gross fixed capital formation reached its 
highest level of 21 percent in 2001, declining to 13 percent in 2002-2004 and recovering to 
20 percent in 2006 (World Investment Directory: Africa, 2008). Although absolute global 
FDI inflows have been increasing over the years since the 1980s, large shares of these 
inflows have been accounted for by developed economies. 
The inflows of foreign direct investment into Africa have lagged far behind those of other 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America. According to Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below, 
between 1980 and 2007 the average percentage share of global FDI received by the 
developed world was about 73.5%, with Asian countries getting about 14.3% and a meagre 
2.3% flowing to Africa. This African share is also four times less than that received by the 
Latin American countries in the same period 1980 to 2007. It also appears that the 
continent's annual share of global FDI of about 3% converged to the region's shares in world 
exports and world output (UNCT AD, 2007). Developed countries have also accounted for 
52 FDI is defined as the acquisition of sufficient assets or lasting interest in a foreign enterprise so as to have an 
effective voice in its management or to exercise managerial control (IMF, 1995:25). However acquiring 10% or 
more of assets of a foreign firm is the standard definition commonly used in practice. 
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the majority share of inward FDI stock and of flows to many African countries over various 
periods and some of the region's major recipient countries are Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Morocco (World Investment Directory, 2008). Most of the FDI stock coming to Africa 
originates in a few European Union countries namely United Kingdom, France, Portugal and 
Italy with United States representing the North American region (World Investment Report, 
2008). 
Table 4.1 Foreign Direct Investment Inward Stock by host region 1980-2007 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Millions of US dollars 
World 704256 963 352 1941 252 2914 356 5786 700 10180 063 12470085 15210560 
Developed countries 401 680 578 373 I 410962 2051 355 3 987 624 7187182 8766020 10458610 
% share in global stock 57.0 60.0 72.7 70.4 68.9 70.6 70.3 68.8 
DeveloJ!inK; countries: 
Asia 220951 273972 356575 575270 I 078 527 1613586 2016072 2 706635 
% share in global stock 31.4 28.4 18.4 19.7 18.6 15.9 16.2 17.8 
Latin America 40959 68473 110547 185 123 502900 829324 945 029 1140007 
% share in global stock 5.8 7.1 5.7 6.4 8.7 8.1 7.6 7.5 
Africa 39466 41267 59004 87638 152614 270984 335435 393429 
% share in global stock 5.6 43 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 
South Africa 16459 8883 9207 15005 43462 78985 87782 93474 
% share in Aliica stock 41.7 21.5 15.6 17.1 28.5 29.1 26.2 23.8 
Tanzania 342 386 388 620 2778 4390 5342 5942 
% share in Africa stock 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 
Zambia 364 459 1022 1553 2332 3775 4391 5375 
% share in Africa stock 0.9 l.l 1.7 1.8 1.5 14 1.3 1.4 
lIganda II 9 277 807 2024 2425 2909 
~'O share in Africa stock 0.02 0.02 0.01 03 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Mauritius 26 43 168 253 683 805 910 1242 
% share in Africa stock 0.07 0.1 03 0.3 04 03 03 03 
Source: World Investment Report 2008 
NB: For associate and subsidiary enterprises, FDI stock is the value of the share of their capital and reserves (including 
retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise (this is equal to total assets minus total liabilities), plus the net 
indebtedness of the associate or subsidiary to the parent firm. For branches, it is the value of fixed assets and the value of 
current assets and investments. excluding amounts due from the parent. less liabilities to third parties. 
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Table 4.2: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows by host region 1980-2007 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Millions of US dollars 
World 54077 55 887 207278 341041 1398183 958697 1411 018 I 833324 
Developed countries 46577 41696 172 115 220956 I 134564 611319 940880 I 247661 
% share in global flows 86.1 74.6 83.0 64.8 81.2 63.8 66.7 68.1 
Developing countries: 
Asia 543 5419 22 660 80114 148397 210026 272 890 319333 
% share in global flows 1.0 9.7 10.9 23.5 10.6 21.9 19.3 17.4 
Latin America 6416 6223 8926 29513 98267 76375 92927 126240 
% share in global flows 11.9 11.1 4.3 8.7 7.0 7.9 6.6 6.9 
Africa 400 2443 2805 5 655 9671 29459 45754 52982 
% share in global flows 0.7 4.4 14 1.7 0.7 3.1 3.2 2.9 
South Africa -10 -448 -78 1241 888 6644 -527 5692 
% share in Africa flows (25) (183 ) (27) 21.9 9.2 22.6 (12) 10.7 
Tanzania 15 150 216 568 522 600 
% share in Africa flows IJ 0.6 0 2.6 2.2 1.9 LI LI 
Zambia 62 52 203 97 122 357 616 984 
% share in Africa flows 15.5 2.1 7.2 1.7 IJ 12 IJ 1.9 
Uganda 4 -4 -6 125 181 380 400 368 
% share in Africa flows 1.0 (02) (0.2) 2.2 1.9 IJ 0.9 0.7 
Mauritius 41 19 277 42 105 339 
% share in Africa flows 0.3 OJ 1.5 OJ 2.9 0.1 0.2 0.6 
Source: World Investment Report, 2008 
NB: FDI flows consist of the increase in reinvested earnings plus the net increase in funds received from the foreign direct 
investor. FDI flows with a negative sign (reverse flows) indicate that at least one of the components in the above definition is 
negative and not offset by positive amounts of the remaining components. 
The industrial distribution of inward FDI stock and flows clearly shows that resource seeking 
FDI has traditionally played an important role in some African economies. In Botswana, the 
primary sector accounted for more than 60 percent ofthe FDI stock in 2005. In South Africa 
and Nigeria the major FDI recipients in terms of stock, the share of the primary sector has 
risen almost twofold and eight fold respectively since the mid 1990s, reflecting rising 
corporate profit and high commodity prices (World Investment Directory, 2008). Financial 
services accounted for a large share of inward FDI stock in Egypt, South Africa and Zambia 
while in Uganda the share increased from 18 percent in 2000 to 28 percent in 2003. In 
Mauritius as much as half of the FDI inflows went to the financial services sector. Only in a 
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few relatively small FDI recipient countries such as Madagascar, Namibia and the United 
Republic of Tanzania did the share of manufacturing FDI inflow increase in the 1990s 
although in Madagascar the share of the primary sector rose much more than that of 
manufacturing (World Investment Directory, 2008). 
This sluggish inflow of FDI, particularly into manufacturing dampens the continent's efforts 
to foster economic growth and economic integration thus partly supporting the common 
belief that Africa will not be able to achieve the 2015 Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) [Commission for Africa report, 2005]. Thus, it would be difficult for the continent to 
achieve high levels of employment, reduce poverty and improve standards of living of many 
Africans, if growth enhancing FDI inflows continue to remain very low (Commission for 
Africa report, 2005). 
The quest for growth in developing countries has therefore made cross-border investment by 
multinational firms to be the most salient feature of development strategies. Many countries 
in Africa have developed a variety of investment packages mostly in the form of export 
processing zones to attract multinational companies (UNCT AD, 2003). These packages 
include a number of incentives like tax holidays, export subsidies, special infrastructure 
facilities (warehouses and factory shells etc), tariff incentives, freedom from foreign 
exchange regulation and exemptions on profit repatriation restrictions as well as relaxed 
labour laws (Rolfe and White, 1991; Wallace 1990). This increase in the importance of cross-
border investment has resulted in location choices of multinational enterprises receiving a 
great deal of attention from researchers across the world. Most of these studies have sought to 
understand the nature of firm specific as well as location specific factors that are important to 
multinational firms. They identified the following location determinants: market size (Head 
and Mayer, 2004; Coughlin et at., 1991), labour cost (Wei et at., 1999, Cheng and Kwan, 
1999; Kinoshita and Campos. 2004 etc ), infrastructure (Cheng and Kwan, 2000, Asiedu, 
2002, Khadaroo and Seetanah, 2004, Wheeler and Mody, 1992, Loree and Guisinger, 1995; 
Morisset, 2000 etc), government policies (Head and Ries, 1996; Wu, 2000) and tariffs 
(Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Kogut and Chang, 1996; Bloningen, 1997) and institutions (Wei 
(2000a, 200b; Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Kinoshita and Campos, 2002; Kirkpatrick et at, 
2006; Stein and Daude, 2001) Some researchers have stressed agglomeration effects, 
concluding that agglomeration economies are an important consideration when foreign 
investors make location choices (Head et al , 1995; Blonigen et at., 2005; Crozet et at., 2004; 
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Guimaraes et al., 2000; He, 2002, 2003). The basic rationale is that greater numbers of 
foreign firms in a particular location generate positive externalities in terms of the availability 
of skilled workers, specialized services, intermediate products and shared knowledge (Head 
et aI, 1995). Cheng and Kwan (2000) argue that huge market size and quality infrastructure 
are one of the location factors that can also lead firms to concentrate production in a 
particular area. 
In this chapter, we also want to examine the impact of location factors (like infrastructure) 
and firm heterogeneity on foreign direct investment in Africa using firm level data. We 
however depart from the traditional approach that has been followed in the literature 
particularly with regard to the measurement of infrastructure variables. We propose to use 
infrastructure indicators measured at firm level as opposed to country wide indicators 
commonly used in the empirical African literature (see Schoeman et aI, 2000; Morisset, 
2000; Asiedu, 2002; Khadaroo and Seenatah, 2004). We control for infrastructure indicators 
by using the number of days or hours without electricity, telephone, water and customs whilst 
at the same time highlighting the importance of firm specific controls. Our argument is that 
energy consumption or generation per capita, percentage of paved roads and telephone 
density convey very little about infrastructure quality particularly if provision is characterised 
by poor maintenance of roads, intermittent power outages and poor telephone connections. It 
is true that a good measure of infrastructure quality should incorporate both infrastructure 
availability and reliability (Asiedu, 2002). The measures that we employ here however, only 
capture reliability. This is because infrastructure is of little use if it's not reliable and that is 
why we expect infrastructure reliability (how often are phone lines down) to be more 
important to foreign investors than availability (number of telephones lines per capita in a 
country). 
The other problem with country level indicators is that there are not that many countries in 
the world on which there is good enough macro data on social infrastructure to derive robust 
statistical results53 and the proxies used as explanatory variables do not provide much specific 
guidance about what countries need to do to improve their investment climates (Dollar et aI, 
2005). In addition to the fact that very few54 FDI studies in Africa employ firm level data in 
53 See also Levine and Renel! (1992): Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000): Dollar and Kray (2003): Blonigen (2005) 
54 See Harvey and Abor. 2009 on Ghana. 
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their analysis, country level data assumes that the quality of infrastructure is the same across 
locations within a country, when in fact they may be interesting variations based on local 
governance (Dollar et ai, 2005). Additionally, a number of studies that have examined the 
site determinants ofFDI using firm level data have mostly looked at the characteristics of the 
investing firms not the characteristics of the firms that have attracted some foreign ownership 
(see for example Hong, 2008; Kinoshita, 1998; Chen and Moore, 2009; Dunning 1980). This 
study therefore provides another departure from this traditional approach. We attempt to 
investigate the characteristics of the invested firms that make them more attractive to foreign 
multinationals. Thus the question that we want to answer is: Do multinationals prefer 
investing in large firms, older firms or in firms with none unionized labour force? This study 
will not only help us understand the importance of location specific features but also the 
attributes of domestic firms that are attractive to multinationals who engage in mergers and 
acquisitions instead of Greenfield investment55 . 
Furthermore, some studies have also shown that export-oriented FDI is driven by different 
factors than domestic market-seeking FDI (see Davis and Weinstein, 1999, 2003; Kumar, 
2005; Woodward and Rolfe, 1993; Meyer 1995, Cheng and Kwan, 1999; Coughlin et ai, 
1991). Meyer (1995) found that market size and tariffs have a positive and significant 
influence on market seeking FDI whilst wages, transport costs and outward looking policy 
regimes are major determinants of export oriented FDI. Our aim in this chapter is also to use 
the available firm level infrastructure data to examine whether there are differences in the 
determinants of market seeking and export oriented FDI in our African sample. The 
identification of these effects is important in formulating infrastructure - specific industrial 
policies. This is because, to set appropriate industrial policy goals and make reasonable 
expectations about the effects of investment promotion policies, you need to understand what 
influences the location decisions of different multinational companies. Foreign investment 
problems facing countries mostly in Africa, particularly in manufacturing can only be 
understood and remedied successfully if policy makers have a clear understanding of the 
behaviour of these investors. 
55 In our data set the average amount of equity bought by a foreign multinational is about 78.3% and about II % of foreign 
invested firms have 100% foreign ownership. These statistics suggest that mergers and acquisition could be the dominant 
form of investment by MNEs in these countries. See table 4.6 for more. 
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4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1 Theoretical literature 
4.2.1.1 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident 
entity in one economy in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor 
(Protsenko, 2003). The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship 
between the direct investor and a significant degree of influence on the management of the 
enterprise (lMF, 1993; OECD, 1996). "Significant degree of influence" and "long term 
relationship" are the key terms to distinguish FDI from portfolio investments, which are short 
term activities undertaken by institutional investors through the equity market. A "lasting 
interest" in foreign entity emphasises the difference to other forms of capital flows and occurs 
in form of know-how or management-skills transfer whilst "significant degree of influence" 
exist if the direct investor controls at least 10% of the equity structure of the invested firm 
(Michael and Elma, 2005). 
Direct investment undertaken by foreign firms in a host country can take the form of either 
greenfield investment or mergers and acquisitions (M&As), depending on whether the 
transaction involves mainly newly created assets coming under control of the foreign firms, 
or just a transfer of existing assets from local firms, respectively (Calderon et aI, 2004). In the 
case of M&A, one can draw a further distinction between cross-border mergers, which occur 
when the assets and operation of firms from different countries are combined to establish a 
new legal identity, and cross-border acquisitions, which occur when the control of assets and 
operations is transferred from a local to a foreign company (with the former becoming an 
affiliate of the latter) (Nocke and Yeaple, 2006). In practice, world M&As have been 
predominantly driven by acquisitions. According to Calderon et aI, (2004), world cross-
border mergers represented only three percent of cross-border M&As in 1999 and over 50 
percent of cross-border M&As in 1999 took the form of full (or outright) acquisitions. 
Minority acquisitions by foreign firms (that is, purchases of 10% to 49% participation in total 
capital) represented one-third of acquisitions in developing countries and less than 20 percent 
in developed countries (see UNCT AD, 2000). According to UNCT AD (2000), the rise in 
M&A foreign investment in developing economies, especially Latin American was largely 
driven by privatization of state-owned enterprises, particularly in the utilities and financial 
services industries. 
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In today's fast moving, rapidly changing business and technological environment, the form of 
market entry in new foreign markets has become a crucial decision to most MNEs 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2004). Several empirical studies have identified certain 
determinants that may affect the choice of entry strategy. In an early entry mode study, Dubin 
(1976) discovered that U.S. firms tend to favour greenfield investments if the firm size was 
large, targeting a developing country and had previously acquired foreign experience (cited in 
Kogut & Singh, 1988). Hennart and Reddy (1997) found that Japanese investors in the u.S. 
favour the use of acquisition rather than greenfield investment if the target market is 
characterized by high scale economies and high concentration levels. Caves and Mehra 
(1986) noted that the entry mode is driven by the form of entrant's corporate organization and 
the characteristics of its product market. Focusing on firms entering the u.S. market, they 
disconfirmed the hypothesis that previous investments in a country have an impact on a 
firm's choice to enter by greenfield over acquisition into the U.S. market. In addition, they 
indicated that acquired experience in these fields, e.g. knowledge of routinized processes in 
internationalization, will encourage a firm to choose acquisition rather than greenfield 
investment. In a similar fashion, Andersson and Svensson (1996) differentiate between 
technological and organizational skills of a firm and analyzed empirically their impact on 
entry mode choice. They come to the conclusion, that firms with strong organizational skills 
prefer takeovers, while firms with strong technological skills favour greenfield operations. 
Zejan (1990) also found that experience is insignificant and that takeovers become more 
common because of growing instability and uncertainty in host countries. 
Dunning (2001) identifies the importance of cross-border M&As in the FDI process and 
offers a broad conceptual distinction among different modes of FDI. Specifically, he suggests 
that the location requirements of strategic asset-seeking FDI are different from those of 
natural resource, market or efficiency-seeking FDI. In particular, the presence of high quality 
physical and human infrastructure and a favourable political and commercial ethos towards 
M&As and cooperative alliances are especially important for strategic asset-seeking FDI. 
Other studies also suggest a variety of possible factors that conceptually make M&A activity 
a more likely mode of FDI in some countries than in others. For example, Pugel (1985) 
hypothesizes that the depressed U.S. stock market made entry by acquisition more attractive 
and more prevalent in the United States in the 1970s. Feliciano and Lipsey (2002) examined 
inward FDI in the United States for 50 industries over the period 1980-1990. They estimate 
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equations for the share of u.s. corporate assets acquired by foreign entities and the share of 
u.s. corporate assets accounted for by new foreign establishments. Several differences are 
identified. In particular, a higher price for the U.S. dollar discourages inward takeovers, 
whereas the exchange rate is not significantly related to foreign investment in new 
establishments. Higher U.S. stock prices are a stronger positive influence on foreign 
investment in new establishments than on foreign acquisitions. However, acquisitions and 
establishments of new firms both tend to occur in periods of high u.S. growth. 
4.2.1.2 Export oriented and market seeking FDI 
There are two main reasons for firms to engage in FOI and these include serving a foreign 
market and taking advantage of lower cost inputs. This distinction is used to differentiate 
between two main types of FOI: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal FOI refers to the foreign 
manufacturing of products and services roughly similar to those the firm produces in its home 
market (Aizenman and Marion, 2001). This type of FOI is called "horizontal" because the 
multinational duplicates the same activities in different countries. Horizontal FDI arises 
because it is too costly to serve the foreign market by exports due to transportation costs or 
trade barriers and is therefore a substitute of international trade (Fukao and Wei, 2008). 
The first presentation of the horizontal model was by Markusen (1984). In its original 
version, the two countries are identical and Markusen compares equilibrium with one 
multinational enterprise (MNE) to that with two national firms. In the horizontal model, a 
MNE firm has two advantages over a national firm. The first advantage arises because 
headquartering is a joint input, that is, it can be used in multiple production locations, 
including those in other countries, without additional cost. Thus, if two national firms were 
producing the same amount as the single horizontal MNE, their average headquartering costs 
would be twice as great. The second advantage of the MNE is that by servicing a market 
through local production, it avoids trade costs. In determining the relationship between the 
skills difference and horizontal FOI, the key is to recall that the skill-intensive production of 
the MNE's good takes place in both countries. As one country becomes skill abundant 
relative to the other, it gains a comparative advantage in both headquartering and the 
production of the MNE's good. Thus, the MNE has an incentive to shift production and 
citizenship towards the skill abundant country. Therefore, as the skill differences rises, FOI 
goes down since the MNE produces less in the host. Two factors are important for the 
appearance of horizontal FDI: presence of positive trade costs and firm-level scale 
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economies. The main motivation for horizontal FDI is to avoid transportation costs or to get 
access to a foreign market which can only be served locally. Theoretical models of horizontal 
FDI are based on the trade-off between additional fixed costs from setting up a new plant and 
the saving of variable costs from avoiding tariffs and transportation. 
The model predicts two situations when horizontal FDI will dominate over exports or crowd 
them out completely. The first is when the transportation costs are large in comparison to the 
plant fixed costs, while the second occurs when firm-level scale effects are larger than plant 
level scale effects. This means that the incentive for horizontal multinationals increases the 
greater are transport costs relative to fixed plant costs and the greater are increasing returns at 
the firm level relative to the plant level. The findings from the models of horizontal FDI can 
explain a variety of features of FDI flows. First, horizontal FDI reduces trade flows, since the 
market is served through local production instead of exports. Second, horizontal FDI takes 
place if the costs of importing are high relative to costs of investing. Third, horizontal FDI is 
more likely to occur in large foreign markets, which allows spreading fixed costs for the new 
plant over a large vol ume of production. 
Vertical FDI takes place if the MNE geographically fragments its production by stages. The 
fragmentation of production occurs in order to exploit differences in relative factor costs. It is 
called vertical since the production stages in different countries are conducted one after 
another. The modelling of this type of FDI is based on the idea, that different parts of the 
production process have different input requirements. Since the input prices vary across 
countries it becomes profitable to split production, conducting for example labour intensive 
production stages in countries with low labour costs 
The vertical model finds its genesis in Helpman (1984). In its original form, the model is 
described by a standard Hecksher-Ohlin model with the exception that the factors used in the 
production of the MNE's good can be combined across borders. This again shows that the 
skilled labour used in the headquartering activity can be geographically separated from the 
production activity. Here, there are no trade costs. As is typical in the Hecksher-Ohlin model, 
when the factor endowments of the two countries lie within the factor price equalization 
(FPE) set, the integrated world equilibrium can be achieved through trade in goods. In this 
case, there is no need for an MNE since there is no advantage to this structure relative to a 
national firm structure. Vertical FDI only exists when factor endowments lie outside the FPE 
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set, i.e. only when the skill difference between the parent and host countries is sufficiently 
greater than zero. If otherwise the difference in relative endowments of countries is not 
sufficiently large, trade in goods will lead to the equalisation of factor prices between 
countries. Then, there will be no incentive for the firm to separate headquarter and production 
activities and FDI will not occur. If, however, the difference in relative factor endowments is 
large, one country for example has a much higher endowment of labour relative to capital, 
then trade does not equalize factor prices. Here it is profitable for the firm to split activities, 
locating the labour-intensive part of production (e.g. assembling) in the labour-abundant 
country. Zhang and Markusen (1999) argue that the size of the host market has a negative 
impact on vertical FDI because the fixed costs for the new plant can be sooner covered in a 
larger market. 
Another term related to vertical multinational activities is "export platform FDI", which has 
gained attention in recent studies. It is defined as production in a host country, with the output 
sold to a third market and not in the parent' or local market. Thus, such a definition 
incorporates the features of vertical and of horizontal FDI as well. Here the foreign affiliate 
serves a large integrated market as a horizontal investment. But at the same time the location 
within the region is chosen on the basis of cost considerations, which is typical for vertical 
FDI (Ekholm et. a!., 2003). However, empirical findings by Hanson et a!., (2001) suggest a 
closer relationship to vertical FDI, since this type of investment is strongly cost driven and 
depends negatively on the size of the foreign market. 
According to Pradham and Abraham (200 I) export oriented FDI can be expected to generate 
strong links with local economy compared to market seeking- horizontal FDI in the host 
country because it is motivated to exploit the locational advantages offered by the host county 
like low-cost labour, raw materials, components parts etc. They argue that because of this, the 
scope for 'knowledge spillovers' from the entry of export FDI is much larger than from 
horizontal FDI. The presence of vertical FDI may also induce purely domestic firms to 
diversifY into export market when information on foreign markets brought in by foreign firms 
spill over to them. Another important aspect in which vertical FDI is relatively beneficial vis-
a-vis market seeking FDI is the possibility 'crowding-out' effect. Market seeking FDI being 
motivated to serve the domestic market can erode the market share of domestic firms because 
of their superior assets bundles. Vertical FDI on the contrary can stimulate domestic 
investment by generating demands for intermediate goods and besides being primarily 
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oriented to markets which are external to the country of location, are less likely to adversely 
affect domestic firms. 
Recent work by Markusen, Venables, Konan,and Zhang (MVKZ, 1996) and Markusen 
(1997) has combined these two motivations for FDI into a unified approach called the 
Knowledge Capital (KK) model. According to Markusen and Maskus (1999) among others, 
one of the key methods for distinguishing between the horizontal and vertical motivations for 
FDI is to analyze the relationship between countries' relative factor endowments and FDI. In 
particular, the literature has focused on countries' relative supplies of skilled labor. 
According to the theory, horizontal FDI is greatest when countries have similar endowments 
since this supports production of the MNE's good in both countries Vertical investment, 
however, is greatest when countries have very different endowments since that creates large 
differences in factor prices 
Horizontal FDI takes place between large, similar countries, whereas vertical FDI arises 
between a high-cost country and a low-cost country. Trade costs make horizontal FDI more 
attractive while they are discouraging vertical FDI. Both types of FDI have a positive impact 
on welfare by avoiding the duplication of headquarter activities and by making the global 
production more efficient. They differ, however, in the impact on wages. Vertical FDI 
reduces the absolute wage differences between countries and increase the relative wages 
within countries. 
Further differences between vertical and horizontal FDI exists with respect to the mode of 
market entry. Potsenko (2004) found that in the Czech Republic, horizontal FDI takes place 
in almost 50 percent of all cases by acquiring local firms. One possible explanation for this 
was that, buying an existing firm gives the investor a quick access to a large market share. In 
addition, a well established local brand makes it easier to serve the new market. In contrast, 
68.1 percent of export oriented vertical FDI choose greenfield investment as the form of 
market entry. These multinationals seem less interested in local brands, and a modernisation 
of existing old production lines could be more expensive than a completely new production 
site. 
4.2.1.3 General theoretical determinants of FDI 
Shatz and Venables (2000) distinguished between two main reasons why foreign direct 
investors would like to locate in a foreign country. The first one is to better serve the local 
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market and is called 'horizontal' or 'market seeking' since it results in a duplication of 
production plants. The main motivation behind horizontal FDI is to economize on tariffs56 , 
transport costs and to tap a new market. This type of FDI is a substitute for international trade 
and is mainly driven by market size and trade barriers. The second reason for locating in a 
foreign country is to have access to lower-cost inputs and also to overcome distribution 
problems and this FD I is called 'vertical' or 'production cost minimizing' since there is 
fragmentation. The motivation here is to economize on production inputs so as to maximise 
profits on each good produced. 
However, the earliest theories of foreign direct investment were based on the theory of 
portfolio investment which assumes that international capital moves across borders in search 
of higher returns (Mcdougall, 1960). In this framework, international capital should flow 
from developed countries where there are lower returns at the margin, to developing countries 
where there are significantly higher returns caused by scarcity of capital. These theories were 
inadequate in explaining the behaviour of capital flows to developing countries which despite 
their low capital-labour ratios, continue to receive the least FDI relative to other parts of the 
world (Razin,et al 2004). 
Due to the inadequacy of the portfolio theories of investment, economists began to explore 
alternative theories to explain FDI movement. The main questions were no longer related to 
factor movement; rather they were related to why companies wanted to extend their 
production activities across international borders and why they sought to control foreign 
production. Hymer (1960) provided the earliest attempt to answer these questions. Hymer's 
explanations were based on the industrial organization theory. Firms operating in a foreign 
country are seen as being at a disadvantage compared to domestic firms. The disadvantage 
arises because unlike domestic firms, foreign firms are not familiar with local conditions such 
as legislation, business culture, language, etc. Foreign firms must therefore have off-setting 
firm-specific advantages allowing them to compete with domestic firms. The firm-specific 
advantages include superior technology, scale economies and intangible assets such as 
managerial skills and brand names. These firm-specific advantages should be transferable 
across national boundaries at low costs, thereby providing a potential source of economies of 
scale. Hymer's theory predicted that a multinational enterprise arises in order to exploit its 
56 Also referred to as tariff jumping FDI. 
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firm-specific advantages in a foreign location. After Hymer (1960), later developments 
within the industrial organization approach placed emphasis on the special characteristics that 
make foreign firms competitive and the nature of market imperfections surrounding FDI. 
Although the industrial organisation theories were able to explain why MNEs emerge, there 
was no explanation of how the MNEs made decisions on where to locate their international 
operations and in what form. This takes us to yet another important contribution in the 
development of FDI theory called the internalisation theory which is based on Coarse (1937) 
transaction costs theorem. Buckley and Casson (1976) gave the first explicit presentation of 
the internalisation theorem. The internalisation theory observes that different business 
activities are linked by flows of intermediate products, including not only ordinary semi-
processed materials, but also knowledge in the form of technological know-how and skills 
embodied in goods and human capital. These links can be based on external market 
transactions. The theory further postulates that external markets are often inefficient 
particularly with regards to transactions in intermediate products that embody firm-specific 
intangible assets. This is because the specification and pricing of these products is 
particularly difficult. Moreover, external markets in knowledge-intensive products are 
difficult to organise, giving rise to high transaction costs. Buckley and Casson (1976) argued 
that a firm can overcome market imperfections by creating its own market or internal ising 
hence investing abroad through FDI. 
Dunning (1980) recognised that although the industrial organisation and the internalisation 
theories provided useful insights, both theories did not individually offer a comprehensive 
explanation of FDI. He then proposed an eclectic approach which combined the industrial 
organisation approach; the transaction costs economics, and the trade and location theory. In 
Dunning's original eclectic framework, the structure and intensity of MNE's foreign direct 
investment decisions are influenced by three factors: ownership-specific (0) advantages, 
internalization (I) advantages and location-specific (L) advantages. 
In its original form, the eclectic paradigm stated that the extent, form, and pattern of 
international production is determined by the configuration of three sets of advantages as 
perceived by enterprises. First, in order for firms of one nationality to compete with those of 
another by producing in the latter's own countries, they must possess certain advantages 
specific to the nature and/or nationality of their ownership. These advantages sometimes 
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called competitive or monopolistic advantages must be sufficient to compensate for the costs 
of setting up and operating a foreign value-adding operation, in addition to the costs faced by 
indigenous producers or potential producers. Therefore ownership advantages are the MNE's 
possession of firm-specific competitive advantages over domestic firms in serving particular 
markets. These ownership advantages such as patents, know-how, trademarks, specialised 
management capabilities, scale advantages, organisational and marketing systems and 
innovatory capabilities are exclusive only to the firm that owns them and not accessible to 
any other firm, thus providing a potential source of economies of scale. 
Internalization advantages refer to the benefits that accrue to the MNEs by choosing to enter 
the foreign market through direct investment rather than relying on international arms-length 
markets. This second condition for international production is that it must be in the best 
interests of enterprises that possess ownership-specific advantages to transfer them across 
national boundaries within their own organizations rather than sell them, or their right of use 
to foreign-based enterprises (Dunning, 1987). This immediately suggests that MNEs perceive 
that the international market place is not the best modality for transacting intermediate goods 
or services. The reasons for the internalization of markets includes the following kinds of 
market failure: (i) those that arise from risk and uncertainty (ii) those that stem from the 
ability of firms to exploit the economies of large-scale production and (iii) those that occur 
where the transaction of a particular good or service yields costs and benefits external to that 
transaction, but that are not reflected in the terms agreed to by the transacting parties 
(Dunning, 1987). These transaction market failures are normally expressed in the form of 
safeguarding supplies of essential inputs, ensuring the quality of end products, guaranteeing 
markets, protecting property rights and spreading the costs of shared overheads etc. The 
greater the perceived costs of transactional market failure, the more MNEs are likely to 
exploit their competitive advantages through international production rather than by 
contractual agreements with foreign firms. 
Location-specific advantages refer to specific locational characteristics of alternative host 
countries that provide an MNE with the incentive to locate at least some part of their 
production activities in another country rather than in its home country. This strand of the 
eclectic paradigm is concerned with the "where" of production. Enterprises will engage in 
foreign production whenever they perceive it is in their best interests to combine spatially 
transferable intermediate products produced in the home country, with at least some 
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immobile factor endowments or other intermediate products in another country. Dunning 
(1987) argued that the choice of location is prompted by spatial market failure and that trade 
barriers have led to a lot of foreign manufacturing investment by MNEs. At the same time a 
reduction in transport costs, natural resources availability, cultural and political environment, 
factor prices, government policies regarding trade and local content requirements as well as 
the formation of customs unions or regional trading blocs have prompted greater regional 
specialization of production by MNEs (Dunning 1987b). While the O-advantage depends 
strictly on the characteristics of the firm and its business, the host country conditions and 
policies can influence the L and I advantages. 
Whilst Dunning's original eclectic theory emphasized on locational advantages, he did not 
explicitly emphasis the role that infrastructure in the host country could play to influence 
industrial location. It was only after the early 1990s when there was growing emphasis on the 
role of infrastructure in economic growth that FDI theorists began to incorporate the role of 
these supply side variables in explaining FDI. In particular, recent extensions to the 
ownership location and internalisation (OLI) framework have placed a vital role on 
infrastructural factors as determinants of FDI in developing countries. Thus Dunning and 
Lundan (2006) contributed towards fusing the traditional OLI framework with infrastructural 
factors. They argued that good infrastructure create location advantages that foreign firms 
seek before operating and investing in the host country. 
The earliest attempt at modeling the role of infrastructure particularly transport infrastructure 
was done indirectly by Krugman (1991) when he introduced the concept of economic 
geography in explaining industrial location. His model sought to answer why and when does 
manufacturing become concentrated in a few regions, leaving others relatively undeveloped 
with the remaining regions playing the "peripheral" role of agricultural suppliers to the 
manufacturing "core"? Using a two regions, two goods and two factors of production model 
and borrowing from the monopolistically competitive model initially developed by Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977), as well as assuming iceberg transport costs, Krugman used his model to show 
that transport costs can encourage firms to concentrate or fragment production. One 
important message from his model is that if the size of the market for a good produced by a 
firm is huge in a certain region, then firms will concentrate production there. He called this, 
the "home market effect" suggesting that it is better to produce in that market than to export 
particularly if trade costs are high. On the other hand, if transport costs of moving goods from 
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one region to another are zero location is irrelevant but if they increase firms will move from 
the core to the periphery. He also argued that there is a threshold level of transport costs 
beyond which increases trigger manufacturing divergence. In short Krugman's model 
highlighted the importance of market size in industrial agglomeration and also the fact that 
high transport costs can lead to defensive investment. 
Martin and Rogers (1995) went a step further and modelled the role of different types of 
infrastructure (domestic and international) in influencing industrial location. They proposed a 
new way of modelling public infrastructure which makes it possible to analyse its effect on 
trade patterns and industrial locations7 . His model differs from that of Krugman (1991) in that 
poor infrastructure impose costs on trade within and between countries rather than only on 
international trade a la Krugman. Using iceberg transport costs as in Krugman (1991), they 
also differentiate between infrastructure that facilitates domestic production (domestic 
infrastructure) and infrastructure that facilitates international trade (international 
infrastructure). Thus the iceberg costs are modelled to affect the transportation of goods from 
foreign markets as well as transportation to final destination at home. In this case 
infrastructure costs are lower when the good is produced at home than when it is produced 
abroad because it has to incur both domestic and international trade costs. Their model which 
is a variant of Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Krugman (1991), assumes two countries 
(home and foreign), two factors of production (capital and labour) which are used to produce 
a variety of differentiated goods, fixed by the endowment of capital in each country. This 
model shows that when trade is integrated, firms will locate in countries with good domestic 
infrastructure. Thus poor domestic infrastructure will increase the price of home 
differentiated goods for domestic consumers and will therefore decrease the demand for these 
goods and increase the demand for foreign goods. To take advantage of the high demand in 
the country with better domestic infrastructure and therefore returns to scale, firms will locate 
in this country. In this model, differences in international infrastructure do not induce 
industrial location but good international infrastructure increases the sensitivity of industrial 
location to differentials in domestic infrastructure. Agglomeration of firms will occur if the 
difference in domestic infrastructure is important and if international infrastructures are 
strong. This result mirrors Krugman's (1991) finding that if transport costs are low and 
57 They interpreted public infrastructure to include any facility or institution provided by the state which facilitates 
production and consumption. This interpretation incorporates not only transport and telecommunications but even law and 
order. 
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economies of scale are strong, manufacturing will concentrate in one country. They also 
arrive at the same conclusion as Krugman (1991) in showing that differences in market size 
will result in firms locating in country with largest market. 
Martin and Rogers (1995) model does not distinguish between export infrastructure and 
import infrastructure on the argument that it is difficult to think of many infrastructures that 
would facilitate exports but not imports and vice versa. This model assumed that 
improvement in the quality of infrastructure implies symmetric reduction in transactions costs 
for both exports and imports. This assumption is justified in their model on the grounds of 
simplicity. However, Kikuchi and Iwasa (2009) argue that infrastructure improvements often 
cause asymmetric reductions in transaction costs. For example, an improvement in the quality 
of a region's local transport networks affects the region's imports more than its exports. 
Kikuchi and Iwasa (2009) illustrated their argument using a simple two region two good and 
two factor model. By using iceberg costs they show that an improvement in the quality of 
import infrastructure in one region sets into motion two effects. The first one is that it lowers 
trade costs and increases the effective number of imported varieties resulting in a fall in local 
demand for locally produced varieties. Secondly easier access to a region with high quality 
import infrastructure increases the advantage of locating in the other region with poor import 
infrastructure. These two effects reinforce each other and induce firms to move away from 
the region with good import infrastructure. According to this model, although better import 
infrastructure reduces import transaction costs, it also induces industrial diversion and raises 
the transaction costs of receiving products from those industries that relocate elsewhere. In 
this model, the possibility that industries will be diverted provides some theoretical grounds 
for the coordination of infrastructure investments among regional economies. 
4.2.1.4 Summary 
These models that relate industrial location to infrastructure agree that the presence of quality 
infrastructure is seen as reducing any type of costs that affects the amount of output that 
reaches the consumer commonly referred to as iceberg costs (Krugman, 1991, 1993; Martin 
and Rogers, 1995; Kikuchi and Iwasa (2008). This characterization does not only capture the 
key role played by transport infrastructure but also by other types of infrastructure that may 
have an effect on output such as telecommunication or electricity. Assuming that 
infrastructure is supplied mostly by the government, the presence of quality infrastructure 
affects the location decisions of foreign firms in many ways. First the presence of good 
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infrastructure significantly reduces firm's output costs providing a positive incentive for 
vertical foreign direct investment in cases where MNEs base their location decisions purely 
on a cost basis (Markusen, 1984). Secondly improved public infrastructure also provide a 
negative incentive for the location of horizontal FDI or investment motivated by the 
avoidance of transport and other input costs (Castro et aI, 2007). In this case, foreign 
companies may choose to supply the country from a subsidiary located in another country 
instead oflocating a plant there, thereby reducing FDI inflows into the host country. 
Martin and Rogers (1995) argue that in the presence of economies of scale public expenditure 
in domestic infrastructure may have different impacts on the geographical distribution of FDI 
inflows than expenditure in regional infrastructure or public infrastructure aimed at 
enhancing market access to neighbouring countries. In such settings foreign firm will tend to 
locate in countries with the best domestic infrastructure in order to take advantage of 
economies of scale. In contrast, regional infrastructure may influence the sensitivity of 
foreign firms' investment location decisions to infrastructure differentials and hence actually 
reduce FDI in the countries with poor domestic infrastructure. The overall effect of regional 
infrastructure is therefore ambiguous a priori as it depends on the existing stock of domestic 
infrastructure in each host country (Castro et aI, 2007). Third public infrastructure could also 
enhance access to intermediate goods suppliers in neighbouring countries providing a 
positive incentive for complex FDI location strategies, where MNEs locate different 
production activities in separate geographic regions. Thus theory does not suggest an 
unambiguous and unique effect of a reduction in transport or other input costs caused by 
improvements in public infrastructure on the spatial location ofFDI. The multiplicity of these 
theoretical channels implies that disentangling the true effects of infrastructure quality on FDI 
location primarily remains an empirical issue (Castro et aI, 2007). 
The above discussion also highlighted the fact that mergers and acquisitions have been the 
dominant mode of entry by multinationals in many countries. The factors that played a role in 
attracting this kind of investments in host countries include inter-alia, privatisation 
programmes, instability and uncertainty, level of respect for private property rights, stock 
market performance etc. These surveys also found that accumulated international business 
experience of a company is an important determinant of the company's choice between M&A 
and joint ventures as an FDI mode. Firms with more international business experience are 
more likely to choose the M&A mode and this suggest that countries home to "experienced" 
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MNEs will have higher shares of outward FDI taking the form of M&A than will countries 
home to relatively inexperienced MNEs. This section also discussed the difference between 
horizontal and vertical multinationals and argued that the former is motivated by market size 
and trade costs whilst the latter is a result of differences in factor prices between countries. 
Vertical multinationals are also seen to be trade creating or complementing whilst horizontal 
FDI is a substitute for international trade. 
4.2.2 Empirical literature review 
Root and Ahmed (1979) were among the first scholars to establish a positive role of general 
infrastructure on FOI. They used a data set of about 70 developing countries over the period 
1966 to 1970 and employed a multiple discriminant analysis technique since they were 
dealing with categoric rather than continuous data. They measured infrastructure variables 
using transport expenditures as a proportion of GOP, communication expenditure as a 
percentage of GOP and electricity production per 1000 people. Their results show that 
developing countries that have attracted the most nonextractive direct foreign investment on a 
per capita basis are those that have substantial urbanization, a relatively advanced 
infrastructure, comparatively high growth rates and per capita GOP, and political stability. 
Similar results were also obtained by Wheeler and Mody (1992) using a panel data model of 
42 countries from 1982 to 1988. They found that infrastructure quality (transport, 
communication and energy) is an important variable for developing countries seeking to 
attract FDI from the United States, but less important for developed countries that already 
have high quality infrastructure. 
In an attempt to study inter-temporal linkages and regional distribution of FDI, Cheng and 
Kwan (2000) estimated the effects of the determinants of foreign direct investment in 29 
Chinese regions from 1985 to 1995 using Chow's (1997) partial adjustment model. Their 
study is different from the conventional empirical studies in that it recognized that investment 
flows depends on the actual stock of capital and this takes time to adjust towards the target 
stock of FDI which changes with the environment. They postulated that the desired stock of 
FO I in region one in period t is a function of the region's infrastructure, labour quality, wage 
rate, regional income. In measuring infrastructure, they used total lengths of roads per unit of 
land mass, the total lengths of high grade paved roads per unit of land mass and the total 
lengths of railway per unit land mass. On quality of labour they experimented with the 
percentage of the population with at least primary school education, junior secondary school 
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education and senior secondary school education. In their results they found that good 
infrastructure (roads) contributed to FDI but high grade paved roads did not perfonn any 
better than all roads. They also found that wages had a negative effect on FDI in contrast with 
Chen (1996) finding that wages did not affect FDI as well as Head and Ries (1996) that the 
effect of wages was negligible. None of the education variables used had a significant impact 
on FDI. They also found that the region's market as approximated by regional income has a 
positive effect on industrial location. They also found a self reinforcing effect of FDI on itself 
something consistent with the agglomeration effect identified by Head and Ries (1996), 
where they argued that FDI attracts further FDI. The problem however with their self 
reinforcing effect is that they assumed it to be the same for all regions implying that the 
"Gompertz growth curves" for all regions FDI stocks share the same slope. To improve the 
model, it may be desirable to have measures of region specific self reinforcing effects which 
takes into account the differences in the accumulation ofFDI stocks. 
Kumar (2001) departed from using individual indicators of infrastructure and constructed a 
composite index for infrastructure availability which captured availability of transport, 
telecommunication, information and energy. He used data from 66 developed and developing 
countries across the world over a period 1982 to 1994 and employed principal component 
analysis. Using overseas affiliates of US and Japanese firms, he found that infrastructure 
availability is important for outward oriented FDI. He constructed an infrastructure index for 
the study countries for the periods 1982, 1989 and 1994. The aspects of transport 
infrastructure that they used to construct availability and quality is roads length per square 
kilometre of area and commercial vehicles per 100 inhabitants. On telecommunication they 
used telephone density measured using telephones per 1000 people whilst for information 
they used intensity of electronic and print media measured as newspapers and television per 
1000. Energy availability was measured using energy use per inhabitant. In differentiating 
between exports oriented FDI and domestic oriented FDI, he argued that domestic oriented 
FDI is governed by different factors than is domestic market seeking FDI. Thus by being 
efficiency seeking export oriented FDI could be more sensitive to availability of quality 
infrastructure than overall FDI. He also argued that there are two distinct types of export 
oriented FDI, the one serving primarily the MNEs home market and those serving third 
countries. He found that the quality of infrastructure has a positive and significant coefficient 
while explaining third country orientation of exports of both US and Japan. The infrastructure 
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index they created had a positive and significant effect when explaining home market 
orientation of US affiliates but insignificant for Japan. 
Employing a different econometric technique, Castro et al (2007) looked at the impact of 
infrastructure on the location of FDI in Argentinean provinces using spatial econometric 
techniques. They estimate their spatial models using maximum likelihood techniques and the 
Generalized Spatial two stage least squares model. They used FDI determinants like 
infrastructure, market size factor endowments, and public expenditure. On infrastructure, they 
used two proxies for road networks; total roads length and paved roads whilst for electricity 
they used installed power capacity and gross electricity generation. Host market size was 
proxied using gross provincial product. They proxied skilled and unskilled labour using per 
capita primary and secondary school enrolment respectively. Their results show that paved 
roads matter for FDI but other proxies of infrastructure do not seem important. More 
precisely they found that increasing the kilometres of paved roads by 10% increases FDI in 
the host province by between 17% and 33%. The results also show a robust home market or 
domestic market size effect but the electricity variable shows a negative significant sign. 
However, Woodward and Rolfe (2002) analyzed the location of export-oriented 
manufacturing investment in the Caribbean Basin, using micro data for all reported 
manufacturing plant openings from 1984-87. They test a broad range of influences on country 
selection and compared the results with the existing literature on foreign direct investment in 
less developed countries. The probability of country selection was estimated with a 
conditional logit model. The estimates were then used to predict the location of Caribbean 
Basin investments made in 1988 and 1989. They argued that since a nation's infrastructure 
incorporates many facets of the economy, a proxy measuring one aspect of infrastructure, 
such as communications, may not reflect the quality of infrastructure in other respects, such 
as transportation. To them, per capita GNP provides information about the general quality of 
infrastructure in the country. Their arguments are based on Coleman and Nixson (1986) 
finding that economic and social indicators are highly correlated with the level of GNP per 
capita. Their results show that per capita GNP has a positive effect on foreign investment 
whilst transport costs have a negative significant impact. 
Hong (2008) also departed from using country level data and employed firm level analysis. 
He developed a model which indicates that foreign firms' location choices are determined 
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jointly by site attributes and firm heterogeneity. The model is estimated using data on 2565 
foreign manufacturing investments in China's 21 provinces gathered by the government 
between 2004 and 2005. The conditional logit estimates and simulation results provide 
supportive evidence. An increase in a firm's labour intensity magnifies the impact of labour 
cost, while a location's communications infrastructure has a stronger influence on foreign 
firms that have adopted modern information technology. To control for transport 
infrastructure he used the proportion of road length over land area and for communication 
infrastructure he used the proportion of internet users in the population of the province. 
Results show that better infrastructure appears to reduce relevant costs and facilitate business 
operations. Road density and percentage of internet users included in the model are found to 
be important considerations when foreign investors choose locations. In order to examine 
whether the importance of infrastructure varies with firm-specific characteristics, he included 
interaction terms between local communications infrastructure and firms' adoption of modern 
information technology. The coefficient estimate is positive and significant, suggesting that 
firms adopting modern information technology put more emphasis on local communications 
infrastructure when they make location decisions. 
In the African context, a study by Asiedu (2002) where she analyzed 34 countries over a 
period 1980 to 2000 and used infrastructure indicators like the number of telephones per 1000 
people and also controlling for classical FDI determinants (like market size, cost of labour 
and skills) concluded that countries that improved their infrastructure were rewarded with 
more investments. Using OLS, she found that a unitary increase in telephone density leads to 
1.12 percentage increase in FDI/GOP. 
Another study that used African data was done by Khadaroo and Seetanah (2004). They 
applied static and dynamic panel data models like Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) 
to study the role of transport infrastructure on FDI in 33 Sub Saharan African countries for 
the period 1984 to 2002. They measured transport infrastructure using the length of paved 
roads per square kilometre of area. They proxied communication infrastructure by the 
number of telephones available per 1000 people arguing that availability of telephones is 
important to facilitate communication between the home and host countries. This is the same 
variable that was also used by Loree and Guisinger (1995); Asiedu (2002) Alam and Quazi 
(2003). They also controlled for non infrastructure variables like market size measured using 
per capita GOP and labour quality proxied using general secondary education enrolment. 
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Their results show that transport and communication infrastructure are important in attracting 
FDI and the same is true for market size as well as quality oflabour. 
Sekkat and Veganzones Varoudakis (2004) estimated a correlation for infrastructure of 0.45 
for the case of Middle East and North African countries (MENA) in the 1990s and a lower 
correlation coefficient of 0.21 for the manufacturing sector. Using panel data econometric 
techniques and a sample of 26 countries and data from 1990 to 1999, they reported that ifthe 
MENA countries had increased their infrastructure to the level of the East Asian economies, 
FDI flows could have reached 2.5% of GDP compared to 1.2%. The only measure of 
infrastructure that they used was number of telephone lines per capita. They found that 
infrastructure effects are higher for FDI in the manufacturing sector than total FDI. 
Although many studies found a positive relationship between FDI and infrastructure 
measures, some studies however failed to confirm the positive relationship. In a cross country 
study, Shepotiylo (2006) was not able to find any correlation between a measure of 
infrastructure stock and the pattern of geographical location of FDI in 24 transitional 
countries. Bronzini (2004) using a maximum likelihood tobit model, did not find any 
significant impact of public infrastructure on the spatial distribution of FDI inflows across 
Italian regions. He used an infrastructure index standardized by province size which 
incorporated roads railways ports, airports and telecommunication. The insignificance of the 
infrastructure variable however, could be due to the fact that the variable is highly correlated 
with another variable that was used and referred to as regional density. The correlation matrix 
between these variable shows that a denser area is more endowed with infrastructure and their 
inclusion in the same model could have biased results. Quazi (2005) could also not establish a 
positive and significant relationship between infrastructure measured as the number of 
telephones per 1000 people and FDI using a panel data from 1995 to 2000 from a sample of 
East Asian countries. Fung et al (2005) examined whether hard infrastructure, in the form of 
more highways and railroads or soft infrastructure in the form of more transparent institutions 
leads to more FDI. By controlling for other FDI determinants like market size and human 
capital and using data from USA, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China, they also 
found that soft infrastructure is a more important determinant of FDI than hard infrastructure. 
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4.2.2.1 Horizontal and vertical empirical studies 
One of the main difficulties in estimating the theories of vertical and horizontal FDI is the 
lack of empirical data. Official FDI statistics do not distinguish between vertical and 
horizontal FDI, thus making empirical studies only possible with firm level data 
Pradham and Abraham (2005) estimated a Tobit model using Indian manufacturing firms to 
examine the impact of firm and location specific factors on export oriented FDI. They used 
variables like firm age, firm size, labour productivity etc. They calculated a composite index 
of six different aspects of infrastructure such as road length per square kilometre of area, 
commercial vehicles per 100 inhabitants, telephones per 100 inhabitants, televisions per 100 
inhabitants, newspapers per 1000 inhabitants, and energy use per inhabitant. Using different 
equity ranges from 10-25 up to 85-100 they found that low level of general skills, 
infrastructure bottlenecks, and failures to use bilateral investment treaties as tools for 
attracting export oriented FDI are main factors lowering the attractiveness of India as 
compared to others. 
Fukao and Wei (2008) also looked at the differences in the locational determinants of vertical 
and horizontal FDI using firm level manufacturing data from Japan for the periods 1992 -
2002. Using a conditional logit model and controlling for variables like wages, skilJs, 
electricity infrastructure (proxied using electricity generation per capita), market size, tariffs 
and distance, they found that market size is positive and significant for horizontal FDI whilst 
negative and significant for vertical FDI. The labour cost (wages) and skills variables are all 
negative and significant for vertical FDI as suggested by theory. This suggests that vertical 
firms that are aiming at cheap production factors are more interested in low-skilled low-wage 
labour. They also found electricity infrastructure to have a positive impact on vertical FDI 
and negative on horizontal FDI. This suggests that good infrastructure is more important for 
vertical FDI than horizontal in that it helps in reducing production costs. Production for 
export may be more sensitive to production costs in host countries because the firm can 
choose an alternative location to serve a broader market. 
Aizenman and Marion (2001) using cross sectional analysis of 103 countries over the period 
1980 to 1999 looked at the impact of uncertainty measured using output and exchange rate 
volatility on both vertical and horizontal FDI. Their results suggest that volatility increases 
horizontal FDI but discourages vertical FDI. Assuming that emerging markets attract 
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relatively more vertical FDI than do mature markets, results show that output volatility 
appears to have no noticeable effect on FDI inflows, real effective exchange-rate volatility 
has significant and differential effects on FDI into mature and emerging markets. The 
correlation between exchange-rate volatility and FDI inflows is positive and significant for 
relatively high-income countries. For lower-income countries, the correlation is not negative, 
but it is insignificantly different from zero. According to Aizenman and Marion (2001), this 
finding is consistent with the view that greater uncertainty discourages vertical FDI and 
emerging markets attract a relatively greater share of vertical FDI. 
4.2.2.2 Summary 
The empirical studies on the relationship between infrastructure and FDI have partly 
confirmed the ambiguous relationship between these two variables and also shown that these 
studies including micro level studies have tended to proxy infrastructure variables using 
country wide indicators. However there are few if not none studies that have attempted to 
differentiate between domestic and international infrastructure or between export and import 
infrastructure in their analysis. The empirical literature has also shown that there is very little 
that has been done to analyse infrastructure particularly in Africa using firm level data. This 
is the gap that this chapter attempts to fill. 
4.3 The model 
Most of the models that we discussed under the theoretical literature right from Krugman 
(1991), Martin and Rogers (1995), Kikuchi and Iwasa (2008) as is the case with all other 
industrial location models converge in pointing out that profit maximization is very important 
in influencing industrial location. All these models however analyzed the role of 
infrastructure mostly from the consumption side and not from the production side. This 
approach enabled Martin and Rogers (1995) to capture how infrastructure facilitates trade 
between and within countries and Krugman (1991) to show how differences in transport costs 
between regions result in firms locating production in the region with high transport costs so 
as to avoid these costs. The inability of these models to show how production costs are 
affected by infrastructure quality makes it difficult to relate firm behaviour to industrial 
location. A model that attempted to fill this gap was developed by Head and Mayer (2002). 
Our theoretical model below (which forms the basis of the empirical estimations) draws 
largely from the work of Head and Mayer (2002). It is also supplemented by the works done 
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by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) as well as Krugman (1991). This model assumes that the 
locations available to a multinational enterprise are made up of N heterogeneous countries 
(j = I, ............... , N ) and country heterogeneity is defined by both economic (e.g market size, 
labour costs, infrastructural costs) and spatial (market access) characteristics (Head and 
Mayer, 2002). In this model foreign investments are supposed to arise only once positive 
profit opportunities are available in some locations. 
4.3.1 Consumer behaviour 
The utility of a representative consumer in each country i is a CES function which depends 
on the quantity of each variety h =I, ............... ,n; consumed of a differentiated good 
produced in country j and is given as follows: 
(7 
[~Jl (qijh F]~ (J > 1 (18) 
where q ijh is the quantity of the h variety produced in country j and consumed both in 
country i and j; (J' is the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated products and is 
assumed to be greater than one. Maximizing this utility function subject to the budget 
constraint given by the expenditure of country i on all varieties produced in all other 
countries,( i.e k = In) and if we let M, to represents this budget constraint, the 
; ; 
associated demand function is as follows: 
(p ';h )-(7 M 
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(19) 
where P,;h is the delivered price or import price (c.i.t) faced by consumers in country i for 
products from country j . This delivered price is a product of the producer price P; and the 
trade costs factor,,; . Trade costs include all transaction costs associated with moving goods 
across space and national borders. The quality of transport, telecommunications as well as 
customs infrastructure plays an important role in determining these trade costs. 
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4.3.2 The Profit Equation for Foreign Affiliates 
The model also assumes that each firm sets its producer price to maximize profits and 
following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), firms treat the elasticity of substitution as if it were the 
price elasticity of demand (this may be interpreted as the assumption that each firm has 
infinitesimal market share). The producer prices are simply mark ups over marginal costs 
denoted c
r
: Pr =cr(O"/(O"-I). Substituting into the above demand function, equation (19), 
we obtain the quantity that each firm producing in country j would deliver to each 
destination country i : 
q / 
home for a firm producing in country j is 
1f, 
( ) 1-0" c,rl} 
--"--""---- M I 
O"G J 
This gross profit function can also be expressed as follows: 
(20) 
(21 ) 
These profits are a decreasing function (0" > I) of local production costs c, in the same 
country j, a decreasing function of the intensity of competition with rivals (~=knk (C I ii/ )1-0-], 
itself increasing with the number of rivals nk and decreasing with the production costs they 
face. The profits are also an increasing function of the market potential (2::1 r/~-O-MI of 
country j , i.e. the total demand that is accessible from a plant located in country j . 
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Summing the aggregate gross profits earned in each market and subtracting the fixed costs Fr 
necessary to establish a plant in country or region r , we obtain the aggregate net profits to be 
earned in each location r 
(23) 
This expression can be re arranged as follows, assuming that invariant fixed costs do not 
affect profit ordering of countries and therefore can be omitted. 
(24) 
With rr = L:, [l~ ( )'-0-1 a measure of the comparative advantages of country j 
/ Lk nk CkTk 
with respect to the other countries, we assume that this comparative advantage is determined 
partly by the availability and efficiency of infrastructural services. This is because differences 
in trade costs across countries and between different types of infrastructure is a source of 
absolute and comparative advantage which affect the volume, direction and composition of 
foreign direct investment. (World Trade Report, 2004). e r = ~o- represents the total 
c, 
production costs of a firm located in country r . We assume here that firm size, unionization 
and labour quality are variables that can influence these costs. Financial economies, 
efficiency from large scale production, restrictive labour contracts and productive skilled 
labour affect the costs of producing goods in any firm and 'Pr = L:, T,:-o- M, measuring the 
market potential of location r. This is also similar to Krugman (J 991) market access 
variable. 
Thus according to the above profit equation, a given country might be characterized by 
higher profits than a rival location when the country is characterized by a large increase in 
the market potential and if the quality of infrastructure is good and costs of transporting 
goods across borders as well as factor inputs are relatively cheaper. 
By taking logs these potential profits made by a foreign firm located In region r can be 
represented as follows: 
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(25) 
where rr refers to the (log) comparative advantages of country r with respect to the other 
locations. We assume that this comparative advantage is influenced among other things by 
the quality of infrastructure in country r . The term lfIr captures the rth country's (log) market 
access and the last term captures production costs which are an increasing function of factor 
inputs, unionization and a decreasing function of firm size, labour quality etc. Thus if we 
assume like in Head and Mayer (2002) that the variable cost function e = ~ is assumed 
r 1-0" 
C, 
to be a Cobb Douglas then these costs will be a function of factor inputs and total factor 
productivity. This total factor productivity could be assumed to vary with firm size, 
unionization and quality of labour. 
Thus when an MNE firm chooses its location, the only relevant information is the ordering of 
the profits. Thus if a location is chosen as the destination of FDI, then from an investor's 
point of view, it must be more profitable to produce in that location than in others, given the 
location choice of other investors. If the goods are produced for exports as in the case for 
outward oriented FDI the cost of producing the goods and the costs of transporting them to 
the world markets as well as the size of the firm could be crucial. But if the goods are 
produced for the local market as in the case of market seeking FDI, then local demand factors 
and even the age of the firm would matter. Therefore profitability for a firm of locating in a 
certain country is a very simple function that is decreasing in production and trade costs and 
increasing in the market potential. Production and trade costs are influenced by the cost of 
inputs like labour and capital as well as quality of infrastructure services as well as specific 
features of foreign owned firms. 
This theoretical model forms the basis of the binary choice model we will estimate. Thus the 
parameters that indicate the characteristics of firms that are foreign invested and the features 
of potential host countries are estimated using maximum likelihood Probit model. 
4.3.3 Estimated FDI Model 
The general Pro bit model assumes the following specification 
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K 
· Y, a + I j3 I X 'I + u I (26) 
I~I 
Where a is the common intercept across all firms, Xij is the vector of both firm and non firm 
K 
specific(external) explanatory variables summarized by Ij3X
'1 
excluding the error term. 
I~I 
* 
= I...N (the number of firms), j = I ... K (the number of explanatory variables) and Yi is an 
unobserved variable that can only be observed in a dichotomous state such that 
* { ijy,>O Y o othenl'ise 
This can be expressed as a structural equation in full as follows: 
y; =/30 + I/31h 'Pih + I/32cCPiCk + /33 log FM4 + Jiik 
h c 
Where; \{I represents infrastructure quality 
<I> represents firm level controls 
f.1 is a random error term and m indexes firms 
FMA measures international transport costs 
(27) 
(28) 
In this study the underlying variable Yi could be considered as the probability or likelihood 
of a firm to have some foreign ownership. This variable will also be used to capture the 
probability of attracting inward or outward FDI. The explanatory variables in equation (28) 
should include items that affect the likelihood of being foreign invested including 
infrastructural and geography variables and as well as firm specific factors of invested 
enterprises. 
4.3.4 Hypothesis 
Formally we want to test the hypothesis: 
HO: A location with good infrastructure is more attractive to foreign investors than one 
without. 
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4.3.5 Variables used and their measurement 
Even though the theoretical literature argues that the relationship between infrastructure and 
industrial location is ambiguous58, a number of empirical studies have found that good quality 
infrastructure plays an important role in attracting foreign investment (see Rolfe and White, 
1991; Woodward and Rolfe, 200; Asiedu, 2002; Castro et ai, 2007 etc). In fact, Rolfe and 
White (1991) argued that infrastructure quality is very important in the attractiveness of a 
country for offshore manufacturing investment in that it subsidises their total cost of 
investment raising the rate of return. Khadaroo and Seetanah (2004) also added that 
multinationals are profit seeking entities that seek to minimise the cost of doing business and 
if moving to a developing country to take advantage of lower labour costs means losing 
patent protection to imitators, making informal payments to get things done, incurring high 
transport costs due to inadequate transportation and missed supply shipments due to 
communication problems, then multinationals will not choose to do business there. 
Our dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value of one if the firm has foreign 
equity participation that is greater or equal to 10% and zero otherwise. 10% is the general 
level of participation at which the direct investor is normally regarded as having an effective 
say in the management of the enterprise involved (UNCT AD, 2009). In differentiating 
between export and domestic oriented FDI, we also defined the former by using a dummy 
that takes the value one if the firm has foreign equity participation greater or equal to 10% 
and is also involved in exporting, zero otherwise. Market seeking FDI is also a dummy 
defined for foreign invested firms that are not into exporting (export intensity is zero). 
We use telecommunication, electricity, water and customs variables to control for 
infrastructure in our FDI models. The number of days it takes to import and export is used 
here as an indirect measure of the quality of customs infrastructure at the border. According 
to Hummels (2007) customs delays are longer in many African countries due partly to poor 
communication and information management systems. The quality of telecommunication, 
water and electricity infrastructure is estimated using the average number of hours or days 
without a telephone connection, water and power per day and month respectively as well as 
59 percentage of output lost due to power outages . We however prefer to use hours rather than 
58 See Krugman (1991 ); Martin and Rogers (1995). 
59 These are firm level averages and so vary at establishment level. 
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days without infrastructure services as a better indicator of infrastructure quality. This is 
because infrastructure problems are more severe in a country where residents go for longer 
hours a day for a certain number of days per month without services than in a country where 
firms are only affected for relatively fewer hours a day for the same number of days a month. 
The data on these variables was however characterised in some cases by non responses and 
we tried to minimise the negative impact of this on the size of the sample and quality of 
results by measuring them at regional level using city level averages. This approach also 
minimises endogeneity problems for the customs variable used, since time to export might be 
affected by the experience of the enterprise manager in dealing with customs officials. We 
also alternatively measure some of these infrastructure variables excluding water using 
perception indicators also obtainable from the Investment Climate Surveys and where each 
firm was asked to judge the severity of selected infrastructure problems on a five-point 
scale60. The assumption on these variables is that quality infrastructure is important in 
enhancing productivity, competitiveness and hence creates an environment attractive to 
foreign investors. Thus high values of perception indicators for infrastructural variables i.e. 
high number of clearing days and many hours without infrastructural services as well as high 
percentage of output lost due to power outages indicate poor infrastructure quality and hence 
should negatively affect FDI inflows. 
The empirical literature also suggests that the size of the firm does matter in foreign direct 
investment (see Horst, 1972; Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Lall, 1986; Blomstrom and Lipsey, 
1986, Kinoshita, 1998). Although evidence support the fact that large firms are more likely to 
invest abroad than small firms, descriptive statistics on the firms in this study sample also 
show that most of the firms that have some foreign investment are larger in size than 
domestically owned. Thus the average size of a firm with some foreign ownership is 368 
employees compared to 130 for domestic owned firms (see Tables 4.4 below). This may 
indicate that foreign investors also target large firms when making investment decisions. This 
may be because large firms have better access to local credit facilities and that large scale 
production implies that the firm is likely to produce goods more efficiently through learning 
by doing and may also have more market power (Kinoshita, 1998). We decided to include the 
60 The scale is: 0 = no obstacle: I = minor obstacle: 2 = moderate obstacle; 3 = major obstacle; 4 = very severe 
obstacle. 
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size variable in this study to capture this and the variable is approximated by the number of 
permanent employees in the firm. 
Another variable that has been identified in the literature as an important determinant of FDI 
is the size of the host country's market (see Head and Mayer, 2004; Coughlin et at., 1991 
etc). The size of the market represents the level of demand available for goods and services 
produced by the foreign investors and this variable is particularly important for horizontal 
multinationals also referred to as market seekers. Thus plants producing for an external 
market can be located with little or no regard for domestic demand potential (Woodward and 
Rolfe, 1992). The argument is a larger market increases ceterisparibus the amount of 
potential buyers, and thereby raises expected profits. Higher potential profits in large markets 
are also amplified by the fact that larger markets facilitate potential economies of large scale 
production. In addition, a larger market also provides more opportunities to place a new 
product (Lankes and Venables, 1996). However according to Resmini (1999), the scale of 
new market opportunities does not, depend solely on the total market size but also on the 
dynamics of the market. Therefore, investors prefer markets with high sustainable growth 
rates (Neuhaus, 2006). Khadaroo and Seetanah (2004) also argue that FDI responds 
positively to market size once it reaches a threshold level that is large enough to allow 
economies of scale and efficient utilisation of resources. The importance of market size has 
been confirmed in many previous studies [see Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Schneider and Frey, 
1985; Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Loree and Guisinger, 1995; Lipsey, 1999; Wei 2000; 
Coughlin and Segev, 2000; Fung et at., 2002; Head and Mayer, 2004; Woodward, 1992; 
Zhang, 200 I etc] 
In this study we measure the size of the market at city level by weighting country GDP by the 
proportion of the population in each city. This is because it is difficult to get city level GDP 
which is an ideal measure of market size at city level. Head and Mayer (2004) and Hong 
(2008) use a market size variable measured using GDP weighted by distance to proxy market 
accessibility. We also attempt to capture the same thing by interacting the market size 
variable with a measure of domestic transport costs to determine how accessible the market is 
from the city where the firm is located. This is because high transport costs make distant 
markets more difficult and costly to serve. Thus the location potential of a place should 
include the influence of the transportation costs that are required to access it in addition to the 
size of the market. 
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Another variable that we have also decided to include in the study is finn age. Our argument 
is that foreign investors might also be attracted to old firms because they may have a deeper 
and broader understanding of the local market conditions. The number of years they have 
been in existence enables them to have a better knowledge of the dynamics of local market 
conditions and survival strategies than younger firms. Even though it may be true that firms 
gain knowledge and resources with the passage of years, younger firms can get required 
resources and capabilities via using short cut mechanisms like hiring highly experienced and 
competent managers (Reuber and Fischer, 1997). Harvey and Abor (2009), however, found 
that firm age negatively affects FDI inflow in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector. In the case 
of export oriented FDI, Pradham and Abraham (2005) found that the estimated relationship 
between firm age and export behaviour over the whole range of equity participation 
resembles an inverted S-shape. As age increases, it tends to induce foreign affiliates to export 
more over the equity range 10-25 percent then reduce their export intensity over equity range 
55-75 percent and again turn to increase it over the equity range 85-100 percent. This would 
indicate that foreign affiliates when they grow older they tend to have significant higher 
export performance only when they have minority foreign equity participation (10-25 
percent) or largely majority owned (85-100 percent). We proxy firm age here by using the 
difference between the year the firm started operating and the year when this firm level 
survey was done. 
The quality of labour in the host country is another variable that has been identified in the 
literature as a major FDI determinant. (see Merlevede and Schoors (2005); Neuhaus, 2006; 
Borensztein et aI, 1998). High labour quality not only raises output but enables firms to use 
advanced production techniques. This is particularly true for FDI from US, Japan and 
Western Europe which is capital intensive and skilled labour oriented (Zhang and Markusen, 
1999). Merlevede and Schoors (2005) also argue that although unit labour costs may describe 
the quality of the current labour force, they do not necessarily reflect the capability of the 
labour force to adapt to new technologies. Therefore, an investor should additionally look at 
the current level of human capital in the economy in addition to being concerned about the 
level of wages. Glickman and Woodward (1987) found that an indicator of labour force 
quality is a significant determinant of foreign investment location in the US. Coughlin and 
Segev (2000), Cheng and Kwan (2000), Hong, (2008) also found labour quality to be 
important to foreign investors. We measure labour quality in this chapter at city level by 
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using the percentage of the labour force with tertiary and secondary education weighted by 
the proportion of city population in country population61 • 
Another closely related variable that we use in this chapter is unionization of labour, 
Coughlin and Segev (2000) argue that the extent of unionized labour is a characteristic of 
labour market widely publicized by promoters of economic development in countries with 
low unionization rates. The argument is, in less unionized countries firms have the 
managerial freedom to pursue profit maximization unencumbered by union contract 
restrictions. This is advantageous to foreign firms who want to introduce new managerial 
practices. Empirical findings on this variable are however inconclusive. The coefficient of 
this variable may be negative if unions insist on labour practices that lower productivity 
(Bartik, 1985; Head et al. 1999). Thus using a conditional logit model, Bartik (1985) found 
that high unionization is a strong repellent to u.s. domestic branch plant location, even when 
controlling for labour costs. However Friedman et aI, (1992) found unionization to be a 
positive and statistically significant determinant of plant location whilst Woodward and Rolfe 
(1992) found it to be negative but insignificant for countries in the Caribbean Basin. We 
measure unionization in this study by using a firm level dummy that indicates whether 
employees in the firm belong to a union or not. Our fundamental assumption in this study is 
that before being foreign invested some of these local manufacturing firms were relatively 
larger in size, older and had unionized labour force than others. 
Dummies were also created to capture the sector heterogeneity. This is because some 
products might be more difficult to transport or may use less electricity than others during 
production. These dummies could also capture sectoral comparative advantage based on the 
countries' factor endowments differences relative to other competing countries (Yoshino. 
2008). Just like Wheeler and Mody (1991), in some cases our models excluded country 
specific dummies because much of the interesting variation in the data is across countries, 
reflecting conditions which change slowly. The use of country specific dummies would have 
the effect of removing this variation, leaving only short run within country changes as the 
basis for parameter estimation. The results would therefore tell us much less about how firms 
choose among countries when making investment decisions (Wheeler and Mody 1992). So 
that we do not completely suppress within country variation we try to capture it by using 
61 Data on this variable is obtained from the World Development Indicators (2009). 
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sectoral dummies. To avoid running into a dummy variable trap, we estimated our models by 
excluding the intercept and where necessary, we used one sector or country as a comparator 
or base variable. The manufacturing sectors covered include textile and garment; plastic, 
paper and packaging; construction and metal; chemical and pharmacy; wood and furniture. 
The complete list of variables used in this study is presented in the appendix, Table A4.1. 
4.4 Descriptive analysis of firm level data 
4.4.1 Firm specific controls 
Of the 1598 establishments in this study, about 22% of them have at least part of their equity 
foreign owned. Of these foreign owned firms 97% of them have more than 10% of their 
equity sold to foreign investors whilst about 79% have foreign equity participation that is 
greater than 50%62. Additionally 16% of foreign invested firms have less than 50% of their 
equity in the hands of foreign investors whilst 5% of these firms have the share ownership 
structure equally balanced between domestic and foreign ownership (50%). The minimum 
level offoreign equity participation is 0.12% whilst about 11 % offoreign invested firms have 
100% foreign ownership. 
The statistics on tables 4.4 and 4.6 show that firms with some foreign ownership both at 
country and sectoral level are relatively larger in size, with a country level average of 367 
permanent employees compared to 130 for those without foreign investment. Foreign 
invested firms also appear to be less export oriented than wholly owned domestic firms. In all 
the countries and sectors (excluding plastic paper and packaging as well as construction and 
metal), at least 50% of exporting firms are not foreign invested. However, of the foreign 
invested firms about 67% of them export an average amount of about 27%. This basically 
means that most of the FDI firms are outward oriented rather than market seeking. A large 
proportion of foreign invested firms in these countries and various sectors use the internet and 
this may imply that maybe most of the manufacturing FDI firms (since very few are into 
exporting) are importers and therefore need to interact with international suppliers for inputs 
or it is relatively cheaper to communicate with clients through internet than using other 
means of communication like cellular phones and telephones. 
62 These are finns that are operationally controlled by foreign investors. 
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The sector with the highest number of firms that are foreign invested is the chemical and 
pharmacy with about 30% and the least being the wood and furniture (9%). The same pattern 
is replicated when looking at the average amount foreign invested in each firm 63 . It is high in 
the chemical and pharmacy sector (24%) and lowest in the furniture sector (6%). The 
situation however changes when we look at the percentage amount exported (export 
intensity) by each foreign invested firm in each sector. Statistics on table 4.6 show that 
percentage amount exported is high in the textile and garment sector (48%) as well as food 
and agriculture (36%) and lowest in the construction and metal sector (4%). These statistics 
also show that the number of firms that are foreign invested and the average amount foreign 
invested in each firm as well as export intensity is higher amongst firms with generators than 
those without. It also appears that foreign investors are interested in large firms than small 
firms given the fact that 34% of large firms are foreign invested compared to 14% of small 
firms. Furthermore, on average 26% of the equity stakes of the large firms are owned by 
foreign investors whilst only an average of 10% is invested in small firms. Export intensity of 
these foreign invested firms also seem to be high among the large firms compared to other 
firms and this partly suggests that firm size is important for those firms that have some 
foreign ownership and also export. There also seem to be very little age difference between 
firm that are domestic owned and the ones that have some foreign investment. The average 
age of FDI firms is 22 years compared to 20 years for those without any amount invested in 
them by foreign companies. 
With regard to infrastructure (see table 4.5 below), power outage problems (in terms of 
hours) are more severe in Uganda, Tanzania and Mauritius. Thus the average number of 
hours per day firms go without electricity is at least 7 hours compared to 4 hours in South 
Africa and 5 hours in Zambia. Power outages create a lot of problems for firms in Tanzania 
and Uganda in that the percentage of output lost by firms in these countries is also relatively 
large. Thus about 11 % of output is lost by firms in Tanzania whilst about 6% of output is lost 
by firms in Uganda. Telecommunication is generally a problem in these countries with an 
overall average of 14 hours a day. Telephone problems seem to be severe in Zambia, 
Tanzania and Uganda. In these countries, firms go for an average of 11 hours a day without a 
telephone connection compared to an average of 4.5 days in South Africa and Mauritius. A 
similar pattern is replicated when looking at water problems. Thus Uganda is hard hit by 
(,3 This is calculated using all the finns in the sector. 
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water problems as firms go for about 20 hours a day without water. Mauritius and Tanzania 
also go for relatively longer hours without water supply. These statistics show that firms in 
these two countries go for about 12 hours without water a day and this could have a large 
impact on firms that use a lot of water for production purposes. Import clearing problems 
seem to be common in Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa. It takes about 18, 10 and 7 days 
to clear imports at the borders of Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa respectively compared 
to only 4 days in Zambia. However, when it comes to exporting it seems South Africa tops 
the list followed by Tanzania. Ugandan customs facilities appear to be relatively efficient in 
that it takes only 3 days to clear exports in the country. This could also partly explain why we 
have relatively more firms that have foreign equity being into exporting in Uganda (64%) 
compared to 26% in South Africa. However, it also appears that export transit days are not a 
good indicator of FDI exporting because, in Mauritius it takes only 4 days to clear exports 
but only 17% of FDI firms are into exporting less than in South Africa (26%). 
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Table 4.3 Distdbution of finns among sectors in each countt·y 
AU eountrls ('Y.) South Africa (%) Zambia (0/.) Tanzania (%) Upnda(%) Maarldas (010) 
(1598) ( 603) (207) (276) (300) (212) 
A1lfmns Foreign All fmns Foreign A11fmns Foreign A11fmns Foreign A11fmns Foreign A11fmns Foreign 
invested invested Invested Invested Invested Invested 
Textile_ Gamlent 11.4 16.7 8.2 14.3 5.8 16.7 11.2 25.8 5.0 20.0 36.0 13.7 
Food_agric 24.9 2S.3 lOA 19.4 44.0 28.6 0 29.6 0 2SA 19.2 17.9 
Chemicalyhannarcy 8.7 29.7 8.9 26.4 10.1 33.3 9.8 33.3 6.0 SO.O 9.4 IO.S 
Plapackaging 12.2 17.1 l3.0 13.7 6.3 30.8 9.1 21.9 7.7 30.0 11.3 0 
Woodfumiture 7.0 9.0 4.0 12.S 2.9 16.7 23.6 7.7 2.3 14.3 4.4 0 
Construction metal 8.8 20.9 14.6 IS.8 16.4 22.2 14 .S 27.S 20.3 22.S S.9 8.3 
Source: Author's own computations based on World Bank's Investment Climate Surveys 
Note: numbers in brackets represent the total number offinns in each country. All fmns represent the percentage offinns in each country that belong to any ofthe sectors 
Table 4.4 Firm level valiables means by country and sectors 
SIze Ap Internet_ Esporten Owner: 
(%0Ian.) (%0Ian...) Male (% 0111l11li) 
Not Not Foreip Not Foreign Not Foreian Not Foreign 
Invested Foreign Invested Invested lnvested Invested Invested Invested Invatted Invested Invatted 
South Africa 264 674 23 32 67.4 85.5 74.4 25.6 91.59 80.00 
Zambia 145 433 21 14 21.4 40.9 61.7 39.3 85.84 83.33 
Tanzania 70 183 18 18 40.9 82.5 57.8 42.2 92.59 90.63 
Uganda 25 242 12 17 17.3 72.5 35.6 64.4 94.87 93.48 
Mauritius 148 306 25 22 92.0 96.0 82.8 17.2 88.08 90.91 
Tel\'1ile Gamlent 308 424 22 20 65.8 79.3 80.5 19.5 81.82 86.67 
Food and agric 171 556 19 19 39.1 71.7 57.1 42.9 91.70 90.70 
Chemical yhannarcy 116 144 20 21 64.9 76.9 67.6 32.4 86.67 92.31 
Plapackaging 94 183 21 15 67.3 69.7 79.2 20.8 95 .00 94.12 
Woodfumiture 77 395 17 26 33.0 90.0 75.0 25.0 97.40 100.00 
Construction metal 83 176 22 27 39.1 79.3 71.8 28.2 90.24 100.00 
Source: Author's own computations based on World Bank's Investment Climate Surveys 
# represents percentage of finns that are exporters and are also foreign invested or not 
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Table 4.5 Avenge infnst.-uctu,·e quality by country 
All countries South Africa (OJ.) Zambia ("10) T IUIZIlIIia (%) 
Wo) ( 603) (207) (276) 
(1598) All fIrms All firms Allfmns 
Allfmns 
Power outages days 2.35 0.49 3.10 5.60 
Power outages hours 6.37 4. 12 5.47 7.84 
Days without te lephone 1.55 0.49 3.34 4. 13 
Hours without telephone 14.2 1 3.94 13.48 10.81 
Days without water 2.02 0.42 2.08 8.74 
Hours without water 12.96 3.42 9.75 13 .23 
% output lost due to power outages. 5.30 0.9 4.53 10.83 
Import clearing days 8.02 6.75 4.81 18.47 
Export clearing days 10.01 12.78 2.20 11.67 
Source: Author"s own computations based on World Bank 's In vestment Climate Surveys 
Fig 4.1 Infrastructure indicators by country (Hours per day without infrastructure services) 
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• rowC'r 
• l e i ep ho ne 
o water' 
Upnda(%) Mauritius (%) 
(300) (212) 
Allfmns All firms 
3.22 0.65 
9.06 7.23 
1.49 0.21 
13.45 5.04 
0.5 1 2.06 
20.82 11.35 
6.25 4.00 
9.73 5.45 
3. 16 4.44 
Table 4.6: FOI'ei~ inveshnent (!l'Ofile 
Average%-, Numberof (%offums) export intensity of %offums Average % 
establisbments foreign invested foreign invested foreign invested(%) 100% foreign Equity bought in 
firms (all fums) invested eachFDlfmn 
amongFDI 
fums 
AU countries 1598 21.71 16.78 26.68 11.24 79.80 
South Africa 603 19.57 15.13 20.35 11.37 77.33 
Zambia 276 29.47 24.37 22.54 7.00 82.68 
Tanzania 300 23.19 15.77 25.92 15.72 72.44 
Uganda 207 23.00 20.74 26.00 14.98 91.2 1 
Mauritius 212 16. 11 8.91 62.58 5.42 68.32 
Textile and Gannents 180 16.67 11.42 48.42 6.21 74.93 
Food and agric 395 25.32 20.24 36.44 12.76 81.8 1 
Chemicalyhannacy 138 29.71 23.94 13.46 16.91 83.47 
Plapackaging 193 17.10 14.12 12.28 11.40 82.58 
Wood and furniture III 9.01 6.50 13.00 3.60 72.10 
Constmction and metal 139 20.86 15.82 3.83 10.14 77.98 
Firm characteristics 
Own generator 475 33.89 26.27 32.75 15.47 78.47 
Internet 900 28.33 22.44 29.76 53.45 80.32 
No generator 1111 16.11 12.81 21.24 14.86 81.01 
Firm sizes 
Micro 171 10.19 9.44 11.81 7.60 92.5 
Small 546 14.53 10.80 21.98 7.27 77.94 
Medium 320 19.68 15.23 21.57 10.88 76.93 
Large 561 34.31 26.49 32.20 17.04 80.50 
Source: Author 's own calculation based on World Bank's Investment Climate Surveys 
Micro iffirnl size<IO; Small if finn size<50 &>= 10; Medium iffi rnl size<100 &>=50; Large iffinn size>= 100; ••• amount foreign invested per firnl 
156 
4.5 Econometric issues 
Since our dependent variable is a foreign ownership dummy , it is not advisable to use OLS as 
that will lead to incorrect standard errors and that OLS assumes that the predicted probability 
of being foreign invested is linearly related to the explanatory variables64. To avoid this we 
estimate by maximum likelihood a probit function of equation (I) as presented in section 4.3 
above. Although a probit function is the methodology central to the study, we will however 
use linear probability model mostly to check for the robustness of our results. Moreover, 
because of the smallness in the number of foreign owned firms in countries like Tanzania, 
Uganda and Mauritius, it is not possible to carry out country level estimations so as to test our 
pooling assumption. Thus statistics show that the majority (60%) of foreign invested firms 
are found in South Africa and the rest are spread amongst the four other countries. We 
therefore assumed that pooling is possible and then proceeded to pool our countries data and 
the first stage regression results are presented below in table 4.7: 
Table 4.7 Regressions using OLS and Probit Models 
Dependent variable 
Country dUIImdes 
Sectoral dummies 
Firm. age 
Firm. size 
Market size 
unionization 
labour quality 
Telecommunication 
Transportation 
Electricity 
Customs Regulation 
Observations 
OLS Probit by 
Maximum 
likelihood 
(1) 
Anyfor 
Yes 
Yes 
-0 . 0372 
(0.0111)*** 
0.0899 
(0.0094)*** 
0.0588 
(0 . 0366) 
0.0041 
(0.0286) 
-0 . 0061 
(0.0.0085) 
-0.0035 
(0.0120) 
-0.0029 
(0 . 0099) 
0.0081 
(0 . 0099) 
-0.0139 
(0.0086) 
782 
(2) 
Anyfor** 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.3173 
(0.1067) *** 
0 . 2599 
(0.1147) ** 
2.2407 
(7.3864) 
0.3317 
(0.2724) 
0.2865 
(1.1475) 
0.0557 
(0.1005) 
-0.0246 
(0.0930) 
-0.0135 
(0.0992) 
0.0034 
(0.0775) 
786 
* * Anyfor = foreign ownership dummy: Absolute values of standard errors in parenthesis; 
***Significant at 1\ leveli **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
64 See Pradham and Abraham (2005) who found a non linear relationship between FDI and finn age 
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Results from first regressions using Probit model and shown above on table 4.7 indicate that 
electricity, customs, transport and telecommunication variables are statistically insignificant 
whilst firm age and firm size are the only variables statistically significant. The market size 
variable also has a probability value greater than one under the probit specification. It would 
be erroneous to draw any definitive conclusions from these results since the estimates could 
be biased due to possible endogeneity of all perception based institutional indicators. 
Perception indicators could be endogenous in that enterprise managers with greater 
experience dealing with infrastructure problems might have different perceptions about these 
variables than managers without the same level of experience (Clarke, 2004). To test the 
endogeneity of these two perceptions based institutional indicators we use the Durbin Wu 
Hausman test estimated after running the 2SLS linear probability model and the Smith 
Blundell test (Smith and Blundell, 1986)65 in the context of the probit model. All these 
endogeneity tests reject the null hypothesis that instrumented regressors are exogenous. This 
rejection means that we should use instrumental variables models like 2SLS, endogenous 
Tobit and endogenous probit models for estimation instead of the standard approaches. The 
results of these tests are shown on Table 4.8 below. We attempt to control for endogeneity in 
these institutional variables by substituting with the average perception index of firms 
involved in exporting in the same region and same sector. According to Clarke, (2004), this 
approach does not only correct for endogeneity but also cleans out white noise associated 
with the perceptions of the individual managers. This approach is also followed when using 
perception based infrastructural indicators. 
Table 4.8 Summary of endogeneity tests using OLS and Probit models 
All industries 
Testa and endogenous variables Shea's F-Value Probability 
Partial Partial Value (P>F) 
Durbin Wu Hausman endogeneity test** 4 . 7512 0.0929 
Smith Blundell exogeneity test 19 . 56 0.0000 
Cragg- Donald weak instrument test 27.409 
Electricity 0.116 0.089 32 . 745 0.0000 
Telecommunications 0 .12 7 0.146 57 . 5S 9 0.0000 
Customs Regulations 0.108 0 . 135 33 475 0.0000 
Domestic transport 0 . 123 0.105 44.673 0 . 0000 
** HO: regressors are exogenous 
65 The steps to follow in implementing these tests of endogeneity are explained in Wooldridge, 2002, page 531 
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4.6. Findings 
After testing for endogeneity and correcting for it by creating infrastructure instruments 
calculated at city and sectoral level, we went on to estimate results using two approaches. 
Thus our results were obtained using different variants of a probit model where 
infrastructural indicators are controlled for using perception indicators as well as number of 
hours without infrastructural services. Our aim is to examine the role played by infrastructure 
quality as well as firm characteristics in enhancing the probability of attracting foreign 
ownership. Our dependent variable is therefore a foreign ownership dummy that is equal to 
one when a firm has some foreign equity and zero otherwise. Some studies in the empirical 
literature use the conditional logit model to examine how site and firm attributes affect the 
probability of investing in a given country.66 However, this fixed effects model can only be 
implemented on cross sectional time series data and therefore not suitable for the type of data 
(simple cross sectional) we have. We compare and contrast our results on the Probit model 
with those obtained using the 2SLS linear probability model. This is done purely for 
robustness67 purposes and with the full knowledge of the associated shortcomings of using 
such models on our data. These results are shown on table 4.9 below and summarized as 
follows: We also supplemented these results by examining whether the impact of these 
variables could be affected by the level of equity invested by foreign multinationals in each 
firm. To do so, we disaggregated foreign equity into three ranges i.e. 10% - 40%; 50% -
100% and 100% (results are presented on table A4.2 appendix). 
Market size: A number of studies have argued that the size of the domestic market is very 
important in attracting FDI (see Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Schneider and Frey, 1985; Wheeler 
and Mody, 1992; Coughlin and Segev, 2000; Fung et al., 2002; Head and Mayer, 2002 etc). 
In this study we estimated this variable at city level by weighting national GOP by the 
proportion of country population in each cit/8. This is because it is difficult to find values for 
city level GOP and the beauty of this variable is that it proxies the purchasing power of the 
size of the population and hence better than just using population size. Results show that this 
variable is significant and carries the expected positive sign. It is also robust to changes in 
model and variable specification. We also use another version of the market size variable 
66 See Head and Mayer (2002): Hong (2008): Woodward and Rolfe (2002) 
67 This is done to check whether our results do not change if a different model with different assumptions is used. 
6R City level population data was obtained from the World Gazetteer. http://world-gazetteer.com 
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Table 4.9: Main FDI Rel!ression '·esults···· 
Variable. 
union i zation 
Firm size 
Marke t s i ze 
Labor qual i t y 
Power outages 
Water problems 
Telephone probs 
Firm age 
Import clearing days 
Export clearing days 
Average customs 
clearing days 
Internet connection 
Electricity i ndex 
Telecommunication 
index 
Domestic Transport 
index 
Customs Reg Index 
Mket size_ domest i c 
transport 
Mkt sizey ower 
outages 
Observations 
Bndogenou. 
Probit 
(1) 
-0.0605 
(0. 1129 ) 
0.2890 
(0.04 2 1 ) *** 
0.0911 
(0.0408) ** 
- 0.01 93 
(0.01 7 9) 
- 0. 1 58 1 
(0.0472) * * * 
0.2077 
(0 .1063) * 
0 . 0255 
(0.1226) 
0 . 0065 
(0.1235) 
- 0 . 0506 
(0 . 1053) 
1049 
Bnefog_ou. 
Probit 
(l) 
-0.0643 
(0.0548) 
0. 1 249 
(0.0308) *** 
0.7432 
(0 .6891 
-0 .0092 
(0.0074) 
-0.0264 
(0.02 1 9) 
0.0485 
0.0(06) 
0.0052 
(0.0472) 
- 0.4244 
(0.2393)* 
-0.0057 
(0 . 0426) 
0 . 0294 
(0 .01 57) * 
104 9 
BMog_OU. 
Probit 
(3) 
-0. 1 874 
(0 .1683) 
0 . 3954 
(0 . 0764)*** 
-0 .11 42 
(0 . 0677) * 
0 .305 0 
(0 .1034) * * * 
-0.0371 
(0.1436) 
-1.1633 
(0 . 6087) * 
-0 . 0275 
(0 . 1391 ) 
0.0822 
(0 .0396)** 
1049 
lSLS Linear 
Prob lIIOc1el 
(t) 
-0 . 0198 
(0.0297) 
0.08 1 5 
(0 .11 0 1 ) *** 
0 .022 9 
(0.01 02) * * 
-0.0070 
(0 . 0047) 
-0.04 1 2 
(0.0127) * * * 
0.0514 
(0.0273)* 
0.0079 
(0.0313) 
- 0.0032 
(0.03 11 ) 
-0.0139 
(0 .0271) 
1049 
Probit 
Hour. 
(5) 
-0 . 038 1 
(0.1372) 
0.344 1 
(0.0455)*** 
0. 1 310 
(0 .0562 ) ** 
-0.0544 
(0.01 98) 
-0 . 0337 
(0 . 01 93)* 
0.0058 
(0 . 0066) 
0.0023 
(0.0056) 
-0. 1 657 
(0.0532) * * * 
-0.01 11 
(0.01 87 ) 
767 
Probit 
Hour. 
(6) 
-0.0443 
(0.13 71) 
0.34 72 
(0.0456)*** 
0. 1280 
(0.0566) ** 
-0.0351 
(0.0233) 
- 0.0308 
(0.01 94) ** 
0.0056 
(0.0067) 
0.0036 
(0.0057) 
-0.1629 
(0.0533) *** 
0.0183 
(0.0177 ) 
-0.0201 
(0.0132) 
767 
Probit 
Day. 
(7) 
- 0 . 09 1 7 
(0 .1298) 
0.3468 
0.0440)*** 
0. 1 580 
(0 . 04 1 5) *** 
-0 . 0288 
(0 . 01 92) 
0.0034 
(0.0387) 
-0.0079 
(0 .0196 ) 
0.0709 
(0.0494 ) 
-0. 1 6 1 0 
(0.0525) * ** 
0.0 14 1 
(0.01 36) 
-0.0330 
(0.0116) *** 
822 
Probit 
Day. 
(8) 
-0.0328 
(0.1328) 
0.3566 
(0.0445) 
0.0423 
(0.0626) 
-0.0005 
(0.0225) 
-0.9609 
(0.4033) ** 
0.0031 
(0.019 8) 
0.0956 
(0.0507)* 
-0.1 6 78 
(0.0527)*** 
0.0152 
(0 .013 6) 
-0.0282 
(0.0116)* * 
0.3420 
(0.0543)* * 
0.0684 
(0.0284) ** 
822 
Marginal 
Bffeat. 
t1dng (6) 
- 0.004 1 
(0.0389) 
0.0991 
(0.012 5) *** 
0.2029 
(0.0665) ** 
-0.0067 
(0.0 143) 
-0.1391 
(0 .046 1 ) ** 
0.001 0 
(0.0024) 
-0 . 0080 
(0.0023) 
-0.04 1 8 
(0 . 0149) *** 
0 . 0 1 65 
(0 .0043) 
0 . 0095 
(0 .005 4) 
767 
Absolute v alues of standard errors in parenthesis; **Significant at 5\ level; ** *significant at 1 \ level; * s i gnificant at 10\ level; ***Country 
and sectoral dummi es i nc l uded except in columns 2,6 and 8 
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measured by interacting market size with domestic transport costs. This domestic market 
access variable is also significant even when using the 2SLS linear probability model. 
However, including the market size and the interaction of market size and transport costs in 
the same model result in the former variable (market size) being statistically insignificant (see 
column 2 table 4.9 above). This implies that it is not the big market per se that is attractive 
but its accessibility by foreign firms matters most. As much as domestic transport costs are 
important for market accessibility, electricity is also very important for producing goods to 
serve the respective domestic market. Acute power problems may interrupt production and 
affect the ability of firms to meet the demands of the huge local market that they were 
attracted to. To capture this, we interacted market size with power outages (hrs) and found 
that the variable is positive and significant. This could probably mean that the size of the 
market is more important to investors than power related infrastructure problems. Generally, 
the significance of the market size variable indicates that big cities with big population stand 
a very good chance of attracting investors than small urban centres. This also explains why 
agglomeration of firms is more pronounced in big urban centres than in small towns. 
Firm size: The inclusion of firm size in the model was a result of the fact that most of the 
foreign invested firms in our sample are larger in size than the domestic owned. This 
suggested that there could be a relationship between FDI and firm size and that foreign 
investors probably target large firms when making investment decisions. This may be 
because large scale production implies that the firm is likely to produce goods more 
efficiently through learning by doing and may also have more market power (Kinoshita, 
1998). The results from the estimations support the existence of a strong relationship between 
these two variables. Like market size, firm size does matter in enhancing the probability of 
attracting foreign investment and is significant at I %. The significance of this variable is 
independent of the proportion of equity foreign invested in each company. The results are the 
same whether less than or more than 50% is foreign invested in each firm (see table A4.2 for 
more). Thus marketing and financial economies associated with large firms could also partly 
explain why they are attractive to foreign investors. The other reason could be that fixed costs 
of FDI make it profitable to invest in larger firms. Thus the ability to access cheap credit 
facilities and market power make it easier for a foreign investor to realize good returns from 
their investment and also recoup fixed production costs in large firms within a short period of 
time. 
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Firm age: This variable was meant to capture or to examine whether the number of years a 
firm has been in existence could proxy in-depth knowledge of local market conditions a 
feature that may be attractive to mergers and acquisition foreign investors. Results show that 
firm age has a negative and significant impact in enhancing the probability of attracting 
foreign investment. This result suggests that being old is not attractive to these multinationals 
and probably knowledge of local market conditions is not directly related to firm age. As 
argued by Reuber and Fischer, (1997) younger firms can get required resources and 
capabilities via using short cut mechanisms like hiring highly experienced and competent 
managers. Younger firms are more likely to be less risk averse and more adventurous than 
conservative older firms and are also flexible to changes in technological demands and this 
could be the feature attractive to foreign producers. These findings are also supported by the 
fact that this variable is also negative and significant when the level of equity foreign 
invested in each firm is greater or equal to 50% (see table A4.2 appendix for more). 
Unionisation: This variable was meant to capture whether firms that have organised labour 
force in form of unions are less attractive to foreign investors than ones without. The 
argument is, restrictive contracts may make it difficult for multinationals managers to 
introduce new managerial practises so as to pursue the goal of profit maximisation. Results in 
this study show that unionisation has a negative but insignificant effect on attracting foreign 
investment. This insignificance could mean that organised labour forces in form of trade 
unions are a common feature in many countries, not easily avoidable and therefore should not 
be important in influencing industrial location. We also examined whether the significance of 
this variable varies with the level of foreign investment in each firm (see table A4.2 
appendix). Results show that at lower levels of foreign equity (less than 50%), unionisation 
has a negative and significant effect on FDI but has a positive but insignificant impact at 
higher FDI levels. The fact that companies whose management is overally controlled by 
foreign investors (greater than 50% equity) are not worried about unionisation compared to 
those controlled by domestic individuals partly supports the finding that unionisation is not 
important to foreign investors. However it is possible that this variable could be endogenous 
particularly if we assume that unionisation in a firm could be introduced by foreign investors 
from countries with organised labour so as to effectively deal with employee related 
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Quality of Labour: This variable has been found to be very important to multinationals 
because it enables them to easily transfer technology and expertise necessary for efficient 
production. This variable was proxied in this chapter by weighting the percentage of the total 
labour force with secondary and tertiary education by the proportion of country population in 
each city. This is the standard approach in the literature (see Coughlin and Segev, 2000; 
Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Hong, 2008). Results show that the human capital variable is 
consistently negative and insignificant but the pattern of significance is mixed when looking 
at different levels of investment. This general counter intuitive result could mean that the 
production technologies used by multinationals in these countries do not require secondary 
and tertiary education or that highly skilled labour is usually expensive for FDI firms trying 
to cut production costs. Cheng and Kwan (2000) found to some extent similar results in 
China. Thus the proportions of the population with primary, junior and senior secondary 
education were found to be insignificant in attracting FDI. 
Customs Infrastructure: Some researchers have argued that it is more expensive to export 
and import goods when in Africa, something that may work against efforts to promote 
particularly outward oriented FDI (see Bloningen, 2005; Hummels, 2001). Customs delays 
are longer in most African countries due to excessive inspection of cargoes, redundant and 
poorly coordinated procedures, poor communication and information management systems 
(Hummels, 2001). The results from this study are partly consistent with these arguments 
since the coefficient of the customs variable is negative and statistically insignificant when 
using perception indicators. However using alternative indicators like the average time to 
export, this variable is negative and significant but negative and insignificant when using the 
average number of days to both import and export. This pattern is replicated even when 
looking at different levels of foreign equity participation. However when using the average 
number of days to import, results are positive but insignificant. This could also suggest that 
multinationals in this study sample are mostly outward oriented and therefore affected by 
export transit times. Results on table 4.10 below support this argument as export clearing 
days are negative and significant for export oriented firms. 
69 Due to difficulties in coming up with instruments to correct for this, we did not correct for possible endogeneity on this 
variable. 
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Electricitv Infrastructure: This variable is negative and significant when using the number of 
hours without power but positive and significant when using perception indicators. The 
positive counter intuitive sign of perceptions could imply that the indicators are capturing 
something else other than quality of infrastructure or that this result supports the belief that 
poor infrastructure could act as a barrier to entry and a source of monopolistic profits. 
However the negative and significant effect of number of hours without power suggest that 
power is important for production and power problems negatively affect the industrial 
location decisions of multinationals. Using different levels of FDI, this variable is generally 
negative though insignificant at all levels. The estimated marginal effects suggest that a 
unitary average increase in the number of hours without power decreases the probability of 
being foreign invested by 13 percentage points (see column 9, table 4.9 above). There is 
therefore need for governments that are interested in attracting FDI to improve the quality of 
electricity infrastructure so as to improve the productivity and competitiveness of foreign 
investors. This will not only attract more FDI but will also ensure that the current foreign 
investors are retained or do not relocate to better locations. 
Domestic transport Infrastructure: The results for this variable show that domestic transport 
problems proxied by perception indicators have a negative effect on FDI. This is true even 
after controlling for market access (market size-domestic transport problems interaction). 
This could mean that in addition to facilitating market access, good domestic transport 
infrastructure is important for things like accessing inputs and for also reducing transport 
costs that are a result of using poor road networks. This variable is however expected to 
matter most to firms that are market seeking than vertical multinationals. Results on table 
4.11 show however a weak negative effect on inward oriented FDI. After disaggregating FDI 
levels and using the international transport indicator: distance represented by FMA, we found 
that this variable is positive but insignificant. This illustrate that international transport costs 
have a weakly positive effect on industrial location. This is true for horizontal FDI which is a 
substitute for international trade. 
Telecommunication infrastructure: Results show that the telecommunication infrastructure 
variable is positive and insignificant when using perception indicators and this is the case 
even when using the number hours without a telephone connection. The variable, hours 
without a telephone connection is however consistently negative but insignificant at different 
levels of foreign investment. Due to the fact that it appears that most foreign invested firms 
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have an internet connection (see table 4.6 above), we decided to control for internet 
connection (see column 8 table 4.9 above). The variable is significant at 5%. The significance 
of the internet connection variable coupled with the insignificance of hours without telephone 
variable may imply that internet services is a facility mostly used by FDI firms. Therefore 
good internet infrastructure is important to ensure quality internet services and this might also 
be a pull factor for FD I. 
Water infrastructure: Although water plays a very important role in the production of various 
manufactured goods, results from this study however show that this variable is positive but 
statistically insignificant. This is also the case even when examining different levels of FDI. 
This result is robust to model specification and therefore mean that the quality of water 
infrastructure is a weak determinant of the probability to be foreign invested. This may mean 
that water is not a major productive input and thus not important in attracting FDI. The other 
thing is FDI firms could be aware that they can minimise water related production problems 
by using borehole water. Descriptive statistics show that about 33% of foreign owned firms 
have a borehole. 
4.6.1 Market seeking and outward looking FDI results 
In this section we distinguish between horizontal FDI and vertical multinationals and then 
analyse whether site attributes and firm specific attributes have differential impacts on these 
types of foreign investments. To measure horizontal FDI we looked at those foreign invested 
firms that are not exporting whilst export oriented FDI was measured by looking at those 
firms that are foreign invested and at the same time also export70 . Results for these two types 
of FDI models are shown on tables 4.10 and 4.11 below. 
The variable firm size measured using number of permanent employees in the firm has a 
positive and significant effect on outward oriented FDI but has a negative and significant 
effect on market seeking multinationals. This means that economies of large scale and 
efficient production through learning by doing are important for vertical but not horizontal 
multinationals. This is supported by descriptive statistics in that the average size of inward 
oriented firms is 114 compared to 217 for outward looking firms. This could imply that 
horizontal FDI firms are conservative and risk averse and so by starting small they are able to 
minimise losses from their investments. This could be true for those African economies with 
70 This analysis is in comparison to those firms that are foreign invested only. 
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a history of political instability and unstable economic policies. The positive effect of size on 
export FDI confirm the common finding in the literature that size does matter when it comes 
to exporting (see Clerides eta 1,1998; Soderbom and Teal,2003; Rankin et aI, 2006; Elbadawi 
et aI, 2007). It is also possible that exporting can lead firms to grow in size but with available 
cross sectional data, it is difficult to determine the true direction of causality between size and 
export oriented FDI. The firm age variable is generally positive but insignificant for both 
types of FDI. Although being old could be associated with better knowledge of local market 
conditions and survival strategies this knowledge could still be obtained by hiring 
experienced managers and therefore age does not matter for FDI (Reuber and Fischer, 1997). 
The unionization variable though largely insignificant for both FDI cases is negative for 
vertical multinationals and positive for market seeking foreign producers something counter 
intuitive. However labour quality is generaIly negative and insignificant for the two types of 
FDI suggesting that low skilled labour environments are attractive. The reason for this could 
be that low skilled labour is cheap and thus minimizes production costs of multinationals 
seeking low cost areas. This could imply that these multinationals produce goods that are less 
capital intensive and hence require less skiIled and relatively expensive manpower. The 
distance variable that we used to proxy international transport costs is negative and 
significant for vertical FDI but positive and significant for horizontal foreign investors. Thus 
being far from major markets increases transport costs and reduces the competitiveness of 
exports produced by foreign multinationals. However for domestic oriented foreign investors 
being far from markets enhances the attractiveness of the host country. Instead of domestic 
oriented multinationals exporting to the host country market, they establish an affiliate to 
service the host country from within. This result is sustained even when using alternative 
transport costs indicators calculated using c.i.f. and f.o.b. ratios measured at sectoral level. 
However, domestic transport costs are insignificant for all types of FDI though positive for 
export oriented and negative for inward looking. Poor domestic transport infrastructure harms 
market accessibility for horizontal FDI but has a weak positive and counter intuitive impact 
on vertical foreign producers 71. As expected, the market size variable is positive and 
statisticaIly significant for market seeking FDI. To capture market access, we interacted the 
market size variable with domestic transport costs and found that it is positive and significant 
71 This could also be attributed to the problems of using perception indicators in that they sometimes measure anything else 
different from what you want to proxy. 
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determinant of inward FDI. Controlling for market access, result in market size being 
insignificant but still positive. We also interacted market size with power outages and found 
the variable negative and significant. This suggest that, for inward FDI a huge market size in 
a country with electricity problems makes it difficult to service the market and discourages 
investment. Other infrastructure variables like average number of days to both import and 
export is negative but insignificant for inward FDI but positive for outward investment whilst 
number of days it takes to export is negative and significant for vertical FDI. Import clearing 
days are however negative but insignificant for outward FDI. Electricity problems have a 
generally negative and significant impact on the location of outward FDI but positive and 
significant for inward oriented foreign investors. This suggests that poor domestic electricity 
infrastructure encourages horizontal FDI but discourages vertical multinationals. As for 
telecommunications, this variable is negative and significant for market seeking FDI but 
positive and insignificant for vertical foreign investors. 
Controlling for internet connection in these FDI models shows that firms value using the 
internet to communicate with clients and suppliers both in the domestic market and for the 
purpose of exporting. This is true also for outward FDI where even the alternative 
telecommunication variable like number of hours/ days without a telephone connection is 
positive and insignificant. Water problems do not seem to matter much for inward FDI firms. 
The variable is negative but insignificant for inward FDI but results are mixed for outward 
investors. The negative effect supports the argument that water matters for production 
regardless of whether you are an exporting foreign firm or not. 
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Table 4.10: Ex ort oriented FDI 
Variablas 
Probit 
Modal 
(1) 
Dependent variables Fdi_export 
country dummies No 
Sector dummies Yes 
Market si z e 
F i rm size 
Labour quality 
Power outages (hrs ) 
Water prob l ems 
(hrs ) 
Te lephone probs 
(hrs ) 
Firm age 
unionisation 
Export clearing 
days 
Import clear i ng 
days 
Average customs 
clearing days 
LogFMA 
Internet connection 
Electricity index 
Telecommunication 
index 
Domestic Transport 
index 
Customs Reg Index 
Observations 
0 . 5674 
( 0 . 7 893 ) 
0.3297 
( 0 . 0966 ) *** 
-0.0218 
( 0.0351 ) 
-0.0079 
( 0.1103 ) 
-0.5189 
( 0.2979 ) * 
-0.3682 
( 0.2225 ) * 
0.0262 
( 0.2434 ) 
0 . 1908 
( 0 . 2387 ) 
-0.1231 
( 0.2738 ) 
201 
Probit Linear 
Modal Probability 
Model 
(2) (3) 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
o . 3738 
( 0.1488 ) ** 
-0 . 0552 
( 0 . 1555 ) 
0 . 1533 
( 0.1664 ) 
-0.2418 
( 0 . 5157 ) 
0.73ll 
( 0.4021 ) * 
0.9804 
( 0.5701 ) * 
0 . 4834 
( 0.3280 ) 
-0.2022 
( 0.3869 ) 
201 
0.3458 
( 0.8912 ) 
0.1016 
( 0.0380 ) *** 
- 0 . 0149 
( 0.0400 ) 
-0.0326 
( 0 . 0432 ) 
-0.0595 
( 0 . 1345 ) 
- 0 . 4841 
( 0 . 2037 ) ** 
- 0 .1910 
( 0 . 1042 ) * 
0 . 2633 
( 0 . 1415 ) * 
0.1322 
( 0.0869 ) 
-0.0529 
( 0.1036 ) 
201 
Absolute values of standard errors in parenthesis 
Probit 
Model 
Hours 
(4) 
Fdi_ export 
Yes 
Yes 
o .4 9 1 6 
( 0.1186 ) *** 
0.1795 
( 0 . 748 ) *** 
-0.3789 
( 0 . 1416 ) ** 
0 . 0 7 91 
( 0 . 0423 ) * 
0.0247 
( 0.0332 ) 
0 . 0608 
( 0.1345 ) 
-0.5667 
( 0.3741 ) 
-0.1935 
( 0.0245 ) ** 
-0. 1 467 
( 0 . 1031 ) 
-0.3366 
( 0 . 1721 ) * 
148 
Probit 
Model 
Days 
(5) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.4292 
( 0 . 1120 ) *** 
-0 . 2035 
( 0 . 0752 
-0.0042 
( 0.0959 ) 
-0.03127 
( 0.1599 ) * 
0 . 1232 
0.1659 ) 
0.0855 
( 0. 1 263 ) 
- 0 . 4635 
( 0 . 3655 ) 
0 . 1030 
( 0 . 0707 ) 
- 0. 4 574 
( 0.1296 ) ** 
0.8756 
( 0.3241 ) ** 
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*Significant at 10 % level; *** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level 
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Marginal 
Effects 
Using (4) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1733 
( 0 . 0418 ) *** 
0 . 0632 
( 0.0264 ) 
-0.1335 
( 0.0501 ) *** 
0 . 0279 
( 0 . 0150 ) * 
0 . 0087 
( 0.01l7 ) 
0.0215 
( 0.0474 ) 
o . 1944 
( 0 . 1237 ) 
0 . 0682 
( 0 . 0439 ) 
- 0.0517 
( 0.0364 ) 
-0 . 1179 
( 0 . 0616 ) * 
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Table 4.11: Market seekin FDI 
Variable. 
Dependent variables 
country dummies 
Sector dummies 
Firm size 
Labour quality 
Power outages (hrs ) 
Water problems (hrs ) 
Te l ephone probs (hrs ) 
Firm age 
unionisation 
Market size 
Internet connection 
Average customs 
clearing days 
Marketsize-power 
outages interaction 
Electricity index 
Telecommunication 
index 
Domestic Transport 
index 
Customs Reg Index 
Market size_ transport 
interaction 
Sectoral cif / fob 
logFMA 
Observations 
Probi t Modal 
(1) 
Fdi inward 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.3738 
( 0.1488 ) ** 
-0.0552 
( 0 . 1554 ) 
0.1532 
( 0.1664 ) 
0.2418 
( 0.5157 ) 
0 . 7538 
( 0.3779 ) * 
0.7311 
( 0.4021 ) * 
-0.9804 
( 0.5701 ) * 
- 0 . 4835 
( 0.3280 ) 
0.2022 
( 0.3869 ) 
0.36770 
( 0.1576 ) * 
2 01 
Li naar 
Probability 
Modal (2) 
Fdi inward 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1016 
( 0.380 ) ** * 
0.0149 
( 0.0400 ) 
0.0326 
( 0.0432 ) 
0.0595 
( 0.1345 ) 
0 . 5854 
(0 . 2163 ) * * 
0.1910 
( 0.1042 ) * 
0.2634 
( 0.1416 ) * 
-0.1322 
( 0.0869 ) 
0.0529 
( 0.1036 ) 
o .4841 
( 0.2303 ) * * 
201 
Absolute values of standard errors in parenthesis 
Probit Model 
Houra 
(3) 
Fdi inward 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.3207 
(0 . 0948 ) *** 
- 0 . 2013 
( 0.1322 ) 
0 . 1872 
( 0 . 1079 ) * 
- 0 . 0181 
( 0.0659 ) 
-0.0523 
( 0.1257 ) 
-0.0943 
( 0.1126 ) 
0.1840 
( 0 . 2969 ) 
0.3456 
( 0.0674 ) ** 
- 0.0429 
( 0 . 0437 ) 
o . 5740 
( 0.3415 ) * 
148 
Probi t Model 
Hours 
(4) 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.2936 
( 0.0976 ) *** 
-0.1496 
( 0.1731 ) 
4.3646 
( 2 . 2285 ) ** 
- 0.0189 
( 0 . 344 ) 
-0.0818 
0.0387 ) * * 
0 . 1224 
( 0.1211 ) 
0.1583 
( 0.3153 ) 
0 . 0101 
(1.1476 ) 
0 . 3556 
( 0.1541) * 
-0 . 0229 
( 0.0502 ) 
-0 . 283 2 
( 0.1459 ) * 
o . 1151 
( 0.0519 ) ** 
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*Significant at 10% lev el; *** significant at 1% level , ** significant at 5% level 
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Marginal 
a ff ecta 
(3) 
Yes 
Yes 
-0. 0 972 
( 0.0330 ) *** 
-0.0959 
( 0 . 0559 ) * 
0 . 0170 
( 0.0194 ) 
-0.0120 
( 0.0096 ) 
-0.0181 
( 0.0113 ) 
- 0.0276 
( 0.0384 ) 
0.0710 
( 0.0974 ) 
0.2812 
( 0 . 3038 ) 
-0.0118 
( 0.0147 ) 
0.2496 
( 0.1680 ) 
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4.7. Conclusions 
The primary objective of this chapter was to examine the role played by the quality of 
infrastructure and firm heterogeneity on probability of being foreign invested. Several model 
specifications such as 2SLS linear probability and probit models were used for tills purpose. 
We also differentiated FDI into export oriented and market seeking to see whether there are 
differences in the impacts of infrastructure on these two types of foreign investments. 
Results show that foreign investors are generally attracted to firms that are larger in size 
particularly multinationals that are export oriented. However it appears domestic oriented 
investors prefer firms that are small in size and this could be a way of them playing safe or 
being cautious particularly since the performance of their investment is heavily reliant on the 
performance of the economy that they are not too familiar with. There also exist a positive 
relationship between size and vertical FDI but the direction of causality is difficult to 
ascertain using our cross sectional data set. It also appears that firm age does not matter even 
though export oriented investors weakly prefer young firms whilst horizontal multinationals 
are weakly attracted to older firms. Labour quality and unionization appear to be less 
important in enhancing the probability of being foreign invested even for both types of 
foreign investment. Results generally show that foreign firms weakly prefer low skilled 
labour and are negatively affected by the unionization of labour. 
On location specific variables, it appears that foreign firms are attracted to a market bigger in 
size and that access to that market is also very important. However market size or market 
access appears to be also important for inward oriented multinationals but not vertical foreign 
producers as expected. These results also showed that a big market in an environment 
characterized by acute power problems negatively affects market seeking FDI. Customs 
problems generally have a weak negative effect on the probability to be foreign invested 
particularly inward FDI, but days to export matter to outward looking foreign producers. 
Power outages seem to have a strong negative impact on foreign multinationals and this is 
also true for export oriented FDI but there is a positive and significant impact on inward 
oriented FDI. Thus it appears that for horizontal multinational power problems probably act 
as a barrier attractive to multinationals interested in making monopoly profits. However for 
vertical multinationals power outages may affect productivity and this could impact on the 
competitiveness of their exports. Telephone problems do not seem to matter for outward FDI 
but have a negative and significant effect on inward FDI. The general significance of the 
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internet connection variable also suggest that good internet infrastructure which enables good 
internet connection is very important in attracting outward looking foreign direct investment 
Water problems do not seem to matter for FDI firms in this sample even though the variable 
has a negative and weak effect on market seeking foreign investors. Probably the ability of 
firms to drill boreholes to overcome water problems could be one of the reasons why the 
variable is insignificant. The statistics however show that about 33% of foreign invested 
firms have a borehole and about 36% of inward oriented FDI firms own a borehole compared 
to about 60% of outward looking foreign firms. Distance (proxy for international transport 
costs) from major exporting markets also appears to be important for outward oriented FDI 
firms and international costs measured using c.i.f. -f.o.b. ratio are positive and significant for 
horizontal multinationals. Thus foreign market access appear to be important for vertical 
multinationals but high international transport costs encourage inflows of market seeking 
foreign producers. These results basically show that although the impact of infrastructural 
variables vary depending on the type of foreign direct investment, they are very important in 
attracting FDI inflows. It is important therefore for governments to channel more resources or 
find alternative ways of improving their investment climates. 
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CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX: 
Table A4.1: list of variables 
Variables 
FIRM RELATED C HARACTERISTICS 
pexport 
any for 
firm size 
firm age 
unionisation 
FDI inward 
FDI_outward 
LOCA TION VARIABLES 
Foreign market access : (LogFMA) 
Market size 
Labour quality 
Water problem hours 
Power outage hours 
Telephone problem hours 
Export clearing days 
Import clearing days 
Customs clearing days 
Sectoral cif fob 
Infrastructure perceptions indicator 
TelecomlV 
TransportlV 
CustomslV 
electri lV 
COUNTRY DUMM IES 
dumtanzania 
dumuganda 
dumzambia 
dums_africa 
dums_mauritius 
SECTORAL DUMM IES 
Text il e_Garment 
Food _ agri cu lture 
Chemicalyharmacy 
Plapackaging 
Wood_furniture 
Construction metal 
Ddiaitioa 
Percentage exported by each firm 
Foreign ownership dummy= 1 if there is foreign ownership and 0 othern~se 
Internet dummy= I if firm ha internet or website 
Percentage amount that is foreign invested in each firm 
Dummy= 1 if workers in a firm belong to a un ion 
Dummy= I if anyfor == I and pexport==O 
Dummy =1 ifanyfor== 1 and pexport>O 
Measured using distan ce from nearest port to each country ' s trading 
partner 
Measured using GOP times proportion of city popul ati on in each country 
(proxy for market size) 
Measured by using labour fo rce with secondary and terti ary we ighted by 
proportion of the city populati on in each country 
Number of hours or days without water per day and month respective ly 
Number of hours or days without electri city per day and month 
respectively 
Number of hours or days per day and month without telephone connection 
Average number of days to export 
Average number of days to import 
Average number of days to export and import 
International transport costs measured using cif and fob data measured at 
sector level 
Used sector -regional averages 
A verage perception indicator calcul ated per sector in each city 
Average perception indicator calculated per sector in each city 
A verage perception indicator calcul ated per sector in each city 
Average perception indicator calculated over all firms per sector in each 
city 
Dummy= I if country is Tanzania 
Dummy= I if country is Uganda 
Dummy= I if country is Zambia 
Dummy=1 if country is South Africa 
Dummy=1 ifcountry is Mauritius 
Plastic, paper and packaging sectors 
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Fig A4.1 Kernel densities 
Density for FDI firms that export 
Kern e l den s ity estimate 
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Fig A4.2 FDI Structure at country level 
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Fig A4.3 Relationship between FDI and infrastructure problems in each country 
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Table A4.2: Pro bit Models usinl! different levels of FDI 
Variables 
country dummies 
Sector dummies 
Market size 
Firm size 
Labour quality 
Power outages (days) 
Water problems (days) 
Telephone prob (days) 
Firm age 
unionisation 
Export clearing days 
Import clearing days 
LogFMA 
Power outages (hrs) 
Water problems (hrs) 
Telephone probs (hrs) 
Observations 
[10% -49%1 
Days 
(3) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.24285 
(0.43845) 
0.25331 
(0.09380)*** 
0.02726 
(0.09911) 
0.05978 
(0.12917) 
0.16709 
(0.12519) 
-0.06644 
(0.19982) 
0.10537 
(0.11019) 
-0.61612 
(0.28650) ** 
-0.04113 
(0.03420) 
0.11325 
(0.04652) ** 
0.11034 
(0.91012) 
725 
[10% -49%1 
Hours 
(4) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.35192 
(0.48037) 
0.25419 
(0.09780)*** 
-0.01663 
(0.10777) 
0.06163 
(0.11117)*** 
- 0.54456 
(0.29511)* 
-00284 
(0.04225)** 
0.05074 
(0.05869) 
0.44118 
(0.89537) 
-0.04251 
(0.07829) 
-0.00084 
(0.02529)** 
0.00491 
(0.02095) ** 
644 
[50% - 100%1 
Days 
(1) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.12135 
(0.26727) 
0.37587 
(0.51530)*** 
0.02606 
(0.05771) 
-0.04783 
(0.04726) 
0.11369 
(0.06831)* 
0.16821 
(0.06819)** 
-0.22332 
(0.05969)*** 
0.14781 
(0.16379) 
-0.02199 
(0.01956) 
0.04215 
(0.02493)* 
0.21910 
(0.43183) 
725 
[50% - 100%1 
Hours 
(2) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.028033 
(0.29743) 
0.36268 
(0.05315)*** 
0.02279 
(0.06137) 
-0.21004 
(0.06147)*** 
0.10582 
(0.17015) 
0.00105 
(0.02364) 
-0.01788 
(0.03071) 
0.52962 
(0.51142) 
0.08266 
(0.04211)** 
0.01212 
(0.01251) 
- 00146 
(0.01055) 
670 
100% 
Days 
(5) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.28439 
(0.32669) 
0.28916 
(0.05452)*** 
-0.01986 
(0.06806) 
-0.05789 
(0.05321) 
0.15099 
(0.07660)** 
0.16514 
(0.07543) ** 
-0.20432 
(0.06339)*** 
0.08807 
(0.17957) 
- 0.44440 
(0.22604)** 
0.03634 
(0.02812) 
0.30534 
(0.54035) 
725 
100% 
Hours 
(4) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.28440 
(0.34913) 
0.28114 
(0.05571) *** 
-0.03486 
(0.07097) 
-0.19842 
(0.06514)*** 
0.05056 
(0.18498) 
-0.01705 
(0.02749) 
-0.02628 
(0.03635) 
0.65560 
(0.57098) 
-0.04936 
(0.04201) 
0.00515 
(0.01269) 
-0.00728 
(0.01095) 
670 
Absolute values of standard errors in parenthesis, *Significant at 10% level; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level 
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CHAPTERS 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusions 
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the role that is played by the quality of 
infrastructure on export participation and on foreign direct investment using firm level data 
gathered by the World Bank through their investment climate surveys done in five Sub 
Saharan African countries. In addition to contributing to the ongoing debate on the role of 
infrastructure on economic development, this study also introduces a different dimension to 
the analysis of these variables by using firm level data. Thus most studies so far have 
concentrated much on country level data despite the fact that decisions to invest and export 
are made at firm level. 
Although descriptive statistics show that exporting firms are older, larger in size, are more 
attractive to foreign investors, uses internet and rate infrastructural constraints more than non 
exporters, results from regressions are somehow mixed and the impact of these supply side 
constraints appear to vary from sector to sector as well as from country to country. The 
statistical significance of firm specific variables like size, foreign ownership and internet 
access confirm a number of literature findings (Clarke 2004 who looked at 8 SSA countries, 
Clerides et al (\998) who looked at Columbia, Mexico and Morocco, Grenier et al (\999) for 
Tanzania, Bigstern et al (2004), Soderborm and Teal (2003) for Sub-Saharan African; 
countries Bigstern et aI, 2000; Tybout and Westbrook, \995; Bernard and Jansen, \995). This 
therefore means that governments must remove measures that restrict firm growth, create an 
environment that promotes productivity and is attractive to foreign investors as well as design 
policies that improve internet accessibility. 
The significance of the international distance, electricity, customs and electricity- generator 
ownership interaction variables means that infrastructure and distance matter in influencing 
export participation. Thus the reason why very few firms in Africa are outward oriented is 
partly because of poor market access and poor electricity and customs infrastructure. 
For foreign direct investment, results show that outward oriented foreign investors are 
generally attracted to firms that are larger in size compared to horizontal FDI firms. It also 
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appears that firm age does not matter even though export oriented investors weakly prefer 
young firms whilst horizontal multinationals are weakly attracted to older firms. Labour 
quality and unionization appear to be less important in enhancing the probability of being 
foreign invested even for both types of foreign investment. Results generally show that 
foreign firms weakly prefer low skilled labour and are negatively affected by the unionization 
oflabour. 
On location specific variables, it appears that foreign firms are attracted to a market bigger in 
size and that access to that market is also very important. However market size or domestic 
market access appears to be also important for inward oriented multinationals but not vertical 
foreign producers as expected. These results also show that a big market in an environment 
characterized by acute power problems negatively affects market seeking FDI. Customs 
problems generally have a weak negative effect on the probability to be foreign invested 
particularly inward FDI, but days to export matter to outward looking foreign producers. It 
also appears that for horizontal multinational power problems probably act as a barrier 
attractive to multinationals interested in making monopoly profits. This is because power 
outages have a positive and significant impact on inward oriented FDI. However for vertical 
multinationals, negative significance implies that power outages may adversely affect 
productivity and this could impact on the competitiveness of their exports. The general 
significance of the internet connection variable also suggest that good internet infrastructure 
which enables good internet connection is very important in attracting outward and inward 
looking foreign direct investment. Water problems do not seem to matter for FDI firms in this 
sample even though the variable has a negative and weak effect on market seeking foreign 
investors. Probably the ability of firms to drill boreholes and thus overcome water problems 
could be one of the reasons why the variable is insignificant. These results also show that 
foreign market access appear to be important for vertical multinationals but high international 
transport costs encourage inflows of market seeking foreign producers. 
Generally results from estimated regressions support the common finding in the literature that 
infrastructure is very important for investment and exporting but the level of significance 
vary across products and also depend on the direction of investment (inward or export 
oriented). Thus generally, the quality of infrastructure is critical to any development process 
and from the results, it appears investment and trade cannot occur without good power 
sources as well as functional roads, transportation and efficient customs systems. The 
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importance of good infrastructure is even more pronounced now because globalization and 
liberalization initiatives have increased the extent of interdependence among world 
economies. Therefore it will be increasingly difficult for Africa to remain competitive in the 
global market if its infrastructure systems continue to be sub-standard and underperforming. 
Current infrastructural problems imply that the continent's competitiveness in the global 
economy requires a complete overhaul. It is important therefore for governments to channel 
more resources or find alternative ways of improving investment climates in their respective 
countries. 
Inefficient infrastructure systems pose high economic and opportunity cost to Africa. This is 
not just to the producer or consumer in terms of a higher economic price and additional 
investment required to alleviate the problems of inadequate infrastructure, but higher costs in 
form of lost jobs, incomes, improved standards of living of the Africans as well as lost 
opportunities to expand investment and therefore markets (Simuyemba, 2000). According to 
Hummels (2007), freight costs are a far more restrictive barrier to African exports than tariffs 
and reducing transport costs would not only lead to improved competitiveness in the 
international market place, but would also result in lower input, production and consumer 
costs and ultimately to better economic performance of African economies. According to 
Simuyemba (2000), as long as Africa continues to export primary commodities and source its 
raw materials from outside Africa, Africa's transportation systems will remain "outward 
oriented and sea bound" rather than "inward oriented and hinterland bound." For the current 
trend to be reversed and intra regional trade to be improved, Africa's industrial and trade 
patterns must undergo dramatic transformation. 
5.2 Recommendations 
In light of these results, it is important therefore for African governments with the help of the 
private sector, international organizations to channel more resources or find alternative ways 
of boosting infrastructural investment. This could be through a number of variants of private 
- public sector programmes like Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT). Proponents of aid 
for trade under the World Trade Organization's Doha Rounds, United Nations through the 
Almaty treaty72, the World Bank etc, have shown an increasing interest in addressing these 
72 Thus the Almaty Programme of Action initiated by United Nations deals with infrastructure development and 
maintenance. transit policy issues and trade facilitation measures in mostly landlocked developing countries. 
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supply side infrastructural constraints faced by developing countries so as to foster their 
integration into the global economy. If these efforts are complemented by African 
governments and funds utilized properly, infrastructure inadequacies in the continent would 
eventually be improved. 
Public Private Partnership programs (PPPs) are the most vibrant, visible and competitive 
example of private sector participation in regional infrastructure operations in Africa 
(Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2008). These are a combination of public needs with 
private capability and resources to create a market opportunity through which the public need 
is met and a profit is made (UNECA, 2005). The advantage of these programmes is that they 
transfer the financial and skills burden of these infrastructure projects from the government to 
the private sector. Thus the main objective of PPPs is to ensure the delivery of public 
infrastructure and services cost effectively by leveraging private sector expertise and 
innovation. This method does not substitute but complement other public service delivery 
methods and these PPPs differ by the extent of the risk that each party assumes in the project. 
(For an elaborate spectrum of types ofPPPs, see fig A5.l appendix). 
Public Private Partnership programs are not about privatisation but about delegating delivery 
of certain public service outputs to the private sector where a more cost effective solution can 
be offered. The high start up costs associated with infrastructural projects are paid by private 
investors and this act as an incentive for them to ensure that the infrastructure project gets 
built on time, and that it is maintained to an agreed standard over the full working life of an 
asset. Thus for countries without access to international capital markets and without 
developed local bond markets, a feature characteristic of many African countries, PPPs are 
the only remaining method to get infrastructure projects built now. 
Thus PPP arrangements can accelerate the pace and scale at which investments are made in 
public infrastructure in Africa and besides getting value for money from these arrangements, 
governments can also benefit through building new capacity, new skills and new ways of 
doing business. PPPs also present an alternative by which current public service performance 
can be compared and also leave a legacy of change in the way infrastructure assets and 
services are delivered. However this move from conventional procurement to PPPs requires 
strong political commitment; long term political stability; transparent and predictable 
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regulations; institutional reforms; capacity to design, contract and regulate private sector 
participation; quality control; strong financial markets and a competitive private sector as 
well as access to long term financing (lCA, 2008). It is therefore important for governments 
in many of these African countries to work towards meeting some of these requirements so 
that the private sector can participate effectively in infrastructural development. 
Results of FDI and exporting have also shown that poor customs facilitation is also the 
biggest constraint to trade in Africa. This could be because of the use of systems that are not 
streamlined and harmonized across countries, multiplicity of documentation and procedures, 
different nomenclatures that are not standardized or harmonized, poor customs practices, 
corruption practices as well as inadequate physical facilities or equipment (UNCT AD, 2008). 
The adoption of the UN custom designed customs software called Automated System for 
Customs Data (ASYCUDA) by many countries in West Africa is also helping in harmonising 
and streamlining customs procedures in these countries and this is one avenue that other 
African countries could follow or adopt to improve customs efficiency at their borders. 
ASYCUDA is a computerized customs management system which covers most foreign trade 
procedures and it accelerates customs clearance by simplifying clearance through 
computerization (UNCT AD, 2008). This cuts costs for businesses and shortens the time it 
takes to process goods. Governments gain from improved control of customs, increased 
revenue and availability of reliable and timely statistical information. Thus regional 
agreements intended to promote trade in Africa such as the proposed COMESA and SADC 
Free Trade Areas will have limited impact if cross-border trade facilitation is not improved. 
As long as Africa continues to operate as small discrete markets each with its own systems, 
rules and regulations, regional integration will not achieve the desired results and benefits for 
Africa (UNECA, 2008). 
The 2008 Commission for Africa report also states that for southern Africa, studies have 
shown that delays at major border posts cost the region about US$60 million annually. This is 
an additional cost to business and to the economy. Introduction of a computerized customs 
system that is regionally linked would greatly improve cross-border facilitation. Such systems 
like ASYCUDA would, provided there was concurrence by governments, result in shorter 
transit time through quick clearance of goods. 
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Finally, Africa's population is predominantly rural. Of Africa's 750 million people, 63 
percent are in the rural areas, 37 percent live in the urban areas and only II countries have 
urban populations of 50 percent or more (UNECA, 2005). Another characteristic is that 
African countries are small both in terms of population and economic size or income levels. 
This has implications on the pattern and nature of African infrastructure development. There 
are three fundamental principles that determine private sector participation in any economy. 
The first is the political will and ideology to embrace private participation. The second is 
putting in place the macro-economic environment and policy framework to support private 
sector participation and the third is market size to support investment and high volume of 
exports. Integration of these African markets through free trade and the formation of regional 
infrastructural arrangements can also boost investment and trade in the region. Thus the 
ultimate objective for Africa should be to create a single market of 750 million people that is 
competitive within itself and within the global economy and this can be facilitated by 
regional infrastructure integration and development across the continent. 
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CHAPTER 5: APPENDIX SECTION 
Fig A5.1: PPP Spectrum 
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Source : Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2008 
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